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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue One. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the 2002 Amended 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions governing the Development was 
void ab initio. (Issue preserved: R. at 741/18.)1 
Standard of Review. Questions of interpretation of a restrictive covenant not 
requiring resort to extrinsic evidence is a matter of law, reviewed for correctness. View 
Condominium Owners Ass }n v. MSICO, LLC, 2005 UT 91, \ 17,127 P.3d 697. 
Whether a trial court correctly defined and interpreted Utah common law is a question of 
law, reviewed for correctness. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, \ 11, 154 P.3d 808. Whether 
a provision of a restrictive covenant is severable is a question of intent, which is a 
question of law if the intent can be derived from the written contract. Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1980),, 
Issue Two. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Sky Ranch's claim for 
1. In reviewing the record index, it has come to Sky Ranch's attention that several 
record documents are only indexed on their first pages. In order to provide pinpoint 
record citations and to avoid confusion with page spans and line numbers, Sky Ranch 
will use a slash ("/") between the index number of the first page of the document and the 
pinpoint page of that document. For example, "R. at 741/18" refers to page 18 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which are listed in the document index as 
beginning on page 741 of the record. 
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tortious interference with business advantage, notwithstanding the fact that the claim was 
never submitted for decision and the trial court had agreed to hear more evidence on the 
issue. (Issue preserved: R. at 742/2-3.) 
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
without a hearing is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Price v. Armour, 949 
P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997). A trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, % 10, 235 P.3d 730. 
Issue Three. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Sky Ranch was not 
entitled to termination of the lease or damages. (Issue preserved: R. at 741/16.) 
Standard of Review. Whether a party is required to comply strictly or merely 
substantially with a contractual provision is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998). Whether a party complied with a 
contractual provision is a question of fact, reviewed for clear error. Saunders v. Sharp, 
793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah App. 1990). Whether the trial court correctly interpreted a 
contract is a question of law. Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 387, f 6, 223 P.3d 484. 
Whether the trial court correctly applied the equitable estoppel doctrine is a mixed 
question of law and fact. Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2008 UT App 282, f 
11, 191 P.3d 814. 
Issue Four. Whether the trial court erred when it held that the amounts held in 
escrow constituted "payment in full under the lease through December 31, 2010," 
notwithstanding the fact that the issue was never raised in either party's pleadings and no 
evidence was ever presented at trial that would allow the court to make that finding. 
(Issue preserved: R. at 742/3-4.) 
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Standard of Review. Whether an issue was properly before the trial court presents 
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Lee v. Sanders, 2002 UT App 281, ^  
7, 55 P3d 1127. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions whose interpretation is central to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Landowners Association (hereinafter 
"Association") filed suit on June 11,2003, asking, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment 
against Defendants Grassy Meadows Airport Inc., Sky Ranch Development Inc., and 
Michael Longley (collectively "Sky Ranch"). (R. at 1.) Sky Ranch filed a counterclaim, 
seeking damages and injunctive relief for breach of lease and unlawful interference with 
economic relations. (R. at 7.) After a long period of litigation, motions and preparation, a 
trial was held in this matter on April 19-20, 2010 before Judge G. Rand Beacham. (R. at 
754-755.) 
After hearing the trial evidence, the trial court issued written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on August 6, 2010. (R. at 741.) The Association submitted a 
proposed final judgment on August 30 2010, granting declaratory judgment for the 
Association, denying Sky Ranch's claims of breach of lease and unlawful interference 
with economic relations to the trial court, and ordering that the amounts held in the 
court's escrow account should be released to Sky Ranch as payment in full under the 
lease. (R. at 746.) Sky Ranch filed a written objection to the proposed judgment on 
September 3, 2010, arguing that the unlawful interference claim had never been 
submitted for decision, and that there was no evidence taken to determine that the amount 
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in escrow represented the full amount owed to Sky Ranch under the lease agreement. (R. 
at 742.) The Association filed a written response to Sky Ranch's objection on September 
7, 2010. (R. at 743.) Without addressing Sky Ranch's objections, the trial court entered 
the final judgment as submitted by the Association on October 20, 2010. (R. at 746.) Sky 
Ranch filed a Notice of Appeal on November 17,2010. (R. at 747.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Sky Ranch began to develop Grassy Meadows Sky 
Ranch (Development or Community), a planned community in Hurricane, Utah. (R. at 
741/2.) The premise behind the Development was to create a community of private 
aviators who could enjoy their love of flying from their homes. (Id.) To that end, Sky 
Ranch constructed Grassy Meadows Airport next to the Development. (Id.) 
I THE 2002 CC&RS 
In 1984, Sky Ranch created and recorded CC&Rs to govern the Development. 
These CC&Rs were superseded by an Amended Declaration of CC&Rs in 1990 ("1990 
CC&Rs"). (R. at 741/4.) The 1990 CC&Rs provided that Sky Ranch had the authority to 
unilaterally amend the CC&Rs until 2005, or until the Community was fully developed 
and 80% of the total lots were sold. (Ex. 5 §§ XI.2 & .4, XII.3.)2 The 1990 CC&Rs 
specified that the Development was limited to 150 lots. (Id.) The 1990 CC&Rs also stated 
that the developer could unilaterally amend to more accurately express the intent of any 
provision in the 1990 CC&Rs, to better insure the workability of the arrangement 
contemplated in the 1990 CC&Rs, and to facilitate the integration of additional tracts into 
2. For ease of reference, the trial exhibit binder (R. at 375a) will be cited to as Ex. 
(with a capital E) followed by the number on the tab of the exhibit. 
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the Development. (Id.) 
In approximately June 2002,75 of the 92 lots platted in the Community had been 
sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the Community to 81.5 percent. (R. at 741/4.) In 
September 2002, the Association alleged in a letter to Sky Ranch that its right to 
unilaterally amend the 1990 CC&Rs had terminated. (Id.) However, Sky Ranch disagreed 
with the Association's interpretation of the amendment provisions of the 1990 CC&Rs 
and filed amended CC&Rs in October 2002 ("2002 CC&Rs"). (R. at 741/5; Ex. 6.) 
The Association disagreed with several of the amendments set forth in the 2002 
CC&Rs, and so sued to nullify them. The trial court determined that the 1990 CC&Rs 
were ambiguous as to when Sky Ranch's power to unilaterally amend terminated, and so 
construed them against Sky Ranch as the drafter, nullifying the CC&Rs. (R. at 741/18-
19.) The trial court also ruled that the 2002 CC&Rs impermissibly went beyond the 
purposes allowed for in the 1990 CC&Rs and in Utah common law. (Id.) 
II. T H E F B O 
When Sky Ranch platted Phase I of Sky Ranch, it left an eight-acre parcel of land 
to the west of the runway. (Tr.l 41:11-24; Ex. 8.)3 The 1990 CC&Rs reserved to Sky 
Ranch the authority to use that eight acres of land 
to conduct collateral, commercial business activity on the Project, 
including, but not limited to, conducting fixed base operations for the 
fueling and maintenance of aircraft and purposes incident thereto, 
construction and maintenance of aircraft and purposes incident thereto, 
construction and sale or leasing of aircraft hangar space, scenic air tour 
services and light manufacturing. 
3. For ease of reference, the trial transcripts of April 19th (R. at 754) and 20th (R. at 
755) will be referred to as Tr.l and Tr.2 respectively. 
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(Ex. 5 at 20.) At trial, Mr. Longley testified that in 1994, pursuant to the provisions of the 
1990 CC&Rs, the Association signed an agreement regarding developing the Fixed Base 
of Operations ("FBO") and other commercial operations at the Development that 
provided for related commercial activities such as food service, lodging, and a gas 
station. (Tr.l 103:19-104:12, 105:10-107:15, 109:4-110:25, 122:24-126:3.) Three water 
shares were given to the Association in consideration of this agreement. (Ex. 22 at 1.) 
This evidence was not contradicted at trial. 
Notwithstanding this agreement and the 1990 CC&Rs, in 2001, Ray Batson and 
Gary Jubber appeared before the Washington County Planning Commission on behalf of 
the Association for the purpose of persuading the Commission to reject Sky Ranch's 
request for a zone change that would have allowed it to develop the FBO. (Dep. Batson 
30-36.)4 Washington County denied Sky Ranch's zoning change request. (R. at 489/14.) 
Based on these facts, Sky Ranch brought a claim against the Association for breach of 
contract and tortious interference with business relations in its counterclaim. (R. at 
489/12-16.)5 
The matter was set for a four-day trial beginning April 19, 2010. (R. at 692; 699.) 
One week before the trial was to begin, the trial was shortened to two days. (Docket entry 
4. For ease of reference, Sky Ranch will refer to the testimony submitted into 
evidence by means of deposition (R. at 702, 734, 736, 737) as "Dep." followed by the 
person's last name and the page number of the deposition transcript. Any references to 
exhibits appended to these depositions will be designated by a lowercase "ex." 
5. Despite the characterization of the cause of action as "tortious interference," Sky 
Ranch's counterclaim alleged that the Association's duty not to interfere was established 
by contract. (R. at 489/12-16.) While the cause of action may be more appropriately 
classified as breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Longley will 
continue to refer to the claim as "tortious interference" for the sake of consistency. 
fs 
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of 4/12/2010; Tr.l 20:24-21:2.) As the trial progressed, it became obvious to Sky Ranch's 
counsel that they would not be able to fully cover the tortious interference claim. Sky 
Ranch's counsel requested that the court hear evidence on this issue on a later date, which 
the Court agreed to do. (Tr.2 at 170:6-171:10.) 
Notwithstanding this agreement, and without giving Sky Ranch notice or an 
opportunity to respond, the trial court ruled upon the issue of tortious interference in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding that the Association "had no 
contractual obligation not to oppose Mr. Longley's effort not to oppose zoning 
changes . . . and because they are immune from liability for petitioning the government in 
any event, there is no basis to hold the Association liable for tortious interference in this 
case." (R. at 741/22.) The trial court further held that any agreement "not to resist zoning 
changes adverse to the Association" would be "void as being inconsistent with the board 
member's fiduciary duties." (R. at 741/22 n.5.) 
The Association later submitted a proposed judgment in its favor with respect to 
the issue of tortious interference, which included a footnote stating that 
prior to adjourning the trial, Defendants had been unable to establish any 
contractual obligation on behalf of Plaintiff that could form the basis of a 
tortious interference claim. Specifically, the only evidence Defendants had 
introduced was an unsigned contract with proposed modifications 
handwritten on it.[] After further reviewing the tortious interference claim, 
however, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff cannot be held liable 
regardless of what additional evidence may be presented because of 
Plaintiffs constitutional right to petition the government.... 
(R. at 746/2 n.l.) Sky Ranch objected to the proposed judgment, stating that (1) 
the tortious interference claim was never submitted for the decision of the trial court, (2) 
the statement in the judgment that "the only evidence Defendants had introduced was an 
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unsigned contract with proposed modifications handwritten on it" was a new finding that 
was never made by the trial court, and one that should not have been made considering 
that Sky Ranch had not had the opportunity to present all of its evidence, and (3) Sky 
Ranch never had an opportunity to brief or argue against the conclusion that the 
Association's right to petition superseded any contractual obligations that it may have 
had. (R. at 742/2-3.) The trial court entered the judgment as submitted by the Association 
without addressing Sky Ranch's objections. (R. at 746.) 
III. THE AIRPORT LEASE 
The Airport is privately owned by Defendant Grassy Meadows Airport Inc. and 
was leased to Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Owners Association pursuant to a lease 
agreement dated November 25, 1990. (Ex. 1.) The Lease required the Association to 
maintain the airstrip and its facilities in the same or better condition, normal 
wear and tear excepted, as when received from Lessor, including but not 
limited to performing the following duties in connection therewith: paint, 
level, compact, remove weeds, repair and oil the surface covering the 
airstrip . . . maintain, replace and repair any runway lighting system, 
beacon, and equipment associated therewith. 
(Id. ]f 8.) The Airport Lease also required the Association to 
provide all risk liability insurance as is commonly provided for private 
airports, which shall show Lessor and Sky Ranch Development, Inc. as 
additional insureds. The limit of liability coverage shall be set by mutual 
agreement, and the policy shall be subject to the reasonable approval of 
lessor. 
(Id. U 10.) The Lease provided that Sky Ranch could terminate the lease if the 
Association did not comply with a written notice to cure within 30 days. (Id. f 4.) 
After a long battle to try to get the Association to maintain the runway and 
associated facilities as per the Lease, Sky Ranch caused a written notice of default to be 
£ 
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delivered to the Association on March 31,2003, which identified the Association's 
breaches. (Ex. 2.) 
The Association replied in a letter, denying that they were in breach of the Lease 
and sending an insurance declaration showing that Grassy Meadows Airport was an 
additional insured on their policy. (Ex. 3.) The Association did some weed cleanup and 
replaced burned-out light bulbs on the runway, but did nothing else to cure their default. 
(Dep. Batson 25-27.) Sky Ranch sent a final notice of termination on May 5, 2003. Sky 
Ranch took possession of the airstrip and did inspections and maintenance work in the 
amount of $12,000.00. (Tr.2 21:16-22:20.) Thereafter, Sky Ranch allowed the 
Association to resume use of the airstrip pending resolution of the dispute. (Ex. 40.) 
At trial, the following evidence was presented regarding breaches of the lease 
agreement:6 
The Runway. An inspection done was done by Wayne Rogers of Applied 
Geotechnical Engineering Consultants on May 2, 2003 and May 19, 2003. Mr. Rogers 
testified at trial as an expert witness. (Tr.2 69:14-16.)7 He found significant cracking of 
the runway asphalt and weeds growing in the cracks. (Tr.2 71:2-25.) Because of the age 
of the asphalt, sealing cracks and oiling the runway was not sufficient maintenance at this 
time—the runway required repaying soon, or it would start to deteriorate rapidly. (Tr.2 
71:23-72:7.) Mr. Rogers also found that the crack sealant put on the runway was quite 
6. The following evidence is in favor of Sky Ranch's position. Evidence supporting 
the trial court's decision will be discussed in the argument portion as required by Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). 
7. A summary of Mr. Rogers' inspection is in the record as Exhibit 35. 
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thick, to the point where he could feel bumps as he drove down the runway in a car.8 
(Tr.2 72:8-73:3.) He concluded that this was a safety concern for light airplanes, and was 
urgent enough that it should be addressed as soon as possible. (Tr.2 73:4-13; see also 
Dep. Dubusschere 39-42, 98-99.) Mr. Rogers observed that there were drainage problems 
on and around the runway, including culverts that had not been properly maintained and 
so not draining, and a depression that had allowed water to pool on the runway. (Tr.2 
73:25-74:8.) He recommended that the culverts be cleaned and that the depression needed 
to be patched at a minimum. (Tr.2 74:9-20.) He could not tell how long it had been since 
the drainage system had been taken care of but it was not recent. (Tr.2 74:25-75:6.) 
Also, Mr. Longley testified that he had sent a letter to a member of the Association 
on February 27,2003, asking them to maintain the runway, and specifically to "develop a 
runway maintenance program that includes short term and long term maintenance, 
overlay, and other pertinent details for [the] runway/taxiway." (Tr.l 212:13-213:3; Ex. 
39.) In the letter, Mr. Longley offered to waive lease payments if the runway was repaved 
by 2006. (Tr.l 214:22-25.) The Association did not accept this offer. (Tr.l 215:2-4.) 
The Airport Lighting System. Ryan Christensen inspected the runway lighting 
system on September 19, 2003. (Tr.l 179:10-17.) He observed that the runway light 
system was in poor condition. (Tr.l 186:16-22.) The clear lenses of the runway lights had 
been sandblasted and looked like frosted glass, and the inside of the lenses and the bulbs 
were covered with dust and spiderwebs. (Tr.l 189:1-190:4.) This was a problem, as it 
obstructed the light and dimmed the runway lights. (Tr.l 190:5-8.) Several of the fixtures 
were broken off at the base plate, the transformers were generally buried in the dirt, and 
8. The effect would have been worse for an airplane, as it lacks a suspension. 
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the insulation of the wires was brittle and would come off if the wires were moved. (Tr.l 
181:13-25; Ex. 34.) There were rodent nests, dead mice and massive amounts of dirt in 
the voltage control panels, and evidence of mice chewing on the wires. (Tr.l 182:1-10.) 
The taxiway lights did not work at all, and many were broken and lying on the ground. 
(Tr.l 182:12, 183:1-5,188:15-22; Ex. 34.) This was dangerous, as without taxiway lights 
there was a good probability of taxiing off the runway. (Tr.l 193:22-194:8.) The lighting 
control building was covered in an inch of dirt and mud, and the spare parts inside were 
not maintained. (Tr.l 182:13-21, 186:23-187:14; Ex. 34.) Further, because the antenna 
was put on the outside of the lighting control building, and its wire threaded through a 
hole in the roof, rainwater could leak through the roof and follow the wire right into the 
voltage control box. (Ex. 34.) Because the lighting control building houses the controls of 
the lighting system, it was important that it be maintained. (Tr.l 187:15-188:14.) Mr. 
Christensen testified that he saw no signs of recent maintenance done on the lights or the 
control building. (Tr.l at 191:8-10.) 
Mr. Longley testified that the lighting system was unchanged from May 3, 2003 to 
the date that Mr. Christensen did his inspection. (Tr.l 219:2-21.) The records of the 
Association do not indicate any expenditures for the maintenance of lights between 1998 
and the end of the cure period. (Dep. Habberfield 21 & ex. 2). 
Weed control and Fencing. On June 11, shortly after the cure period had ended, 
Michael Longley went onto the property and took pictures of the weeds around the 
runway. (Tr.2 14-20; Ex. 25-33.) He noted that it looked like someone had attempted to 
scrape some weeds out with a tractor, but a lot of weeds were left, and that was generally 
the condition of the property during the cure period. (Tr.2 16:20-17:21.) He was 
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concerned about the weeds for aesthetic reasons, and testified that the weeds made it 
harder for him to sell properties in the Development. (Tr.2 13:21-14:10.) He was also 
concerned at the lack of maintenance of the wooden fence surrounding the airstrip—the 
Association would not oil or seal it, and often let broken fences just sit. (Tr.2 21:10-14; 
Ex. 41.) Other evidence introduced at trial indicated that the weeds were not well 
maintained and were a continual problem in the time leading up to the termination of the 
lease. (Dep. W. Rieck 17-19; Dep. F. Rieck 15, 28-29; Dep. Debusschere 19-20; Dep. 
Berg 23.) Further, William Rieck testified that lodgepole pine must be oiled to extend its 
life and preserve it, (Dep. W. Rieck 26-29) and Jesse Debusshere testified that 
maintenance of the fencing had been a problem in the past. (Dep. Debusschere 30.) 
Insurance. The evidence at trial was that Sky Ranch had not received any notice 
of insurance for the five or six years previous to the notice of default, and the Association 
had never consulted with Sky Ranch as they were required to under the lease. (Tr.2 
28:23-29:23.) While the Association's attorney had sent Sky Ranch a proof of insurance 
for Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., it did not send a copy of the policy or proof of 
insurance for Sky Ranch Development. (Ex. 3.) Sky Ranch later learned that the 
Association had allowed the Airport Liability policy to lapse from December 1, 2000 to 
May 3, 2002. (Dep. ATP 61-62.) While Grassy Meadows Airport was named an 
additional insured from May 3, 2002, Sky Ranch Development was not added as an 
additional insured until February 11, 2004. {Id. at 107-08; Tr.2 32:21-23.) Apparently, the 
naming of additional insured was backdated to May 3, 2003 by the insurance company. 
(Ex. 15.) 
Trial Court's Ruling. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial 
10 
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court held that the Association was entitled to take advantage of the doctrine of 
substantial compliance, (R. at 741/23) and found that the Association substantially 
complied with the terms of the Airport Lease, stating that 
although maintenance issues arose from time to time, including at the time 
the time the Notice of Termination was sent, such maintenance items fall 
within what would reasonably expected as normal wear and tear of 
improvements on real property of this type. Nevertheless, the Airport was 
always in reasonably good working order and condition. 
(Id. at 9-10.) The trial court further held that because Sky Ranch did not present evidence 
that it had complied with the notice requirements of the lease, and the notice of default 
was not specific enough about the breaches that needed curing, Sky Ranch could not seek 
termination as a remedy. (Id. at 22.) Finally, the trial court held that Sky Ranch was 
equitably estopped from terminating the lease. (Id. at 24.) 
IV. MONEY HELD IN ESCROW 
The Airport Lease Agreement provided that rent would be paid to Sky Ranch 
semi-annually, and that the amount of rent would be $7.50 per month for each residential 
lot in the Development, and $30.00 for each commercial lot, excepting lots owned by Sky 
Ranch. (Ex. 1 at 3.) As the lease was for 99 years, the amounts adjusted annually for 
inflation based on the Consumer Price Index for southwestern Utah. (Ex. 1 at 4.) 
After Sky Ranch terminated the Airport Lease, it refused to take lease payments 
from the Association; leading the Association to seek an order establishing an interest-
bearing escrow account for the funds. (R. at 88/2.) Sky Ranch stipulated to the 
Association's motion, and the trial court ordered "that Plaintiff be allowed to deposit the 
amounts owed and that Plaintiff alleges will become due under the lease directly to the 
Fifth District Court." (R. at 154/2.) Thereafter, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
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Lease agreement that the iunds should be paid semi-annually, the Association submitted 
funds to the Court at various times and in varying amounts. (See, e.g., Docket entries of 
7/20/2004; 12/15/2004; 9/26/2005; 10/26/2006; 5/21/2007; 5/15/2008; 8/18/2009.) 
Neither party requested an accounting or determination of what amounts were owing 
under the lease in their pleadings. (R. at 211; 219; 489.) Also, there was no evidence put 
on at any time as to whether the amounts deposited with the court were lull and complete. 
When the Association submitted its proposed judgment, it included a provision 
saying that "all monies currently held by the Court in escrow shall be released to 
Defendant.... All monies so released shall be applied as rent paid in full under the lease 
through December 31, 2010." (R. at 746/3 (emphasis added).) Sky Ranch objected to this 
provision, stating that there had never been an accounting of the amounts owed under the 
lease or any other evidentiary foundation for the trial court to make such a decision. (R. at 
742/4.) The trial court entered the judgment as submitted by the Association without 
addressing Sky Ranch's objections. (R. at 746.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should overturn the trial court's rulings in this matter because (I) the 
1990 CC&Rs unambiguously gave Sky Ranch the ability to make amendments to the 
CC&Rs, and those amendments were within the scope of Sky Ranch's power to amend; 
(II) an individual's First Amendment right to petition the government can be restricted by 
entering into private contracts; (III) the trial court's conclusion that there was no material 
breach of the Airport Lease was against the great weight of the evidence; and (IV) the 
trial court had no authority to rule on an issue that was never pleaded by either party. 
ARGUMENT 
1J. 
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The primary concern in this case is whether Sky Ranch's claims and defenses 
were fairly adjudicated in this matter. As will be shown, the trial court's decision to 
adjudicate one of Sky Ranch's claims without hearing the evidence on the issue (see 
Point II), and its decision to rule on an issue never brought before it by the parties (see 
Point IV), were both clear violations of Sky Ranch's right to due process. The trial 
court's method of making findings should also give this Court pause. The trial court 
prefaced its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with this statement: 
Due to case load and scheduling demands, the Court's findings are overdue 
and I sumply do not have the time necessary to complete independent 
findings. Since I am largely persuaded by Plaintiffs evidence and 
arguments, I am adopting most of Plaintiff s proposed findings and 
conclusions. 
(R. at 741/1.) This statement casts doubt on whether the findings and conclusions 
represent the considered independent opinion of the trial court, and this Court should 
scrutinize those findings closely. See Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. 
Canon-McMillan School Dist, 152 F.3d 228, 233 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
statement by the trial court that it would adopt whichever party's proposed findings that 
were more reasonable was evidence that the findings may not have represented the trial 
court's independent judgment and undermined their legitimacy). The fact that the trial 
court made adopted findings regarding the interpretation of a written instrument (see 
Point I) and referred in one of its findings about evidence that was never actually 
presented (R. at 741/8 fl[ 27)) makes the trial court's statement even more troublesome. 
Because every litigant deserves a full and fair hearing on the issues it brings before a trial 
court, as well as having any judgment be the considered result of the court's own 
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reasoning, this Court should reverse and remand the trial court's decision in this case. 
I. THE 2002 CC&Rs ARE VALID. 
The trial court erred in declaring the 2002 CC&Rs void ab initio. The 2002 
CC&Rs were executed within the timeframe contemplated by the 1990 CC&Rs, and the 
amendments were within the scope of permitted amendment. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's decision. Further, the court should award Sky Ranch with its 
attorney fees incurred in appealing this issue as per § XII.4 of the 2002 CC&Rs. (Ex. 6.) 
A. The 1990 CC&Rs unambiguously allowed Sky Ranch to amend the CC&Rs 
until either July 16, 2005, or until 120 residential units were sold. 
The trial court erred in holding that, under the provisions of the 1990 CC&Rs, Sky 
Ranch's authority to amend the CC&Rs was extinguished before the filing of the 2002 
CC&Rs. The source of the trial court's error is focusing on just one provision of the 1990 
CC&Rs, rather than construing the document as a whole. In its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that the language allowing unilateral 
amendment was in force until "80% of the lots in the community (including additional 
phases as may be added) have been sold to purchasers." (R. at 741/18 (quoting Ex. 5 § 
XII.3).) The trial court held that 
the phrase, "as may be added," could be interpreted to include lots (1) "as 
are permitted to be added in the future, no matter how many have already 
been added at any point in time," or (2) "as may have been added at any 
point in time, no matter how many may be permitted in the future." 
(R. at 741/19.) The trial court concluded that because the provision was ambiguous, it 
should be construed against Sky Ranch. (Id.) 
However, before declaring that a provision in a contract is ambiguous, the trial 
court must first attempt to harmonize all of the contract's provisions by "examining] the 
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entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other [to] give a reasonable 
construction of the contract as a whole, to determine the parties' intent." Gillmor v. 
Macey, 2005 UT App 351, \ 19, 121 P.3d 57. In the section of the 1990 CC&Rs entitled 
"Annexation of Additional Land," it states that Sky Ranch has the right to unilaterally 
amend the CC&Rs "until the right to enlarge the Development through the addition of 
tracts or subdivisions terminates." (Ex. 5 § XI.4.) Sky Ranch's right to annex the land is 
limited to fifteen years, and to 150 total residential lots. (Id. § XI.2). At first blush, the 
"eighty percent" provision and the "termination of annexation rights" provision seem to 
conflict. "Provisions which are apparently conflicting are to be reconciled and 
harmonized, if possible, by reasonable interpretation so that the entire agreement can be 
given effect." Munfordv. Lee Servicing Co., 2000 UT App 108, K 18, 999 P.2d 23. The 
two provisions can easily be read together to conclude that Sky Ranch's power to amend 
terminates when it has finished developing and 80% of the lots are sold. 
This interpretation is supported by the text of the 1990 CC&Rs. The "termination 
of annexation rights" provision is contained in the section of the 1990 CC&Rs dealing 
with annexation. This section contemplates that Sky Ranch will continue to annex land to 
the Development "for common areas or for subdivision into additional residential or 
commercial lots." (Ex. 5 § XI. 1.) This section also gives Sky Ranch the authority to 
modify the 1990 CC&Rs through a supplementary declaration filed upon annexation of 
additional property. (Id. § XI.3.) There is a clear intent in this section that Sky Ranch 
should retain the power to amend the CC&Rs until it is finished developing. On the other 
hand, the "eighty percent" provision is contained within a section entitled 
"Miscellaneous," and inside of a provision that outlines the procedure for membership 
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amendment. After explaining the procedure, it then states that Sky Ranch has the 
unilateral right to amend until 80% of lots are sold "notwithstanding anything herein 
contained to the contrary." (Ex. 5 § XII.3.) It is clear from the placement of the provision 
that it was intended to be a separate condition that occurred after the Development was 
finished. 
This interpretation is also consistent with common sense and the intent of the 
parties. The 1990 CC&Rs evince a clear intent to "annex additional phases to the 
Development," (Ex. 5 at 2 (Recital D)) and gives Sky Ranch fifteen years to finish 
developing. (Id. § XI.2.) The purpose behind developing in phases is so that the 
developer can use the profits of property sold in the first phases to develop later phases. 
However, under the trial court's interpretation, Sky Ranch could not sell too many of 
those properties at once, or it would lose its control over the project. This defeats the 
purpose of developing in phases. Further, the trial court's interpretation would terminate 
Sky Ranch's right to amend, but not its right to continue annexation. This is an absurd 
result, as it puts Sky Ranch's control over the Development into a gray zone that was 
certainly not intended, and it would nullify the "termination of annexation rights" 
provision and conflict with Sky Ranch's power to modify the CC&Rs through 
supplemental declarations. It also leads to the question of whether Sky Ranch's right to 
amend is restored when it annexes land that takes the threshold of lots back below 80%. 
Because the trial court's interpretation defeats the intent of the 1990 CC&Rs and makes 
them unworkable, this Court should adopt Sky Ranch's interpretation of the amendment 
provisions of the 1990 CC&Rs. 
B. The trial court erred in nullifying the entirety of the 2002 CC&Rs, as the 
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amendments were reasonable clarifications of the 1990 CC&Rs and other 
agreements. 
Besides holding that the 2002 CC&Rs were void because Sky Ranch lacked 
authority, the Court also held that they were void because they were not within the scope 
of amendment permitted by the 1990 CC&Rs and would have materially changed the 
character of the Development. (R. at 741/20.) However, as this conclusion is not 
supported by the texts of the two documents, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
conclusion. 
In determining the scope of permissible amendment, the trial court held that the 
1990 CC&Rs restricted Sky Ranch to amending the CC&Rs to the following purposes: 
(i) to more accurately express the intent of any provision of this Declaration 
in light of then existing circumstances or information; (ii) to better insure, 
in light of then existing circumstances or information, workability of the 
arrangement which is contemplated by the Declaration; or (iii) to facilitate 
the practical, technical, administrative or functional integration of any 
additional tract or subdivision into the Development. 
(R. at 741/4.) The trial court also concluded that Utah Law forbids a developer from 
amending CC&Rs "in a way that would materially change the character of the 
development...." (R. at 741/20 (citing Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 
6.21 (2000).)9 In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that several terms in the 2002 
9. The full Restatement section is as follows: "A developer may not exercise a power 
to amend or modify the declaration in a way that would materially change the character 
of the development or the burdens on the existing community members unless the 
declaration fairly appraises purchasers that the power could be used for the kind of 
change proposed." While this proposition has never been adopted by the Utah appellate 
courts, it does not appear to burden Sky Ranch's right to amend any further than the 
provisions of the 1990 CC&Rs, and neither the trial court nor the Association relied on it 
below. Sky Ranch therefore does not address the issue at this time, while reserving the 
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CC&Rs "were dramatically different from key provisions" of the 1990 CC&Rs, and were 
not "mentioned, contemplated, or addressed in any manner in the 1990 Declaration." (R. 
at 741/5-8.) The trial court concluded that these differences were adequate grounds to 
declare the 2002 CC&Rs void. 
However, the trial court's interpretation of these provisions is in error—as will be 
shown, none of the amendments in the 2002 CC&Rs went beyond clarifications of, or 
amendments designed to ensure the workability of the 1990 CC&Rs. Below is a list of 
each of the provisions that the trial court found objectionable and Sky Ranch's 
response.10 
• The 2002 CC&Rs greatly expanded the limited property that was designated for 
the Community (which was limited to 150 lots) described in the 1990 Declaration, 
and therefore those having access to the Airport, to include "those portions of land 
set forth in Exhibit B" to the 2002 Declaration, which included "any and all 
property that may be annexed into the Community." (f 25a.) 
This is not true. The provision in the 1990 CC&Rs11 was slightly ambiguous on 
this point, as it used "lot" "living unit" and "unit" interchangeably. (Ex. 5 § XI.2(a).) The 
2002 CC&Rs clarified that the limitation was to "150 total residential lots," but that this 
right to argue it in its reply brief if the Association argues that it is sufficiently different 
in scope than the CC&R restrictions. 
10. While the trial court's statement was listed as a finding, the question of whether 
the 2002 CC&Rs were dramatically different from and were not contemplated in the 
1990 CC&Rs can be decided by looking at the four corners of the documents, and hence 
is a question of law entitled to no deference regardless of the trial court's 
characterization. See 50 West Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). Also, to the extent that any provisions that 
required the consideration of extraneous evidence, no such supporting findings were ever 
made. 
11. "Declarant shall not effectuate any annexation of land which would cause the total 
number of living units existing on, or planned for, the Property to exceed 150 total Lots, 
or 106 units in the additional property after Phase I and II." 
^n 
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did not restrict hangar or commercial units. (Ex. 6 § XI.2(a)). 
The 2002 CC&Rs modified the definition of "lots" within the Community to 
include hangars and the definition of "members" of the Association to include 
owners of hangars, which would significantly alter and dilute the Association 
member's voting rights vis-a-vis Mr. Longley's voting rights. fl[ 25c.) 
This is not true; the 2002 CC&Rs merely clarified the voting rights of owners of 
hangar lots as was outlined in the Phase 5C Declaration. (Ex. 36.)12 Phase 5C consisted of 
320 ten-foot wide airplane hangar lots and three commercial lots. (Id. f 2.) The Phase 5C 
Declaration explained that the hangar lots were subdivided in ten-foot amounts to 
accommodate various sizes of hangars, and that Sky Ranch intended to sell them in 
blocks. (Id. 1f 5.) The Declaration designated "each block of units intended to form a 
hangar space" as one Class C lot for voting purposes. (Id. ^5.) The 2002 CC&Rs simply 
clarified how the hangar lots owned by Sky Ranch or held in trust for it were to be 
counted in terms of Class C votes. (Ex. 6 §11.2 (Class C).) This was not a substantial 
change from the 1990 CC&Rs as amended. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs greatly expanded he commercial fixed base operation area 
("FBO") to be constructed adjacent to the Airport to "include, but [not be] limited 
to, facilities for the sale of airplane fuel, a convenience store, lodging units 
("casitas"), airplane repair facilities, airplane washing facilities, and any other 
related facilities deemed appropriate or desirable by the Declarant." fl[ 25b.) 
There was no great expansion of the right of commercial development between the 
1990 CC&Rs and the 2002 CC&Rs. The 1990 CC&Rs reserved the right of Sky Ranch to 
12. The Phase 5C Declaration amended and supplemented the 1990 Declaration and 
was binding on the Development and Association. (See Ex. 5 §§ 1.1 (Declaration includes 
"amendments or supplements . . . which are to occur in conjunction with the expansion of 
the Development."), XI.3 (Supplementary Declarations "may contain such 
complimentary additions and modifications of the covenants, conditions and 
restrictions . . . as may be necessary to reflect the different character, if any, of the added 
property and as are not inconsistent with the plan of the Declaration.").) 
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conduct certain commercial operations on lands owned by it adjacent to the 
airstrip, including, but not limited to, fixed base operations for refueling 
aircraft and purposes incident thereto, construction and sale or leasing of 
aircraft storage and hangar space, scenic tour flights and such other 
business operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate. 
(Ex. 5 § VII.6 (emphasis added); see also § VII. 16.) It is clear from the language of the 
provision that the list of commercial operations were not limited by the listed items, and 
the commercial operations added to the list in 2002 were not of such a type that would 
seem grossly out of place in that list or create a new or special burden to residents that 
was not presented by the operations already on the list. These operations were meant to 
be small and primarily serve the residents and their guests. (Tr.l 94:14-95:2.) As the 
Development is five miles south of SR-9 in Hurricane and there is nothing between the 
Development and the Arizona border, a small restaurant, a convenience store and a few 
lodging units would not have drawn much traffic from outside. Furthermore, the 
uncontested evidence was that the Association approved these uses in an agreement 
signed in 1994. (Tr.l 103:19-104:12, 105:10-107:15, 109:4-110:25, 122:24-126:3; Ex. 22 
at 3.) The Phase 5C Declaration also stated commercial uses in its commercial lots 
including "an airplane washing and service area" and "a pilot cafe and/or lounge.'5 (Ex. 
36 K 9.) Finally, both the 1990 CC&Rs and the 2002 CC&Rs provide that the commercial 
operations shall not unreasonably interfere or restrict the Owner's beneficial use and 
enjoyment of their Lots or the Property. This provision is a safeguard and enforceable 
right to make sure that the scope of the commercial development will be reasonably 
limited based on the character of the neighborhood and would allow a resident or the 
Association to seek injunctive relief or damages when a specific development proposal is 
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in place. There was no substantial change as to the allowed commercial uses of the 
Development between the 1990 CC&Rs and the 2002 CC&Rs. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs imposed a burden upon the Association to "maintain the 
taxiways to meet all applicable safety standards" despite the fact that the taxiways 
are not common property of the Association, but owned by private individuals, 
including Mr. Longley. fl[ 25d.) 
This is neither a significant nor unreasonable amendment. As the taxiway was for 
the common benefit of the Association members and had been used by the members for 
the taxiing of their airplanes since it was built, it seems obvious that the Association has 
an implied easement on the taxiway, regardless of the private ownership of the land. The 
fact that the taxiway lighting system was built in conjunction with the runway lighting 
system and the controls were housed in the same place, (Tr. 1 186:3-188:22) and that the 
taxiway connected several residential units with the airstrip (Tr.l 209:20-210:7) further 
suggests that the Association had an equitable easement over the taxiway. Requiring the 
Association to maintain property upon which it has an easement is an unremarkable and 
well-accepted point of law. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property; Servitudes § 4.13. 
Further, this amendment merely incorporates what had been the course of conduct of the 
Association—it has maintained the taxiway in the past and has admitted that it was their 
continuing responsibility to do so. (Tr.l 209:20-210:7; Tr.2 144:23-145:12, 165:6-20; Ex, 
21; Ex. 22 at 2.) However, even if this section were entirely new, it would not be an 
unreasonable amendment that would fundamentally change the character of the 
13. Notwithstanding the language in the 2002 CC&Rs that the commercial uses shall 
not interfere "in the view of the Declarant," the right is enforceable. See Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1038 (Utah 
1985) (holding that even though a party could exercise the right to cancel "in its sole 
discretion," that it could not do so unreasonably or in bad faith). 
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Development, and, given the purpose of the taxiway, the provision is surely one that be 
one that better ensured the workability of the declaration and more accurately expressed 
the intent of the 1990 CC&Rs. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs further diluted the Association members' voting rights 
by . . . (2) attempting to resurrect Class B voting rights (the Declarant's voting 
rights) which had previously been extinguished . . . ; and (4) extending the period 
of developer's control for 7 years from 2005 to 2012.14 fl[ 25e.) 
Reestablishing Class B voting rights was appropriate because the 1990 CC&Rs 
show an intent to protect the developer's rights, which is consistent with the amendment, 
and clarifies an ambiguity in the 1990 CC&Rs. The 1990 CC&Rs provide that Class B 
voting rights were to cease "when the total number of votes held by all Class A and C 
Members equals the total number of votes held by the Class B Member." (Ex. 5 § III.2 
(Class B).) As the addition of lots was to proceed in phases and comprise 150 total 
residential lots, Sky Ranch would have more Class B votes after each phase was 
incorporated. This raises the question of what would happen if Sky Ranch's class B rights 
ceased, then it added more lots to the Development. The 1990 CC&Rs were silent on that 
question. However, it was clearly the intent of Sky Ranch to continue to have control 
over the Development until all phases were completed. The amendment stating that those 
rights would come back into being answers that question consistently with the intent of 
the 1990 CC&Rs, and so is a legitimate amendment. 
Extending the period of control was also appropriate. The intent behind the 1990 
Declaration was to annex land into the Community until there were 150 residential units. 
This has taken substantially more time to do this than Sky Ranch originally contemplated, 
14. Items 1 and 3 in this list were addressed supra. 
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due in part to the Association's failure to properly keep up the airport, {see Point III, 
infra) and the Association opposing its proposals before the Washington County Planning 
Commission, (see Point II, infra). There was no evidence presented at trial or otherwise 
that Sky Ranch unreasonably delayed its course of development. Given these facts, 
allowing Sky Ranch more time to develop the property to its conclusion is a reasonable 
provision that both provides for the workability of the arrangement contemplated by the 
Declaration and facilitates the integration of additional tracts into the Development. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs imposed a prohibition to challenge Sky Ranch Development, 
Inc.'s voting rights by stating: "It shall be cause for automatic dismissal from 
membership on the Board of Trustees of the Association for board members to fail 
to recognize Declarant's votes, including those held in trust for Declarant." fl[ 
25f.) 
This is not an unreasonable condition, but one that was justified to better ensure 
workability of the agreement. Mr. Longley testified that some board members of the 
Association had refused to recognize voting rights for Owners of hangar lots. (Tr.l 97:9-
17.) An in terror em clause like this would have been a reasonable and appropriate way to 
ensure that any further challenges of voting rights would be in good faith and not 
arbitrary. if • - ' •-• • * - - •-•••-'-• -
• The 2002 CC&Rs allowed for the first time the "airport owner" (i.e., Grassy 
Meadows Airport, Inc.), not the Association only, to adopt rules and regulations 
burdening all the members of the Association, flf 25g.) 
This is false. The Airport Lease stated that "Lessee, its members, invitees, their 
guests and invitees shall, at all times, abide by and be bound by . . . any and all rules and 
regulations adopted by Lessor or the Lessee, as the case may be, for the operation of the 
Airport." (Ex. 1 If 2.) The 2002 CC&Rs made no change to that agreement. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs removed the Board of Trustees' ability to promulgate rules or 
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regulations limiting "the allowable number of guests or invitees'5 that can be 
granted access to the Airport despite the fact that the Airport was intended to be 
used exclusively by Association members and their own guests. fl[ 25h.) 
The sections complained of explicitly do not limit the Board of Trustees' ability to 
make rules limiting the allowable number of guests or invitees than can be granted access 
to the airport. The section of the 2002 CC&Rs cited by the trial court is § IV.2, which 
states that guests and invitees may be granted the right to use and enjoy common areas by 
Members, subject to the rules and regulations made by the Association. It later states that < 
"the Board of Trustees may not limit the allowable number of guests or invitees under 
this paragraph." (Ex. 6 § IV.2.) The 2002 CC&Rs explicitly note that "the airstrip and 
taxiways are not common areas," (id. §§ 1.7, IV. 1.) meaning that the rulemaking 
restriction does not apply to the airport. Excluding the airport from the common area is 
consistent with the 1990 CC&Rs, which note that notwithstanding the Airport Lease to 
the Association, "as presently constituted, no common areas are included" in the 
Development. (Ex. 5 § IV. 1.) 
• The 2002 CC&Rs allowed for the first time "jet or large aircraft" to land on the 
Airport despite the fact that the Airport was not designed for jets in terms of length 
or structural integrity (the Airport was designed to handle only aircraft that weigh 
less than 12,500 pounds) and despite the Declaration's prior prohibition of 
annoyances and nuisances, including the substantially greater noise generated by 
jet engines as opposed to propellers. fl[ 25/.) 
There are two different ways in which the 2002 CC&Rs mention jets and large 
aircraft. First, the 2002 CC&Rs make clear that as the Development is an airplane 
community, Members' right to quiet enjoyment does not exclude aircraft of any type or 
size from using the airstrip, and waive claims resulting from use of the airstrip, including 
jets and large aircraft. (Ex. 6 §§ IV.2; IV.4(k); VII.22.) The second provision states that 
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"the Declarant or any subsequent owner of the airstrip shall not be restricted from using 
the airstrip for marketing purposes including inviting guests to use the runway (which 
may include jet aircraft, subject to FARs) without needing to gain any approval from the 
Association or its members.5' (Id. § IV.4(e).) 
These provisions do not change the Association's rights under the 1990 CC&Rs 
and the Airport Lease. The Airport Lease allowed Sky Ranch to use the airport "for 
marketing purposes, including guests to use the runway." (Ex. 1 f 1.) The Airport Lease 
never had any provision that would have allowed it to restrict or regulate Sky Ranch's 
use of the runway, and allowed Lessor to adopt rules for the operation of the airport. (Id. 
Tf 2.) Finally, Sky Ranch's right to use the airstrip was subject to the applicable Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FARs), which would keep unreasonably large aircraft from 
landing at the airstrip. 
• The 2002 CC&Rs allowed the Declarant to charge an admission fee and other fees 
to Association members for use of the Airport contrary to prior representations and 
agreements. (Tf25j.) 
The language of this provision allows the Declarant or Association to charge 
"reasonable admission and other fees of Association Members for the use of the airstrip 
or any recreational facilities situated upon the Common Area." (Ex. 6 § IV.4(d).) While 
this language is vague, it seems unlikely that it would give Sky Ranch a right to charge 
fees for the use of the airstrip, as Sky Ranch is not the same entity as the Lessor under the 
Airport Lease. (Id. § 1.9; Ex. 1 at 1.) Rather, it seems to contemplate the possible addition 
of recreational facilities that may remain in the control of Sky Ranch. 
C. Any unreasonable amendments in the 2002 CC&Rs can be severed 
without nullifying the entire document. 
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Finally, if any of these provisions were invalid as a matter of law, they could 
simply be severed from the 2002 CC&Rs rather than nullifying the entire document. See 
Management Services Corp., 617 P.2d at 408 (a contractual provision is severable 
depending on the intention of the parties). In determining whether a provision of a 
restrictive covenant is severable, the Court should look at whether the remainder of the 
covenant is operable and still furthers the intended purpose. Cf. Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 
UT 89, Tf 88, 54 P.3d 1069 (discussing the standard for severance of unconstitutional < 
portions of statutes). The 2002 CC&Rs expressly a severance clause. (Ex. 6 § XII.9.) 
Also, as shown above, it is clear from the document and contemporaneous documents 
that the intention of these amendments was not to make a whole and undivided revision 
of the structure of the Development, but to make several different amendments that 
would clarify and summarize past agreements and declarations. Further, none of these 
amendments are interdependent and can operate independently from each other. As a 
matter of law, therefore, if this Court believes that any provisions of the 2002 CC&Rs are 
unlawful, it can sever them without invalidating the entire document. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED SKY RANCH'S CLAIM FOR 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS. 
The trial court dismissed Sky Ranch's claim for tortious interference 
notwithstanding its agreement to hear further evidence on the issue. Procedurally, the trial 
court's act constituted summary judgment upon the trial court's motion. As the trial court 
did not give Sky Ranch notice of its intent to consider summary judgment or an 
opportunity to respond, the ruling was a violation of Sky Ranch's due process rights. The 
dismissal was also based on an error of law, which should be reversed by this Court. 
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A. The trial court's dismissal of Sky Ranch ys claim for tortious interference was 
a violation of its right to due process of law; any findings of fact made with 
respect to this issue were improper and void. 
Fundamental to our system of justice is the concept of procedural due process, 
which is protected in the state and federal constitutions as well as in statutes and the rules 
of procedure. At its core, due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before a court deprives a person of a property interest. United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993). Specifically, 
procedural due process requires that a court allow a party the opportunity to fully present 
its evidence on a matter before making any factual findings. B&O R. Co. v. United States, 
298 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1936). Procedural due process also requires that the court provide 
notice and opportunity for a hearing before the court sua sponte makes a dispositive 
ruling on an issue of law. Moore v. California Minerals Products Corp., 252 P.2d 1005, 
1109(Cal.App. 1953). 
This last point is not only guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, but 
also by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A trial court is required by the rules to "grant a 
request for hearing on a motion . . . that would dispose of the action or any claim or 
defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is 
frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e). The failure 
of a trial court to hold such a hearing is reversible error. Price, 949 P.2d at 1255. 
While Rule 7(e) contemplates a situation where a formal motion is brought by a 
party, the same due process requirements for notice and an opportunity for hearing 
embodied in Rule 7(e) must apply to dispositive motions brought sua sponte by the trial 
court. While it does not appear that the Utah appellate courts have squarely addressed the 
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procedure regarding a trial court considering summary judgment on its own motion, 
courts interpreting the federal version of the rule have concluded that a trial court that 
raises such a motion must provide proper notice and opportunity to respond to the party 
who would be adversely affected by the ruling. Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 73-74 
(2d Cir. 1996); 1OA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 
(3d ed. 2011); see also Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 683 (1949) (holding that a court 
of appeals could not grant summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party on appeal, i 
as it deprived the other party "of an opportunity to dispute the facts material to that 
claim" in the appeals court).15 
In this case, the trial court summarily dismissed Sky Ranch's claim for tortious 
interference without providing it the opportunity to present all of its evidence and without 
giving it notice of the decision or an opportunity to respond by briefing the issue and 
requesting a hearing. The court's act constituted a violation of Sky Ranch's due process 
rights, and this Court should reverse the trial court's decision. 
B. The trial court's error was harmful, as there was evidence in the record that 
the Association had a contractual obligation not to interfere with the 
development of the FBO and commercial area, and the Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine does not apply to persons who are restricted from interference by 
contract. 
The trial court's dismissal of Sky Ranch's claim for tortious interference should 
also be reversed, as there were genuine issues as to material facts, and the decision was 
15. The decision in Ramsey was later adopted by the drafters of the Federal Rules in 
2010. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 now explicitly allows for a trial court to "consider summary 
judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be 
genuinely in dispute," so long as the court gives "notice and a reasonable time to 
respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 
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based on an error of law. Although there had been a trial in this matter, the trial court 
indicated that it would take further evidence with regard to the tortious interference 
claim, making any finding of fact on this issue premature and void. See Kirkpatrick v. 
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App. 1996). As stated in the 
Statement of Facts, the 1990 CC&Rs reserved to Sky Ranch's the right to develop an 
FBO and commercial area, and Michael Longley's testimony that the parties had signed 
an agreement as to the FBO and commercial area constitutes sufficient evidence to create 
a genuine issue of fact as to the Association's contractual duties that should have been 
resolved by giving Sky Ranch a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence before 
any factual finding was made. Therefore, any finding that the Association was not under 
a contractual obligation not to interfere with the development of the FBO was in error.16 
However, even if we assume that the trial court did not rely upon the existence or 
non-existence of a contract in making its decision to dismiss and instead relied solely on 
the fact that the interference in question was speaking against the zoning change at the 
Washington County Planning Commission,17 the decision is still in error. While the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects those who petition government boards and agencies 
from immunity for tortious interference, Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 
36, f 26, 116 P.3d 323, this doctrine does not extend to circumstances where the party's 
duty not to interfere is based on contract. Contracting parties voluntarily give up 
16. While the Court's determination that the Association "had no contractual 
obligation not to oppose Mr. Longley's effort to change the zoning ordinances applicable 
to the Airport and community," (R. at 741/21) because there was a dispute as to whether 
the 1994 contract was actually entered into by the parties, (Tr.l 108:24-25) the existence 
of a contract is a question of fact. See O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981). 
17. The trial court seems to suggest this in its judgment. (R. at 746/2 n. 1.) 
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constitutional rights all the time—for example, non-compete agreements are a restriction 
on the right to ply a trade, and confidentiality agreements are a restriction on the freedom 
of speech. Judicial enforcement of these types of agreements is constitutional. See, e.g., 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that an injunction preventing 
publication of information protected by a confidentiality agreement was not 
unconstitutional prior restraint); Spear Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. William Blair & Co., 
LLC, 610 F.Supp.2d 278, 288 (D. Del. 2009) (holding discussed below); Ford Motor Co. 
v. Lane, 61 F.Supp.2d 745, 750 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that use of trade secrets in 
violation of a confidentiality agreement is not protected by the First Amendment); 
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94 (Minn. 1979) 
(holding that an injunction based on a non-compete agreement was not an 
unconstitutional restraint on free expression). The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Delaware specifically rejected an attempt to use the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to avoid a 
claim for breach of a confidentiality agreement: 
The cases cited by [Defendant] all involve situations where all that was 
alleged was that plaintiffs by various acts induced or sought to induce a 
department of the federal government to take certain actions. In these cases, 
the courts rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to merely repackage such lawful 
attempts to influence government as claims for, among other things, 
tortious interference with prospective business advantage, abuse of process, 
and violation of antitrust laws. Here, however, Plaintiffs state bona fide 
claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and unjust 
enrichment. . . . [Defendant] is not relieved from liability for these claims 
merely because they then used a petition to a government agency as the 
mechanism for allegedly harming Plaintiffs. 
Spear Pharmaceuticals, 610 F.Supp.2d at 288. 
Just like the defendant in Spear Pharmeceuticals, the Association is attempting to 
avoid liability for breaching its contractual obligation by invoking the First Amendment. 
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Utah law holds that a party who has entered into a contract cannot thereafter act in such a 
way that would deny the other party the expected benefit of its bargain. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith fs Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 450-51 (Utah 
App. 1994). Allowing a party to a contract to defeat the other party's expected benefit 
under the contract in the name of petitioning the government would cut a wide swath in 
contract law and would be a public policy disaster. Sky Ranch therefore urges this Court 
to reverse the trial court's decision. 
III. SKY RANCH WAS ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE AIRPORT LEASE AND IS 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR THE ASSOCIATION'S BREACHES OF THE LEASE. 
As shown below, because the Association materially breached the terms of the 
Airport Lease, Sky Ranch is entitled to termination of the lease and to recover its 
damages incurred. See Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, f 14, 20 P.3d 388 (outlining 
elements for a case for breach of contract). Further, even if this Court determines that 
termination is not an appropriate remedy, Sky Ranch is still entitled to recover its 
damages caused by the breach. 
A. The trial court's finding that the Association substantially complied with the 
provisions of the Airport Lease was clearly erroneous. 
The Association failed to maintain the airport and failed to maintain insurance as 
required by the Airport Lease, which constituted material breaches and precluded a 
finding of substantial compliance. See Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Utah 
App. 1999). The Airport Lease required the Association to "maintain the airstrip and its 
facilities in the same or better condition, normal wear and tear excepted, as when 
received." (Ex. 1 f 8.) Specifically, the lease required the Association to "paint, level, 
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compact, remove weeds, repair and oil the surface covering of the airstrip . . . and replace 
or repair any runway lighting system, beacon, and equipment associated therewith." (Id) 
The Association materially breached these responsibilities. 
1. The Association did not properly maintain the runway. 
The evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the Association was not 
properly maintaining the runway. There was significant cracking on the runway, and 
while sealing the cracks had been proposed, it was not carried out during the cure period. 
There were visible marks of where water had been allowed to pool on the surface of the 
runway, and the culverts that drained the runway area were in dire need of maintenance. 
The crackseal on the runway posed a potential safety risk to light aircraft as they landed 
at high speeds. 
Further, the evidence stated in the Statement of Facts shows clearly that the 
runway had to be repaved soon. Sky Ranch made a generous offer with regard the 
repaving, offering to waive lease fees so that it would be done. This offer was never 
accepted, and there was no plan in place to deal with the short-term or long-term 
maintenance of the runway. This failure to accept Sky Ranch's offer within a reasonable 
time constituted an unequivocal manifestation of the Association's intent not to repave 
the runway by 2006, which was a breach of the lease agreement. See Breuer-Harrison, 
Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 724 (Utah App. 1990) (outlining legal standard for 
anticipatory breach of a contract); Rappaport v. Savitz, 220 A.2d 401, (Pa. Super. 1966) 
(where the owner of property sought permission from the tenant to make necessary 
repairs to the premises, and the tenant refused that permission and did not take any action 
herself, there was a claim for breach of contract and waste.). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As the entity in charge of maintenance, repair, and operations of the runway, the 
Association had a responsibility to have a long-term plan for maintenance, including 
periodic inspections and seeking advice about what issues would constitute safety 
problems. This was not a parking lot—the Association had the duty to know about these 
issues and get in front of them without poking and prodding by Sky Ranch. Claiming that 
they did not know about these issues was no excuse. 
Marshaling. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the following are the trial 
court's findings in support of its decision that the runway was properly maintained, along 
with citations to the record evidence and further explanations of that evidence where 
necessary. 
• The Association paid to have portions of the Airport needing attention crack sealed 
almost every year, including in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. (R. at 741/11.) 
While the Association did crack seal in 2000, 2001, and 2002, (Dep. Habberfield 
21 & ex. 2) the record evidence does not support that the Association crack sealed in 
2003. The records produced by Lynne Habberfield do not show that the Association 
crack sealed in 2003, and the last coat of slurry seal on the runway was done in 1998. 
(Id.) Mimi Murdock testified that while the Association had considered doing crack 
sealing in response to Sky Ranch's February letter, it was not done before or during the 
cure period. (Tr.2 144:23-145:12, 149:21-150:2.) Moreover, the crack sealing was 
building up and becoming a safety problem, and in any event would not be adequate to 
maintain the runway for much longer, as it needed overlaying with new pavement. 
• Wayne Rogers, one of Mr. Longley's experts, testified that the Airport had definitely 
been maintained. Mr. Rogers also testified that asphalt inevitably shrinks and cracks 
due to environmental conditions, the cracking he observed at grassy meadows was 
consistent with an airport of its age, shrinkage and cracks by themselves do not 
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indicate a lack of maintenance but are just a result of natural aging, he had no reason 
to believe that the weeds or drainage issues he observed posed any kind of hazard, and 
the airport was in fairly good condition compared to the other runways he has 
inspected. (R. at 741/12.) 
This accurately states the testimony of Wayne Rogers. (Tr.2 78:5-85:21.) The trial 
court's finding also reflects the testimony of Steven Brewer, who stated that the hot days 
and cold nights cause cracks in asphalt, and the cracks were to be expected. (Tr.2 156:6-
23.) However, it indicates a fundamental misinterpretation of the concept of "normal 
wear and tear" with respect to the Airport Lease. Unlike a short-term residential lease, 
this lease was for 99 years. (Ex. 1.) The Association paved the runway and took it in as-is 
condition. (Id. ^  1.) The Lease did not provide for Sky Ranch to repave the runway—all 
maintenance responsibilities were in the hands of the Association. (Id. f 8 ("It is the 
intent of this Lease that it shall be a 'triple-net lease' with no costs payable by Lessor.").) 
As the life of asphalt is about 20 years, (Tr.2 72:4) the Lease would have contemplated 
that the Association's maintenance responsibilities included repaving several times 
before the end of the lease. In the case of the runway, "normal wear and tear" is 
consistent with the principles of waste: the Association had to ensure that the value of the 
asset did not deteriorate. See Eleopulos v. McFarland and Hullinger, LLC, 2006 UT App 
352, T|ll, 145 P.3d 1157. 
The unreflited testimony was that the asphalt, while presently in fair to good 
condition, (Tr.2 79:15-25) was nearing the end of its useful life and starting to have 
significant maintenance issues. (Tr.2 85:15-21.) If an overlay was not done soon, the cost 
to restore would skyrocket, as the previous pavement would have to be torn up. (Tr.2 
24:6-22.) The Association refused to adopt a plan to deal with the maintenance issues and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refused Sky Ranch's offer to waive lease fees in exchange for dealing with the problem. 
Allowing the runway to deteriorate to a state where restoration costs would be much 
higher, even though that deterioration is natural and expected, goes beyond normal wear 
and tear, and refusing to deal with the problem constitutes breach of the Airport Lease. 
Further, while Mr. Rogers testified that the drainage issue did not constitute a 
safety hazard itself, he further stated that the inappropriately maintained culverts were 
definitely a maintenance issue that would pose a hazard if the airplane went off the 
runway. (Tr.2 81:22-83:1). He further stated that the weeds that he saw growing in the 
asphalt would cause deterioration and degradation as they grew. (Tr.2 83:2-16.) At any 
rate, he testified that it was a maintenance issue that had not been addressed by the 
Association during the cure period. 
• Craig Ide, one of the Association's experts . . ., testified that the airport rated a 69 or 
"good" on the Pavement Condition Index, and that the average score for municipal 
airports in 2003 was 59. 
This accurately states the affidavit of Craig Ide. (Ex. 20.) The trial court's finding 
also reflects the testimony of Steven Brewer, who stated that the airstrip was not unsafe. 
(Tr.2 156:24-157:1, 167:18-21.) As mentioned previously, this conclusion does not 
conflict with the fact that the pavement was nearing the end of its useful life, and the 
runway needed to be repaved. In fact, after inspecting the runway, Mr. Ide recommended 
that the Association develop a plan to maintain the runway, including an overlay of the 
existing asphalt. (Dep. F. Rieck, 26.) 
2. The Association did not properly maintain the runway lighting system. 
Again, as the Association was in charge of running an airport, it had the 
responsibility to know about the proper maintenance issues involved with the runway 
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lighting system and develop a maintenance plan without having to be told about the 
maintenance issues from Sky Ranch. The Lease required more than just replacing light 
bulbs and repairing fixtures—it required that the system itself be maintained, including 
keeping the lenses polished and free of dirt, ensuring that rodents and the weather did not 
interfere with the lighting system, and otherwise maintaining the wiring and other parts of 
the entire system, including the lighting control building. The Association's failure to do 
this and to allow the lighting system to get into such a condition was an unacceptable 
breach of the Lease. 
Marshaling. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the following are the trial 
court's findings in support of its decision that the lighting system was properly 
maintained, along with citations to the record evidence and further explanations of that 
evidence where necessary. 
• The Association Kept most of the airport lights in good working condition, including 
repairing lights on taxiways, even through not required to do so by the lease. (R. at 
741/11). 
"Good working condition" is a matter of opinion, given the significant 
maintenance problems shown by Mr. Christensen's report. This finding is explained in 
further detail in other findings, and will be addressed below. However, it is important to 
point out that the lights on the taxiways were not functional from 1996 until after the cure 
period had expired, (Tr.l 182:12; Tr.2 40:8-12) and the Association made no attempt to 
fix the taxiway lig;hts during the cure period. (Tr.2 136:6-9.) 
• The lighting system was a military surplus system which [Mr. Longley] bought and 
installed himself. (R. at 741/13.) 
This is true. (Tr.2 4:3-9.) However, Mr. Longley put in new lenses and wiring 
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when he installed it. (Tr.2 4:3-15.) This also doesn't account for the dirt, rodents and 
other maintenance problems. 
• All the evidence introduced established that, while the lighting system was showing 
its age, it was generally in good working order—at least in the same condition as 
when it was installed, normal wear and tear excepted, as permitted by the lease. (R. at 
741/13.) 
Sky Ranch identifies the evidence for this proposition elsewhere in this section. As 
explained supra, the trial court's finding is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of 
"normal wear and tear." Because the Association had the job to maintain the lighting 
system, including repairing or replacing it, they are required to keep the system in good 
repair, and not just do the minimum to keep the lights on. 
• Ryan Christensen testified that although there were some lights on the airport that 
needed replacing and others that needed cleaning and polishing, the lighting system 
worked when tested and performed the function it was designed to perform. Mr. 
Christensen acknowledged that when he was deposed shortly after inspecting the 
runway in late 2003 he testified that he "wouldn't be concerned about" landing on the 
airport at night. (R. at 741/13.) 
Mr. Christensen did state that the lights did come on and were adequate for night 
landings in Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather. (Tr.l 204:15-205:12.) This was also 
supported by the testimony of Jennifer McCarroll, who testified that she had no difficulty 
spotting the lights while doing a night flight in August of 2003. (Tr.2 92:10-22.) At the 
trial, Mr. Christensen clarified and stated that he would do so in case of an emergency, 
but would prefer to go to St. George or Hurricane, as their airports were in better 
condition. (Tr.l 190:17-191:7.) He also stated that if the weather were marginal VFR, 
such as dusty or foggy weather, he would not do it. (Tr.l 204:23-205:4; 205:19-206:1.) 
Also, the trial court's finding is based on the assumption that unless there is an immediate 
threat to safety, there would be no breach of the contract. This is not supported by the text 
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of the contract or by normal definitions of maintain, repair, or wear and tear. 
• Any lights on the airport that were broken in March 2003 were subsequently and 
timely repaired by the Association. (R. at 741/13.) 
There was evidence that the Association did fix lights during the cure period. 
(Dep. Batson 25-27; Dep. Santuosso ex. 1; Dep. Assoc. 14; Tr.2 106:15-19.) As 
mentioned before, replacing burned out light bulbs and fixing broken pedestals was not 
enough to constitute proper maintenance of the lighting system. 
The following is further record evidence that would support the trial court's 
verdict: 
• Ryan Christensen did not inspect all of the lights, just the broken ones, did not look at 
the lights at night to determine what their brightness was, and had no way of knowing 
if the maintenance problems were in place during the cure period. (Tr.l 200:16-201:2, 
203:15-23.) 
He later testified that he doubted that the maintenance problems he saw happened 
in a short period of time, and that he could see clearly that lenses themselves were 
opaque. (Tr.l 206:2-207:4.) He further testified that the cause for the lenses being opaque 
was sandblasting, (Tr.l 189:1-7) so there is no reason to believe that the lenses he 
inspected were not representative of the whole, especially as the Association testified that 
they did not clean the fixtures or check the wiring, and did not spend any money on 
maintenance of the lights. (Dep. Habberfield 21 & ex. 2); Dep. Assoc. 16.) 
• The Association testified that it had no duty to maintain the Lighting Control 
Building, as it belonged to Sky Ranch. (Dep. Assoc. 17-19.) 
The lighting control building is where the voltage control boxes and the spare 
parts are housed. There is no question that it is part of the lighting control system that the 
Association has a duty to maintain under the Lease. This was never done, including 
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during the cure period. (Dep. Santosuosso 18.) 
• The lighting control system was not built watertight or animal-proof by Sky Ranch; it 
was not built to code. (Tr.2 38:18-39:5, 160:10-161:8.) 
This is not an excuse. The Association took the property as-is. (Ex.1.) They had 
control over the building for 13 years at that point, and had the responsibility to 
weatherproof and animal-proof the system or to regularly inspect it. Further, Mr. Longley 
testified that the Association put the antenna where it was, including cutting the hole in 
the roof of the building without sealing it. (Tr.l 212:5-12.) 
• There was no duty to maintain the taxiway lights, as they were not specifically 
mentioned under the lease and they were on Sky Ranch's Property. (Tr.2 37:1-10; 
Dep. Assoc. 16.) 
This is not a reasonable reading of the lease. The Airport Lease states that the 
Association is to be the exclusive occupant of the airport for "taxiing, take-off, and 
landing of aircraft." (Ex. 1 % 1.) They are responsible for paying "the electric bills 
associated with the operation of any runway lighting and beacon systems," (id, ^ 8) and 
since the taxiway lights and the runway lights are controlled in the lighting control 
building, both are hooked to the same electric meter. There is no question that the 
taxiway lights were intended to be part of the lighting control system that was part of the 
facilities of the airport. Indeed, the Association acknowledges that the taxiways are under 
their control, when it stated in 2002, "Board Decisions going back to 1993 acknowledge 
the responsibility of [the association] to maintain not only the airport runway, but all 
taxiways." (Ex 21.) 
3. The Association did not properly maintain the fences and keep the 
property free of weeds. 
The Association had a duty to keep the airstrip and the area surrounding free from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
weeds, and to maintain the facilities, including the fence surrounding the airstrip. The 
pictures are enough proof that they did not do so. While this may seem to be a minor 
issue, it is a bargained-for provision of the contract and was important to Sky Ranch as an 
untidy and poorly maintained airstrip made it harder for it to sell lots. The Court should 
respect the contract by declaring the breach material. See Howe v. Professional Manivest, 
Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah App. 1992). 
Marshaling, Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the following are the trial 
court's findings in support of its decision that the weeds, fences, and general maintenance 
of the airport was properly maintained, along with citations to the record evidence and 
further explanations of that evidence where necessary. 
• The Association took measures to abate and remove weeds, including spraying and 
cleaning the Airport in March, July, August and September of 2003. (R. at 741/11.) 
Even granting the truth of this, three of these measures occurred after the cure 
period. Michael Longley testified that the weeds needed to be worked on once or twice a 
month to keep them down, and if they started to get large, spraying would no longer 
work—you had to pull them. (Tr.2 9:24-10:9.) The pictures speak for themselves. 
• The Association kept the rail fences surrounding the Airport in good repair. (R. at 
741/11.) 
While the Association did repair the fences, (Tr.2 105:19-24) there is no question 
that the Association did not oil the fences. While Ray Batson testified that oiling the 
fence did not help its appearance or its lifetime, he did not make that statement from 
personal knowledge, and the trial court was wrong to give it any weight. (Dep. Batson 
18-19.) The only competent testimony on the matter was William Rieck, as he had 
experience building fences, including wood fences. 
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• Danny Holt testified that he inspected the Airport at the very time that Mr. Longley 
alleged it was in disarray and concluded that the Airport was in good condition and 
decided to purchase a lot in the community based thereon. Another witness testified 
that he inspected the airport around this same time and found it to be in very good 
condition. (R. at 741/14.) 
Danny Holt's testimony with respect to the airstrip was that there was nothing that 
caused him concern; he limited his statement to the appearance of the asphalt, saying that 
it "was possibly grayed out, but it was not an issue for me to not buy because of the 
runway." (Tr.l 72:24-73:10.) He did not comment on any other items. Steven Brewer 
testified that the condition of the airport was not a concern for him, but that there were 
weeds, which he started to clean up. (Tr.2 156:6-157:1, 163:19-165:5.) Again, the 
pictures prove that the Association was not cleaning up weeds. 
• The Association added paint markings as an improvement to the Airport. (R. at 
741/11.) 
This is true (Ex. 3), but not relevant for determining other breaches as to 
maintenance. 
• The Association funded an apron composed of crushed stone and sterilant pellets to 
be placed on each side of the airstrip to repair undercutting to the airstrip that 
occurred. (R. at 741/11.) 
This was done, but not done at any time near the termination or cure period. (Dep. 
Santosuosso ex. 1.) 
• At no time have maintenance issues affected flight operations or compromised the 
safety of those using the Airport in any way. (R. at 741/14.) 
While this is debatable, as explained earlier, present safety was not the only 
consideration in lease. Maintenance of valuable assets and aesthetics were both 
considerations of the lease that would have rendered the breach material regardless of 
safety concerns. 
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4. The Association did not comply with the insurance requirements of the 
Airport Lease. 
Paragraph 10 of the Lease between the parties provides that the Association would 
provide risk liability insurance for the airport, "which shall show Lessor and Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc. as additional insureds." (Ex. 1 U 10.) The policy limits were to be set 
by mutual consent, and the policy is subject to the approval of Sky Ranch. (Id.) This 
agreement clearly contemplated not only coverage, but also disclosure of the policy 
chosen and its terms, and consultation as to the limits. This was never done. In fact, Sky 
Ranch Development was not even added as an additional insured until well after the 
expiration of the cure period. This was a material breach of the lease. 
Marshaling. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), the following are the trial 
court's findings in support of its decision that the insurance provisions of the lease were 
substantially complied with, along with citations to the record evidence and further 
explanations of that evidence where necessary. 
• Once the Association was apprised of Mr. Longley's concerns, it immediately made 
arrangements to have a copy of the insurance policy forwarded to Mr. Longley. (R. at 
741/15.) 
This does not appear to be true. The evidence shows that the Association made an 
attempt to show that proof of insurance was sent to Mr. Longley, but not the policy itself. 
(Ex. 3; Tr.2 32:12-15.) This is significant, as proof of insurance does not allow Sky 
Ranch to look at any of the terms and conditions of the policy that it has a reasonable 
right to object to. 
• There is no evidence in the record that the Association failed to [seek Mr. Longley's 
approval of the policy] after being put on notice by Mr. Longley. (R. at 741/16.) 
Again, this is not true. Mr. Longley states that he was never consulted about the 
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insurance policy. (Tr.2 29:15-17.) 
• The Association exercised good faith efforts to name Mr. Longley's development 
entity, Sky Ranch Development, Inc., as an additional insured in a timely fashion after 
being notified of the fact that the entity, for whatever reason, had been omitted as an 
additional insured. (R. at 741/16.) 
The testimony regarding the efforts to put insurance in place was information that 
Lynne Habberfield had taken some action regarding putting the insurance in place, but 
there was no testimony as to the time of those efforts. (Dep. Assn. 47.) The only evidence 
as to when the Association tried to get insurance was a memo from ATP to the 
Association dated May 5, 2003, the day after the cure period, asking for information on 
the additional insureds. (Ex. 14.) This does not tell us anything about, given the 
timeframe for curing deficiencies, whether the initial request was made in a timely 
manner, and making such a request in the final days of the cure period would not have 
been "a timely fashion." 
• No evidence was presented to indicate why the certificate of additional insureds was 
not issued until February 11, 2004, however the certificate clearly indicates that 
insurance coverage existed for the development entity from May 3, 2003. This 
evidence indicates that the Association acted in a timely manner to secure the required 
additional insured certificate, as it is unreasonable to conclude that an insurance 
company would provide insurance coverage it was not obligated to provide. (R. at 
741/16.) 
The evidence from the insurance company was that Sky Ranch Development was not 
an additional insured until February 11, 2004, but that the naming was retrodated to 
the beginning of that year's policy. (Dep. ATP 107-08.) This does not constitute 
compliance under the lease agreement. 
• The Association maintained continual and adequate insurance coverage at all times 
following the date the notice was first sent. (R. at 741/17.) 
Sky Ranch assumes this refers to the fact that the policy was backdated, as discussed 
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earlier. Even if one accepts that the backdating of Sky Ranch's proof of insurance meant 
that it was covered under the policy, Sky Ranch was not covered until May 3, 2003. (Tr.2 
32:21-23.) . 
• No claims were brought against Mr. Longley or any of his entities during the period in 
which the development entity was not named as an additional insured. (R. at 741/17.) 
This is true, (Tr.2 137:29-24) but irrelevant to the question of breach of contract. 
Sky Ranch was not timely named as additional insured, never consulted as to the policy 
limits, and never given a policy so that it could be informed as to the terms of the policy. 
B. Sky Ranch adequately notified the Association of its breaches as required 
by the Airport Lease and is entitled to termination. 
The first reason the trial court gives for its decision denying termination of the 
Airport Lease is that Sky Ranch "failed to put on any evidence showing they satisfied the 
contractual requirement to give written notice of termination to each member of the 
Association's board of trustees." (R. at 741/22.) However, this is a misstatement of the 
respective burdens of the parties. The claim being adjudicated in this respect was The 
Association's claim for Declaratory Relief, declaring the Airport Lease in Ml force and 
effect. Because the Association never raised this issue or alleged failure to properly serve 
in its complaint, Defendant did not need to provide evidence to refute it. Further, the 
issue of adequate service of notice was never brought up in Plaintiffs trial brief, and the 
Association admitted it had received both notices in its reply to Sky Ranch's 
counterclaim and at trial.18 (Tr.2 104:4-13; Ex. 3.) Because the trial court cannot raise an 
issue sua sponte without giving notice to the party and then base its ruling on that issue, 
18. Presently it appears that the court record does not contain the Association's reply 
to Sky Ranch's third amended complaint. Sky Ranch will move to amend the record to 
provide this pleading shortly. 
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see In re Behm 's Estate, 213 P.2d 657, 663 (Utah 1950), the trial court's ruling was 
improper. Moreover, as the Association admits that it received notice, and the notice 
provisions in no way protect any other interest of the Association, there is no need to 
require strict compliance. Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 1999). 
Further, the notice was adequate to inform the Association of the breaches. In 
addition to the letter provided that identified the issues, Sky Ranch also sent out a letter a 
month earlier making the same complaints. (Ex. 39.) Between these two items and the 
duty that the Association itself has to take care of the property, the notice was adequate. 
There did not need to be a recounting of every light bulb that was out and every weed that 
was pulled; the Association was sophisticated and knew or should have known its 
responsibilities under the lease. Finally, even if this Court does not believe that Sky 
Ranch qualifies for strict compliance, this would not halt its claims for money damages. 
C. Sky Ranch was not equitably estopped from terminating the lease. 
The trial court also concluded that Sky Ranch could not terminate the Airport 
Lease because it was equitably estopped from doing so. Specifically, the trial court found 
that "Mr. Longley represented to potential buyers that they would always have access to 
the Airport if they purchased a lot," and "most, if not all of the members of the 
Association purchased their lots in reliance upon Mr. Longley's representations regarding 
the Airport, including that they would always have access to the Airport."19 (R. at 741/3.) 
This conclusion does not comport with Utah law. 
First, there was no claim for equitable estoppel, because there was no 
19. Sky Ranch notes that this finding was inappropriate, as neither "most" nor "all" of 
the Association's members appeared or gave evidence before the trial court. The finding 
is therefore appropriate only as to the individuals who testified. 
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representation about a presently existing fact. The Utah Supreme Court explained the 
difference between equitable and promissory estoppel: 
Equitable estoppel reflects circumstances where it is not fair for a party to 
represent facts to be one way to get the other to agree, and then change 
positions later to the other's detriment.... Promissory estoppel, on the 
other hand, contemplates circumstances where a party promises that things 
will be a given way in the future, knowing at the time of the promise all of 
the material facts, but is ultimately wrong, and where the other relied on 
that promise in acting (or withholding action). 
Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ffi[ 15-16, 158 P.3d 1088. Any claim 
in this case would be about promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel. As there was an 
actual contract between Sky Ranch and the Association regarding this subject matter, 
promissory estoppel does not apply. Second, as every lot owner was apprised of the 
Airport Lease and the termination clause contained therein before buying a lot in the 
Development, it does not appear that there could have been reasonable reliance upon Mr. 
Longley's representation. See id. at ^ f 16 (promissory estoppel requires that the Plaintiff 
acted reasonably in relying upon the promise). But most importantly, the Association 
cannot assert an estoppel claim based on promises made to individual members. There 
was no evidence put on that would state that there were promises made to the 
Association, and since there was an actual contract between the Association and Sky 
Ranch, the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply at any rate. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE ESCROW MONIES CONSTITUTED FULL 
PAYMENT OF THE AIRPORT LEASE THROUGH 2010 WAS IN ERROR, AS THIS 
ISSUE WAS NEVER RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS NOR WAS ANY EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED TO JUSTIFY A RULING ON THE ISSUE. 
The trial court erred in making any ruling as to the sufficiency of the amount of 
AO 
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money held in escrow, as it was not properly before the court. As the question of whether 
an issue is properly before the court is a question of law, this Court reviews the question 
without deference to the trial court's conclusion. Lee, 2002 UT App 281 at ^ 6. In order 
for a trial court to make findings and award judgment on an issue, that issue must have 
been raised by the pleadings or tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, and 
the findings must be supported by the evidence presented. Id. at ^ 7; see also In re 
Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657, 663 (Utah 1950); Fisher v. Bylund, 93 P.2d 737, 739 (Utah 
1939); Garrett v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 1937). An issue is tried by the implied 
consent of the parties when "one party raises an issue material to the other party's case or 
where evidence is introduced without objection, and where it appears that the parties 
understood the evidence was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Lee, 2002 UT App 281 
at \ 7. Where the evidence presented to the trial court is not adequate to form a basis to 
resolve an issue, there is no implied consent to try that issue. Id. at 1flJ 10, 12. 
As previously mentioned in the Statement of Facts, there was no request by either 
party for an accounting of the funds held in escrow contained in the pleadings. Indeed, it 
would have been strange for Sky Ranch to request such an accounting, since its position 
was that the Airport Lease had been terminated in 2003 and was of no further force and 
effect, including the provision that determined the rental amount. The trial court's order 
did not bring the issue before the court either, as its order was permissive, stating that the 
Association "be allowed" to deposit the funds with the trial court, and in such amounts as 
it "alleged were due." 
Further, there was no evidence presented at trial as to the sufficiency of the 
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amounts held in escrow. As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, the Airport Lease 
determined the proper rental amount using the amount of residential and commercial lots 
that were not owned by Sky Ranch and the CPI for southwestern Utah, and was due 
semi-annually. There was no evidence as to the rate of inflation under the CPI, no 
evidence as to the amounts paid and the date of payment, and no evidence as to the 
number of residential and commercial lots that had been sold. Without such evidence, 
there was no way that the trial court could have made a determination of the issue, the 
issue was not tried with the implied consent of the parties, and any finding or order made 
would have been improper. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's 
judgment with respect to this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Sky Ranch respectfully asks this Court to reverse the 
trial court's decision and remand for a new trial in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of August, 2011. 
/S/ Nathan Whittaker 
Nathan Whittaker 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
20. It appears that no such finding was made until the trial court signed its judgment. 
While the Association asserts in its response to Sky Ranch's objection (R. at 743/3-4) 
that the trial court's finding that Sky Ranch had claimed that the Association's "current 
lease payment" was past due but provided no evidence to that fact, (R. at 741/17) it 
would appear from the surrounding findings that this finding was made with respect to 
justifying termination of the lease in 2003. At any rate, a finding with respect to the 
adequacy of the lease payments as of December of 2010 would have been improper, 
since there was never any claim made by Sky Ranch for terminating the lease at a later 
date, and such a claim could not be made since he continued to refuse lease payments. 
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NOV f 5 2010 
SMITH HARTVIGSESM 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
?ff/0#/<?_ 
rv. 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH 
LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRASSY MEADOW AIRPORT, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 030501171 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for trial after several years of diligent litigation. The 
volume of paperwork generated, filed and presented in evidence is staggering. The Court has 
received and studied the parties' post-trial papers, including proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from both parties. I have spent numerous hours reviewing the evidence and the 
proposed findings, with the goal to produce the Court's independent findings. Due to case load and 
scheduling demands, the Court's findings are overdue and I simply do not have the time necessary 
to complete independent findings. Since I am largely persuaded by Plaintiffs evidence and 
arguments, I am adopting most of Plaintiff s proposed findings and conclusions. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
From the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the following facts are established 
by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Land Owners 
Association (the "Association") is a Utah nonprofit Corporation with its principal place of business 
in Washington County, Utah. [See Michael O. Longley testimony ("Longley Testimony").] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Defendant/Counterclaimant Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. is a Utah corporation with 
its principal place of business in Washington County, Utah. [See id.] 
3. Defendant/Counterclaimant Sky Ranch Development, Inc. is a Utah corporation with 
its principal place of business in Washington County, Utah. [See id.] 
4. Defendant/Counterclaimant Michael 0. Longley is an individual residing in 
Washington County, Utah, and the principal owner and agent of Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. and 
Sky Ranch Development, Inc. [See id.] 
5. The Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned Development is a planned residential 
development near Hurricane, Utah, consisting of lots with access to a private, restricted airstrip (the 
"Community" or "Grassy Meadows Community"). [See id.; Danny Holt testimony ("Holt 
Testimony"); Jennifer McCarroll testimony ("McCarroll Testimony"); Lynne Habberfield Affidavit 
("Habberfield Affidavit"), attached as Exhibit 1 to her designated deposition, at |^ 4; Marilyn 
Murdock testimony ("Murdock Testimony"); Ray Batson Affidavit ("Batson Affidavit"), attached 
as Exhibit 1 to his designated deposition, at ^ 25; Ronald Santosuosso Affidavit ("Santosuosso 
Affidavit"), attached as Exhibit 1 to his designated deposition, at % 10.] € 
6. The airport ("Airport") is the centerpiece of the Community and the primary purpose 
for which the Community was built. [See id.] 
7. The Association is made up of lot owners in the Community, many of whom are 
private pilots and/or airplane owners, and Mr. Longley's company, Sky Ranch Development, Inc. 
as the developer. [See Longley Testimony; Holt Testimony; McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield 
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Affidavit at ^  39; Murdock Testimony; Batson Affidavit at ^ 6; Santosuosso Affidavit at Tf 5; Steve 
Brewer testimony ("Brewer Testimony").] 
8. Mr. Longley used the existence of the Airport in his marketing efforts to sell lots 
within the Community. Mr. Longley represented to potential buyers that they would always have 
access to the Airport if they purchased a lot. [See Longley Testimony; Exhibit 5 (1990 Declaration).] 
9. Mr. Longley further represented that access to the Airport would be restricted to 
small, non-commercial aircraft flown by other lot owners and their invitees only. [See id] 
10. Most, if not all, of the members of the Association purchased their lot(s) in reliance 
upon Mr. Longley's representations regarding the Airport, including that they would always have 
access to the Airport. [See Holt Testimony; McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit at ^ 4; 
Murdock Testimony; Batson Affidavit at ^ 25; Santosuosso Affidavit at f^ 10.] 
11. Consistent with Mr. Longley's representations to potential buyers, Grassy Meadows 
Airport, Inc. entered into a 99-year lease with the Association on November 25, 1990, pursuant to 
which the Association became the "exclusive occupant" of the Airport (the "Lease"). [See Exhibit 
1 (Lease) at 2; Longley Testimony.] 
12. The Lease contains a provision requiring the lessor to provide the lessee notice of the 
lessor's intention to terminate the Lease for any alleged breach of the Lease and to allow 30 days for 
the lessee to cure the same. [See Exhibit 1 (Lease) at 4, ^ 4.] 
13. Such notice must be in writing and sent via "certified letter, return receipt requested," 
to each member of the Association's Board of Trustees. [See id. at 4-5, f^ 4.] 
14. Such notice is deemed given two days after "posting." [See id. at 5, ^ 4.] 
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15. Also consistent with Mr. Longley's representations to potential buyers, Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc. drafted and recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions for 
the Association on July 16,1990 (the " 1990 Declaration"), which replaced a similar declaration he 
had previously drafted and recorded. [See Exhibit 5 (1990 Declaration).] 
16. The Declaration contains a two provisions allowing the declarant, Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc. to amend the Declaration unilaterally; read together, these provisions allow 
unilateral amendment in order to accomplish three specifically enumerated purposes: (I) to more 
accurately express the intent of any provision of this Declaration in light of then existing 
circumstances, information or mortgagee requirements, (ii) to better insure, in light of then existing 
circumstances or information, workability of the arrangement which is contemplated by this 
Declaration; or (iii) to facilitate the practical, teclinical, administrative or functional integration of 
any additional tract of subdivision into the Community. [See Exhibit 5 (1990 Declaration) at Article 
XI, §4 (p. 26) and Article XII, §3 (pp. 27-28).] 
17. The declarant's right unilaterally to amend the Declaration terminates once 80 percent 
of the lots in the Community have been sold. [See id. at Article XII, § 3.] f 
18. In approximately June 2002, 75 of the 92 lots platted in the Community had been 
sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the Community to 81.5 percent. [See Stipulation as to 
factual accuracy of Exhibit 265 (Association letter to Mr. Longley dated Sep. 7, 2002).] 
19. Subsequent to this event, the Association mailed a letter to Mr. Longley on September 
7, 2002 notifying him that his company's right unilaterally to amend the 1990 Declaration had 
terminated. [See id.] 
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20. Soon thereafter, Sky Ranch Development, Inc. unilaterally amended and restated the 
1990 Declaration and filed the same with the Washington County Recorder on October 25, 2002. 
[See Exhibit 6 (2002 Declaration).] 
21. During this same time period, Mr. Longley had been laying the groundwork for a new 
development ("Copper Rock") located adjacent to the Grassy Meadows Community. [See Longley 
Testimony.] 
22. Copper Rock had more than 1,600 planned lots and a 27-hold golf course. [See id] 
23. Mr. Longley wanted to provide access to the Grassy Meadows Airport to the future 
residents of Copper Rock, despite the 99-year lease that Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. had entered 
into with the Association providing that the Association members would have exclusive access to 
the Airport and despite the 1990 Declaration, which restricted access to the Airport to the owners 
of the 150 designated lots of the Grassy Meadows Community. [Longley Testimony; Exhibit 129 
(Grassy Meadows Ranch LLC Memo).] 
24. To accomplish these development obj ectives, Mr. Longley included terms in the 2002 
Declaration that were dramatically different from key provisions of the 1990 Declaration and added 
new provisions, none of which were mentioned, contemplated or addressed in any manner in the 
1990 Declaration. [See Exhibits 5 and 6 (1990 and 2002 Declarations).] 
25. For example, the 2002 Declaration: 
a. greatly expanded the limited property that was designated for the Community 
(which was limited to 150 lots) described in the 1990 Declaration, and therefore those having 
access to the Airport, to include "those portions of land set forth in Exhibit B" to the 2002 
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Declaration, which included "[a]ny and all property that may be annexed into the 
[Community,]" [see Exhibit 6 (2002 Declaration) at Article I, § 12 (p. 4) and Exhibit B 
thereto (emphasis added)]; 
b. greatly expanded the commercial fixed base operation area ("FBO") to be 
constructed adjacent to the Airport to "include, but [not be] limited to, facilities for the sale 
of airplane fuel, a convenience store, lodging units ("casitas"), airplane repair facilities, 
airplane washing facilities, and any other related facilities deemed appropriate or desirable 
by the Declarant" [id. at Article I, § 13 (p. 4) (emphasis added)];1 
c. modified the definition of "lots" within the Community to include hangars 
and the definition of "members" of the Association to include owners of hangars, which 
would significantly alter and dilute the Association member's voting rights vis-a-vis Mr. 
Longley's voting rights, [see id. at Article 1, §§ 16-17 (p. 5)]; 
d. imposed a burden upon the Association to "maintain the taxiways to meet all 
applicable safety standards" despite the fact that the taxiways are not common property of 
the association, but owned by private individuals, including Mr. Longley, [id. at Article I, 
§23 (p. 5)]; 
e. further diluted the Association members' voting rights by (1) altering the 
formula by which such rights are calculated, particularly by including hangar lots as 
described above; (2) attempting to resurrect Class B voting rights (the Declarant's voting 
1
 Testimony at trial made it clear that the Association did not object to Mr. Longley developing a limited FBO 
area as contemplated in the 1990 Declaration. The Association's objection is to the greatly expanded FBO area, 
including the unlimited right to add "any other related facilities deemed appropriate or desirable by the Declarant." 
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rights) which had previously been extinguished; (3) altering the definition of Class C 
members; and (4) extending the period of developer's control for 7 years from 2005 to 2012, 
[id at Article III, §2 (p. 7)]; 
f. imposed a prohibition to challenge Sky Ranch Development, Inc.'s voting 
rights by stating: "It shall be cause for automatic dismissal from membership on the Board 
of Trustees of the Association for board members to fail to recognize Declarant's votes, 
including those held in trust for Declarant," [id. at Article III, § 2(a) (pp. 7-8)]; 
g. allowed for the first time the "airport owner" (/. e., Grassy Meadows Airport, 
Inc.), not the Association only, to adopt rules and regulations burdening all the members of 
the Association,2 [ id. at Article IV, § 2 (p. 9)]; 
h. removed the Board of Trustees' ability to promulgate rules or regulations 
limiting "the allowable number of guests or invitees" that can be granted access to the 
Airport despite the fact that the Airport was intended to be used exclusively by Association 
members and their own guests,[ id. at Article IV, §§ 2 and 4(i) (pp. 9 and 11)]; 
i. allowed for the first time "jet or large aircraft" to land on the Airport despite 
the fact that the Airport was not designed for jets in terms of length or structural integrity (the 
Airport was designed to handle only aircraft that weigh less than 12,500 pounds) and despite 
the Declaration's prior prohibition of annoyances and nuisances, including the substantially 
greater noise generated by jet engines as opposed to propellers; [id. at art. IV, §§ 2 and 4(k) 
2
 This change also has the potential to allow Mr. Longley unilaterally to amend the Lease. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(pp. 9 and 11); Declaration at Article VII, § 8 (p. 18); Exhibit 122 (Creamer & Noble Expert 
Report]; and 
j . allowed the declarant to charge an admission fee and other fees to Association 
members for use of the Airport contrary to prior representations and agreements, [2002 
Declaration at Article IV, § 4(d) (p. 10)]. 
26. Mr. Longley also sought to change the county zoning ordinances governing the 
Grassy Meadows Community to allow larger aircraft to land and takeoff from the Airport. [See 
Longley Testimony.] 
27. Concerned about the radical changes the 2002 Declaration would cause to the nature 
of their quiet community, and believing Mr. Longley's company no longer had the authority to 
amend unilaterally the community's Declaration, the Association rejected the 2002 Declaration and 
challenged its validity. [See Murdock Testimony.] 
28. Many Association members also exercised their First Amendment rights of free 
speech and to petition the government by resisting Mr. Longley's efforts to change the zoning 
ordinances governing the Grassy Meadows Community at the Washington County Planning 
Commission. [See Longley Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
29. Almost immediately upon the heels of the Association's and its members' resistance 
to Mr. Longley's effort unilaterally to amend the Declaration and to change zoning ordinances, Mr. 
Longley's attorney sent a Notice of Termination of Lease dated March 31, 2003 alleging various 
breaches of the Lease ("Notice of Termination" or "Notice"). [See Exhibit 2 (Notice); Longley 
Testimony.] 
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30. Mr. Longley did not offer any evidence showing he mailed a copy of this notice via 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to each member of the Association's Board of Trustees, as 
required by the Lease. 
31. Nor did Mr. Longley offer any evidence showing the date on which the letter was 
posted in order to establish when the applicable cure period would have begun. 
32. The Notice of Termination alleged the following four breaches: 
a. "Lessee has failed to maintain the Airport and runway lights anywhere near 
the same condition they were in when they were received, normal wear and tear excepted." 
[Exhibit 2 (Notice) at l,1f 1.] 
b. "Lessee has repeatedly ignored and failed to subject itself to the CC&RS [sic]. 
Examples include, but are not limited to, improper Trustee agendas, failure to collect 
multiple lot assessments, failure to maintain fencing and lot weed control, failure to fix 
broken runway lights, failure to deliver the insurance policy to the Declarant, protesting 
before the Washington County Commission the Declarant's Community activities that are 
specifically allowed by the CC&Rs, and denial of Class B voting rights and the voting rights 
of the owners of lots in Phase 5C." [Id. at 1,1f 2.] 
c. "Lessee has failed to meet the necessary insurance requirements as outlined 
in section 10, and has failed to seek the approval of Lessor of the limit of liability coverage 
of said insurance, and has otherwise failed to seek the approval of Lessor before obtaining 
said insurance as required by section 10. Indeed, for some time Lessee has failed to even 
provide Lessor a copy of the insurance policy." [Id. at 2, ^ 3.] 
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d. "The lease fee specified in section 3 has frequently been overdue over the 
years, and is currently past due." [Id. at 2, |^ 4.] 
33. The Notice of Termination was the first such notice Mr. Longley sent to the 
Association during the approximately 12 years that had passed since the parties entered in the Lease. 
[see Longley Testimony] 
34. The only other letter Mr. Longley sent to the Association outlining alleged 
deficiencies regarding the Airport came one month prior to the Notice of Termination. [Longley 
Testimony; Exhibit 273.] 
35. It was only after the Association resisted Mr. Longley's efforts to amend the 
covenants, conditions and restrictions and zoning ordinances applicable to the community to 
facilitate his Copper Rock Development that Mr. Longley sent the Association any kind of written 
complaint about the Airport's maintenance or any other issue pertaining to the Airport. [Longley 
Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
36. The Association denied any breach of the Lease as alleged by Mr. Longley, but 
nevertheless made concerted efforts to address the issues Mr. Longley brought to its attention in 
order to attempt to appease Mr. Longley, including replacing all broken lights, removing weeds 
growing next to the Airport and addressing other minor maintenance issues. [Murdock Testimony.] 
37. Mr. Longley described the Association's efforts in this regard as "frenzied." [See 
Exhibit 2 (Notice).] 
38. Evidence presented at trial shows that the Association substantially complied with 
all the terms of the Lease. 
m 
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39. Although maintenance issues arose from time to time, including at the time the Notice 
of Termination was sent, such maintenance items fall within what would reasonably be expected as 
normal wear and tear of improvements on real property of this type. 
40. Nevertheless, the Airport was always in reasonably good working order and 
condition. [See Holt Testimony; McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit; Murdock Testimony; 
Batson Affidavit; Santosuosso Affidavit.] 
41. The Association engaged in regular and frequent maintenance, and even 
improvements, of the Airport throughout the lease period, including the following, among other 
things: 
a. added paint markings as an improvement to the Airport; 
b. funded an apron composed of crushed stone and sterilant pellets to be placed 
on each side of the airstrip for the length of the airstrip to repair undercutting to the airstrip 
that had occurred; 
c. took measures to abate and remove weeds, including spraying and cleaning 
the Airport in March, July, August and September of 2003; 
d. kept the rail fences surrounding the Airport in good repair, including repairing 
them after they were damaged due to a lightning strike and automobile accident; 
e. kept most of the airport lights in good working condition, including repairing 
lights on taxiways, even though not required to do so by the Lease; and 
f. paid to have portions of the Airport needing attention crack-sealed almost 
every year, including in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
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[See Habberfield Affidavit at ffi[ 13,14,16-25, 33-35 and 38; Batson Affidavit at ^  10-18 and 21; 
Santosuosso Affidavit at ^ 6, 9 and 18; McCarroll Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
42. Wayne Rogers, one of Mr. Longley's experts, testified that the Airport had 
"definitely" been maintained. [See Wayne Rogers testimony.] 
43. Mr. Rogers also testified that: 
a. asphalt inevitably shrinks and cracks due to environmental conditions; 
b. the cracking he observed at Grassy Meadows was consistent with an airport 
of its age; 
c. shrinkage and cracks by themselves do not indicate a lack of maintenance but 
are just a result of natural aging; 
d. he had no reason to believe that the weeds or drainage issues he observed 
posed any kind of hazard; 
e. the Airport was in fairly good condition compared to the other runways he has 
inspected. 
[See id] 
44. Craig Ide, one of the Association's experts and the person in charge of inspecting the 
pavement at municipal airports across the state on behalf of the aeronautical division of the Utah 
Department of Transportation, testified that the Airport rated a 69 or "good" on the Pavement 
Condition Index. [See Exhibit 161 (Craig Ide Affidavit) at H 7.] 
45. Mr. Ide testified that the average score for municipal airports in 2003 was 59. [Id] 
1? 
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46. With respect to the lighting on the Airport, Mr. Longley conceded that the lighting 
system was a military surplus system, which he bought and installed himself. [See Longley 
Testimony.] 
47. All the evidence introduced established that, while the lighting system was showing 
its age, it was generally kept in good working order—at least in the same condition as when it was 
installed, "normal wear and tear excepted,"3 as permitted by the Lease. [See Exhibit 1 (Lease) at TJ 
8; Holt Testimony; Batson Affidavit; McCarroll Testimony.] 
48. In addition to witnesses for the Association, another one of Mr. Longley's experts, 
Ryan Christensen, testified that, although there were some lights on the airport that needed replacing 
and others that needed cleaning and polishing, the lighting system worked when tested and 
performed the function it was designed to perform. [See Ryan Christensen testimony.] 
49. Mr. Christensen acknowledged that when he was deposed shortly after inspecting the 
runway in late 2003 he testified that he"wouldn't be concerned about" landing on the Airport at 
night. [See id] 
50. There are no lights on any of the taxi ways, except for those in the FBO area owned 
and controlled by Mr. Longley. [see Brewer Testimony.] 
51. Any lights on the Airport that were broken in March 2003, were subsequently and 
timely repaired by the Association. [See Murdock Testimony.] 
3
 Normal wear and tear is a significant factor to be kept in mind as it relates to the Airport and the lighting 
system in particular given the testimony of the harsh desert conditions that plagued the Airport. [See Longley Testimony; 
Christensen Testimony; Brewer Testimony.] 
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52. At least one witness, a pilot and real estate expert who no longer has ties to any party 
in this matter, testified that he inspected the Airport at the very time Mr. Longley alleged it was in 
disarray and concluded that the Airport was in good condition and decided to purchase a lot in the 
community based thereon. [See Holt Testimony.] 
53. Another witness, a pilot with no continuing ties to any party, testified that he also 
inspected the Airport around this same time and found it to be in "very good condition." [See Brewer 
Testimony.] 
54. At no time have maintenance issues affected flight operations or compromised the 
safety of those using the Airport in any way. [See Longley Testimony; Murdock Testimony; Brewer 
Testimony; Holt Testimony, McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit; Batson Affidavit and 
Santosuosso Affidavit.] 
55. Mr. Longley also alleged that the Association breached the Lease by failing to abide 
by all the conditions, covenants and restrictions of the Declaration. 
56. The Court has previously ruled that uthe provision in the Lease stating that the Lease 
is c[s]ubject to all the terms, covenants and conditions' constitutes an acknowledgment that the 
Declaration exists and encumbers the property rights that the Association was obtaining from Mr. 
Longley; however, it cannot be interpreted to allow Mr. Longley to terminate the Lease for a breach 
of the provisions of the Declaration." [Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action) dated July 17, 2007 at 
4-] 
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57. In addition, the Court finds that the lessor's notice with respect to this issue was again 
deficient. 
58. Mr. Longley did not reference any specific provision of the Declaration he alleged 
the Association had breached. 
59. Moreover, Mr. Longley's references to "improper Trustee agendas" and "failure to 
collect multiple lot assessments" do not identify a specific ongoing breach that needs curing. [Notice 
at 142.] 
60. Mr. Longley also alleged that the Association had denied him his "Class B voting 
rights and the voting rights of the owners of lots in Phase 5C." 
61. With respect to Class B voting rights, Mr. Longley himself affirmed that "Class B 
membership automatically ceased on or about June 16, 1994"). [See Longley Testimony.] 
62. Mr. Longley also asserted that the Association had failed to meet the "necessary 
insurance requirements" outlined in the Lease. Once again, however, Mr. Longley did not specify 
what insurance requirements were not met other than to assert that the Association failed to seek his 
approval and provide him a copy of the policy. [See Exhibit 2 (Notice) at 2.] 
63. Once the Association was apprised of Mr. Longley's concerns, it immediately made 
arrangements to have a copy of the insurance policy forwarded to Mr. Longley. ]See Murdock 
Testimony.] 
64. In fact, in his Final Notice, Mr. Longley states: "A mere statement in Lessee's 
counsel's letter of April 15, 2003 that the required insurance has been maintained and that a copy 
of the same is now belatedly being provided, is not enough." [See Exhibit 4 (Final Notice) at 2, ^ 3.] 
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65. Contrary to Mr. Longley's statement, providing a copy of the insurance policy after 
being given notice of the outstanding need to do so is precisely what is contemplated in the Lease's 
notice and cure provision. Moreover, the Association had little ability to cure its alleged failure to 
seek Mr. Longley's prior approval of the policy until it was time to renew the policy. 
66. There is no evidence in the record that the Association failed to do this after being 
put on notice by Mr. Longley. 
67. The Court also finds that the Association exercised good faith efforts to name Mr. 
Longley's development entity, Sky Ranch Development, Inc., as an additional insured in a timely 
fashion after being notified of the fact that the entity, for whatever reason, had been omitted as an 
additional insured. [See Exhibit 102 (Airport Liability Additional Insured Certificates of Insurance).] 
68. No evidence was presented to indicate why the certificate of additional insureds was 
not issued until February 11,2004; however, the certificate clearly indicates that insurance coverage 
existed for the development entity from May 3, 2003, no more than one day after the 30-day cure 
period expired, assuming without finding that the Notice of Termination was posted on the same day 
reflected on the letter.4 [Id.] 
69. This evidence indicates that the Association acted in a timely manner to secure the 
required additional insured certificate, as it is unreasonable to conclude that an insurance company 
would provide insurance coverage it was not obligated to provide. 
4
 As indicated above, no evidence was presented as to when the letter was posted, and the Court, therefore, 
cannot make any finding in that regard. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that it was posted on March 
31, 2003, the 30-day cure period would begin to run on April 2 (two days after the letter was posted pursuant to 
paragraph 4 of the Lease) and expire on May 2, 2003. 
1 £ 
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70. The Association maintained continual and adequate insurance coverage at all times 
following the date the Notice was first sent. [See Longley Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
71. No claims were brought against Mr. Longley or any of this entities during the period 
in which the development entity was not named as an additional insured. [See Longley Testimony.] 
72. Finally, Mr. Longley asserted that the Association's current lease payment was past 
due, but no evidence was presented at trial and no mention of any outstanding or delinquent lease 
payments was even made at trial. 
73. Despite the deficiencies in Mr. Longley's allegations about the Airport, Mr. Longley 
sent a letter to the Association shortly after purportedly terminating the lease, stating: "Grassy 
Meadows Airport, Inc. [the lessor] has no desire to prohibit lot owners [the Association] from use 
of the runway . . . ." [See Exhibit 283 (Duane Ostler Letter of June 6, 2003).] 
74. The Association thus continued to use the Airport virtually uninterrupted and has 
continued to use the Airport over the past seven-plus years without accident or undesirable incident 
of any kind. [See Longley Testimony.] 
75. Mr. Longley has made no further assertions of breach by the Association during this 
time. [See Longley Testimony.] 
76. To this day, there are virtually no common areas within the Community other than 
the private Airport, which, although technically not a common area, functions for all intents and 
purposes as a common area for the benefit and use of the Association and its members. [See Longley 
Testimony.] 
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77. Access to the Airport is the foundation on which the entire Community was built and 
the primary benefit represented to potential buyers of lots within the Community. As such the 
Airport provides a central and irreplaceable benefit to the Association and its members. [See Longley 
Testimony; Holt testimony; McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit at ^  4; Murdock Testimony; 
Batson Affidavit at *[  25; Santosuosso Affidavit at ^ 10.] 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There are three issues before the court: (1) whether Mr. Longley's company, Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc. had the right in 2002 unilaterally to amend the covenants, conditions and 
restrictions governing the Association; (2) whether the Association and its members had the right 
to oppose Mr. Longley's efforts to change the zoning ordinances governing the Community; and (3) 
whether Mr. Longley may terminate the Lease he entered into with the Association. Based upon the 
above findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law with respect to each of 
these issues. •• • . 
1. The Declaration allows the declarant to amend the Declaration "until eighty percent 
(80%) of the lots in the Community (including additional phases as may be added) have been sold 
to purchasers." [Declaration at Article XII, § 3 (p. 28).] 
2. As the Court previously noted in its Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action) dated July 17, 2007 
("Memorandum Decision"), it is not clear whether the number of lots, from which the 80 percent 
calculation would be made, includes only then-existing lots or all future lots. 
1 Q 
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3. The phrase, aas may be added," could be interpreted to include lots (1) "as are 
permitted to be added in the future, no matter how many have already been added at any point in 
time," or (2) uas may have been added at any point in time, no matter how many may be permitted 
in the future." 
4. Because this language is susceptible to two different interpretations, it creates an 
ambiguity in the contract that must be construed against the drafter, in this case Mr. Longley. [See 
U.S. Fid. and Guar. Cov. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993); Culbertson v. Board of Ctv. 
Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108, ^ f 15,44 P.3d 642 (noting ambiguous legal documents are construed against 
the party that drafted them).] 
5. Consistent with these fundamental rules of construction, the Court concludes that this 
threshold was passed on or about June 11, 2002, some months prior to the declarant's filing of the 
amended and restated Declaration in 2002. 
6. Thus, as of June 11, 2002, Sky Ranch Development, Inc. no longer had the authority 
to amend unilaterally the Declaration and the 2002 Declaration is thus void. 
7. The Court further concludes that the 2002 Declaration did not advance any of the 
three specifically enumerated purposes justifying unilateral amendment. 
8. The 2002 Declaration would have materially altered the terms and substance of the 
1990 Declaration and thereby would have impermissibly altered the nature of the Association in a 
number of significant respects as detailed in the findings of fact. 
9. Far from more accurately expressing the intent of the original Declaration, the 2002 
Declaration would have given Sky Ranch Development, Inc. the right to transform a quiet 
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community, in which a limited number of lot owners had access to a private airport restricted to 
small aircraft, into a hub of commercial activity including greatly multiplying the number of hangars 
and commercial lots originally contemplated. 
10. The 2002 Declaration also would have allowed refueling stations, stores, maintenance 
facilities and even hotels catering to larger aircraft and jets flown by an unlimited number of people 
who may or may not own an unlimited number of lots beyond the original 150 lots plotted for the 
community. 
11. In addition, the 2002 Declaration would have given Sky Ranch Development, Inc. 
unlimited power to expand these already greatly expanded commercial operations as it alone 
"deemed appropriate or desirable" [See Exhibit 6 (2002 Declaration) at Article I, § 13 (p. 4)] 
12. The 2002 Declaration also would have impermissibly diluted the Association 
members' existing voting rights. [Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App 103, ^ | 19, 3 P.3d 187.] 
13. Because the 2002 Declaration did not further any of the three limited purposes 
enumerated in the 1990 Declaration justifying unilateral amendment but rather materially changed 
the character and nature of the Association, the 2002 Declaration would be void even if 80 percent 
of the lots had not been sold at the time of the amendment. [See Restatement (Third) of Property, § 
6.21 (2000) ("A developer may not exercise a power to amend or modify the declaration in a way 
that would materially change the character of the development — " ) ; Moore v. Megginson, 416 So. 
2d 993 (Ala. 1982) (striking down unilateral amendment that expanded commercial uses within a 
fundamentally private homeowners association).] 
on 
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14. There is no evidence showing that the Association interfered with any legitimate 
business interest of Mr. Longley or his companies for "an improper purpose or by improper means." 
[Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).] 
15. The Association had no contractual obligation not to oppose Mr. Longley's effort to 
change the zoning ordinances applicable to the Airport and community, which the Association felt 
far exceeded the limited commercial uses originally planned for the community. 
16. Moreover, the Association had a constitutional right to oppose Mr. Longley's effort 
to change the zoning. [See Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^25, 116 P.3d 323 (holding 
developer's tortious interference claim brought against individuals resisting zoning changes barred 
by Noerr-Pennington immunity).] 
17. The constitutional right to petition the government—and to be immune from liability 
for doing so—is enjoyed by individuals and legal entities, such as incorporated associations, alike. 
[Id. ("In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court has held that individuals and 
organizations are immune from liability under antitrust laws for actions constituting petitions to the 
government.") (emphasis added); Kovac v. Crooked River Ranch Club and Maintenance Ass 'n, 63 
P.3d 1197, 1200-01 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding homeowner association's actions in opposing 
homeowner's application for a conditional use permit amounted to nothing more than 
constitutionally protected participation in the political process and were therefore immune from 
antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.").] 
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18. Because the Association had no contractual obligation not to oppose zoning changes 
they perceived to be adverse to the Association's interests,5 and because they are immune from 
liability for petitioning the government in any event, there is no basis to hold the Association liable 
for tortious interference in this case. 
19. Mr. Longley and Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. failed to provide sufficient notice to 
the Association to justify termination of the lease. 
20. Mr. Longley and Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. failed to put on any evidence 
showing they satisfied the contractual requirement to give written notice of termination to each 
member of the Association's board of trustees. 
21. This alone prohibits the Court from considering termination as a remedy in this case. 
[Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding where 
forfeiture is a possible remedy, person seeking forfeiture '"must comply strictly with the notice 
provisions of the contract.'") (emphasis in Siggard) (citations omitted).] 
22. Moreover, the Notice of Termination itself lacks the requisite specificity to apprise 
the Association of the alleged lease breaches that needed curing. 
23. A cure period is meaningless and of no effect if the lessee is not apprised specifically 
of the alleged problems that need curing. 
24. In any event, the Court concludes that the Association substantially complied with 
the terms of the Lease. [See Cache County v. Bens, 1999 UT App 134, ^  36,978 P.2d 1043 (holding 
5
 Indeed, had any board member agreed not to resist zoning ordinance changes adverse to the Association, such 
an agreement would be void as being inconsistent with the board member's fiduciary duties. 
99 
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"a trial court should determine the materiality of the breach, and then decide whether the breaching 
party had substantially complied with the [lease].").] 
25. First, Mr. Longley and Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. have not been deprived of any 
benefit to which they are entitled under the Lease, including receiving regular lease payments. Id. 
at % 37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 241 (1981)). 
26. On the other hand, the Association would suffer greatly if the lease were terminated. 
27. The veiy purpose for the Community was to have access to a private airport. If access 
to the airport were now denied, the sole purpose for the Community's existence would be eliminated, 
airplane hangars built by the Association's members would have no use, transportation to and from 
the Community would be restricted and property values would decrease significantly. Id. 
28. The evidence presented established that any alleged breaches have been cured. 
29. Mr. Longley's admission that the Association reacted to his Notice of Termination 
with "frenzied efforts" to cure the alleged deficiencies also evinces good faith on the part of the 
Association to comply with all its obligations under the Lease. 
30. The Association's good faith efforts to meet all its obligations under the Lease is 
further supported by the fact that the Association has continued to use the Airport for the past seven-
plus years since the alleged breach occurred without further complaint from Mr. Longley and without 
any accident or adverse incident of any kind. 
31. Consequently, any breach of the Lease that may have occurred was immaterial and 
termination of the Lease would be inappropriate in light of the substantial performance doctrine. 
1-2 
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32. In addition, the Court concludes that Mr. Longley and Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. 
are equitably estopped from seeking termination as a remedy for any minor breach that may have 
occurred. [Whitaker v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 2008, TJ 22, 191 P.3d 814.] 
3 3. The evidence in this case reveals that Mr. Longley represented to the persons to whom 
he sold lots in the community (the members of the Association) that the Community was a 
residential airport community where people could purchase lots adjacent, or in close proximity, to 
the Airport, build homes on those lots, and come and go in their own small, non-commercial aircraft. 
34. Members of the Association testified that they relied on these representations in 
deciding to buy and build homes and other improvements on lots in the Community. 
35. Such action by the members was reasonable in light of Mr. Longley's representations, 
which were confirmed both in the Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. Lease and the Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc. Declaration. 
36. If Mr. Longley were allowed now to act contrary to his representations on which the 
Association members reasonably relied and terminate the lease granting them access to the Airport, 
the fundamental reason that induced members to buy lots from Mr. Longley would be eliminated. 
37. Mr. Longley is thus equitably estopped from seeking termination as a remedy, even 
were this Court to find that there had been a material breach of the lease.6 
38. The Court concludes, therefore, that Mr. Longley is not entitled to terminate the Lease 
but instead continues to be bound by its provision, as is the Association. 
6
 This is not to say that Mr. Longley would be without any remedy in the event this Court had found a material 
breach of the Lease. In such a case, the appropriate remedy would be specific performance of the Lease terms and 
damages, if applicable. 
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39. Plaintiffs counsel should submit a judgment which is consistent with the foregoing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
DATED this fo day of August, 2010. 
G. RAND BEACHAM 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of cWAf\, 2010,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each of 
the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's 
Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
J. Craig Smith 
Attorney for Defendants 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CLERK OF COURT 
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A bench trial was held before the Court, commencing on April 19,2010 and concluding on 
April 20,2010. Plaintiff Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Land Owners Association was represented 
by John D. Richards and Gregory N, Hoole, Defendants Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., Michael 0. 
Longley and Sky Ranch Development, Inc. were represented by J. Craig Smith and R. Christopher 
Preston. At the trial the parties offered testimony and other evidence in support of the three issues 
remaining in this case: (1) whether Defendant Sky Ranch Development, Inc. had the authority to 
record the Second Restated Supplementary and Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & 
Restrictions for Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch recorded by Defendant Sky Ranch Development, Inc. 
on October 25,2002 (the "Purported Declaration") or whether the Purported Declaration is void; (2); 
whether Plaintiff tortiously interfered with the legitimate business interests of Defendants by 
opposing proposed zoning ordinance changes affecting Plaintiff1 and (3) whether the 99-year lease 
entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. on November 25,1990 (the 
"Lease") was breached and then properly terminated by Defendant or whether the lease remains in 
full force and effect, On August 6,2010 the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law regarding these issues. 
Based on evidence received at trial as outlined in these findings and conclusions, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1
 Beoause of a scheduling conflict, the Court adjourned the trial earlier than expected, anticipating that the Court 
would reconvene the trial to hear additional evidence on this second issue, (Prior to adjourning the trial, Defendants had 
been unable to establish any contractual obligation on behalf of Plaintiff that could form the basts of a tortious 
interference claim. Specifically, the only evidence Defendants had Introduced was an unsigned contract with proposed 
modifications handwritten on tt,) After ftirther revlewlngthe tortious interference claim, however, the Court Is persuaded 
that Plaintiff cannot be held liable regardless of what additional evidence may be presented because of Plaintiffs 
constitutional right to petition the government as set forth more ftilly in the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law. In light of this ruling, it Is unnecessary to reconvene the trial to receive more evidence on this issue, 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. Defendant Sky ranch Development, Inc. did not have the authority to record the 
Purported Declaration and, therefore, such declaration is void ab initio. The declarations of 
covenants, conditions and restrictions governing the Plaintiff association prior to the October 25, 
2002 filing of the Purported Declaration continue in Ml force and effect. 
2. Plaintiff did not tortiously interfere with any legitimate business interest of the 
Defendants. 
3. Plaintiff did not materially breach the Lease, and Defendant Grassy Meadows Airport, 
Inc. did not properly terminate the Lease. Therefore, the Lease remains in full force and effect. 
4. Judgement is hereby entered in Plaintiffs favor consistent with these rulings on all 
claims and counterclaims related to these issues. All other claims and counterclaims not previously 
dismissed are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5. All monies currently held by the Court in escrow shall be released to Defendant 
Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of this Judgment, 
assuming no appeal is taken with respect to the breach of contract issue. All monies so released shall 
be applied as rent paid in full under the Lease through December 31,2010. If an appeal is taken, the 
monies will continue to be held in escrow and Plaintiff will continue to make lease payments to the 
Court pending final resolution of this issue. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff is entitled to 
the costs it incurred relating to the claims on which it prevailed at trial. 
/ 
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0£" 
DATED this UP day of Seplerfiijer, 2010, 
. BY THE COURT: 
L£\*Jk&> 
.Hon. G. Rand Beachafti 
District Court Judge 
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GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH 
AIRPORT LEASE AGREEMENT 
This Airport Lease A x e m e n t i s made and entered into this 
g g ^ day cf toJE^gL.A » ^ „ ^ ! ! ^ ^ ! i ^ ^ l _ " B ! W : 
INC. , a Utah corporat ion of St . George, County of Washington, Stat . 
of Utah, (here inaf ter referred t o aa "Lessor") and the GRASSY 
MEADOWS SKY RANCH LAND OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a non-prof i t Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n of Hurricane, County cf Washington, S t a t , of Utah, 
( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as •Lessee") . 
R E C I T A L S : 
WHEREAS, L e s s o r ' s predeceseor in i n t e r e s t , WASCO, » Utah 
g e n e r a l partnersh ip , and i t s individual genera l partners , have 
c o n s t r u c t e d the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Airport a s . a private 
r e s t r i c t e d a i r p o r t in the general v i c i n i t y of Grassy Meadov, Sky 
Ranch Planned Development near Hurricane, Utah, cons i s t ing of a 
1 6 0 - f o o t wide s t r i p of land 4491 feet long, here ina f t er called 
- A i r p o r t " , more p a r t i c u l a r l y described in Exh ib i t "A" hereto, and 
e x p r e s s l y exc ludes that e ight-acre parcel of land known « the 
f u t u r e FBO and pond area; and 
WHEREAS, the general intent of Lessor's predecessor in interest 
c o n s t r u c t i n g s a i d Airport was to jnake i t a v a i l a b l e for the u»e of 
r e s i d e n t s and owners of l o t s in Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned 
Development Subdiv i s ion , their guests and i n v i t e e s , and other 
i n d i v i d u a l s l i v i n g or doing business in the same general area; and 
WHEREAS, Les sor ' s predecessor in in teres t and c e r t a i n owners of 
l o t s i n the GraBsy Meadowj Planned Development, on May 30, 1917, 
EXHIBIT 
R 3 0 / 1 9 
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e n t e r e d Into an Airport Lease Agreement, and the parties as 
s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t , desire to supersede, modify, supplement and 
amend the same aa provided herein r Itor the purpose of granting t h e * 
A%|iac^b^t2^M«4^dbiitt^«meini>erfif guests and i n v i t e e s tha e x c l u s i v e r ight^ 
_ • _ ; HDW .^..THEREFOHEf in., -considerat ion -of the mutual, ..p.romiflfts. and 
agreements here in contained, Lessor grants to Lessee for the period 
o f n i n e t y - n i n e (99) years from the date f i r s t wr i t ten above, th i s 
e x c l u s i v e Airport Lease Agreement for the purposes and u s e of Grassy 
Meadows Sky Ranch Airport for landing and take-off of Leasee's 
members, l i c e n s e e s , the ir guests and i n v i t e e s a i r c r a f t subject to 
t h e fo l lowing terms and-conditions: 
1 . Lessee the Exclusive Occupant, efinabaj-ect t o a l l terms, , 
«miABS3&33fca^"Wi^ ^^ o f Cov enar._ t s^,^ . 
ScmOgtoJmtfa"^^ cf Grassy Meadows Bky Ranch Planned** 
Pj^^opiaenuW^ia-nd^^aiiy^ssupplementa ~ and amendments t h e r e t o , Lessee v» 
s h a l l be the e x c l u s i v e oeeupwnt of the a i rpor t for the purpose of 
t a x i i n g , t a k e - o f f , and landing of a i r c r a f t ^ea^ept j - .as--- othejjd,se 
^parovided hereaftere As the exclusive occupant, *Iessee may grant-to 
ot&^OT 1 1 ^* r i g h t to use the a irport "and i&ay adopt ruler-'-and^* 
r«gttBKtSttJtti governing- the procedure for granting, .such r i g h t s and for 
t*W^fWf!I^tm«aiid«**u»5««o*-the- a irport . *..The p a r t i e s acknowledge that 
the runway i s now paved, and Lessee has had the opportunity to 
i n s p e c t and accept the premises, in "as i s" condition. 
*
5Ntyc«r4^^'ta.'nai,n'igsKtii«-; above rwssexved to Sky Ranch- Dev.elopraentvs.Inc* 
JLhe-jG.raa.a-V.-..Me|a|dp|W|3 , S T ^ j ^ c h Planned 
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Development, l a t h e r ight to use the Airport for the use of up ,to 
S ^ 150 Lot Owners, and to use the same for marketing purposes, 
i n c l u d i n g lnvlrtog^gti'e*^-^o^u^« the runway, *. 
2 . Limitat ion to Described Purpose» The Airport may be used 
by L e s s e e ' s members l i c e n s e e s , the ir -guests and invitees^sole ly , , fa* 
.the purpose of t a x i i n g , take-off_• ^jwi^Knding_p.t_,aix£xaft.„.ai>d„._f.o.rr 
p^^l«%TOm#^purp.o*e* .related the:r*etto^** Under no circumstances sha l l 
Lessee allow a i r c r a f t to park or be t i e d dovm on the runway area, 
tax iways or any part thereof. Lessee further agrees t o require i t s 
members and t h t i r gues t s or i n v i t e e s to provide pr ivate aircraft 
parking areas equipped with tie-down f a c i l i t i e s for . a l l aircraft 
operated by Lessee , i t s members, l i c e n s e e s , t h e i r guests and 
i n v i t e e s . LBBZZ*, i t s members, i n v i t e e s , t h e i r gues^.a and invitees 
s h a l l , at a l l t i m e 2 , ^ ^ B ^ r ^ ^ F ^ ^ o u ^ by a l l applicable FAA 
~ w - ^ & w n i t t f l * ^ the use of the a i r s t r i p .and by any 
and a l l r u l e s and regulat ions adopted by Lessor or the l e ssee , as 
4£tK$%0tts* may be , for the operation of the Add^ost. 
3 . Lease Fees . Lessee agrees to remit to Lessor a monthly 
l e a s e charge of $7.50 per r e s i d e n t i a l l o t and $30.00 per commercial 
l o t , e x p r e s s l y excluding a l l land or l o t s owned or held by Lessor in 
the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned Development Subdivision, except 
for t h o s e l o t s owned by Lessor which are a part and member of the 
Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Landowners Assoc ia t ion . Least payments 
s h a l l commence January 1, 1990, and shal l be paid semi-annually to 
Lessor each s i x months thereafter without pr ior no t i ce . Adjustment 
to the Lease charge w i l l be made 'on "an 'annual basis based on the 
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Publ ished National Consum«r Pries Index for Southwestern Utah, The 
adjustment i s to be e f fec t ive on the anniversary of rent ^j 
commencement baaed upon the annual CPI change for September to 
September. The base CPI i s to be September 1985. 
The monthly l e a s e payments s h a l l be mailed to Lessor at P. 0. 
_ Box ...31_#_ Hurricane, ...Oiah~..84 771r-or a t such other place designated -in — 
w r i t i n g by Leaner. Any rental payments f o r t y - f i v e (45) day* past 
due s h a l l be deemed to be in defaul t . 
Amounts which art past due and remaining unpaid t h a t arc oved 
the L e s s o r by the Less&a shal l , without not i ce to Lessee , become a 
l i e n upon each l o t , other than the land or l o t s owned or held by 
L e s s o r , in the Grassy Meadows Sky "Ranch Planned Development and the 
l e a s e d a irport property and any common areas owned or administered 
by L e s s e e , n inety-one (91) days a f t e r said amount becomes due and 
paya±>la to Lessor . The l i e n provided here in , sha l l continue unt i l >- / 
the p a s t due renta l assessment i s paid in f u l l . « X t ^ t f ? h r ^ l « ^ U ^ ^ 
rei^rl^a^Bessmen^^con^inues in defaul t for a period of s i x .months £>%&* 
moj»sr^l&mTXP**^^ to in i t ia te - ' -suit or p r o s e c u t ^ ^ 
PXQ^^^^||g^i^Aa?v^oii^^equl*tyT ** may b&^nwc^n9&r^^J^^^^fg^£^^^i^^ 
—provided tov*«fo&P94!n*nu\& payment thereof , together wi th interest, 
t h e r e o n , at the maximum legal - rate--peimmiinuin^Xrom^^ 
^eaaee^'shal l pay all" -of "-Les'sor1 s court'"costs ;^reasonable^a^t^0OTey^^^ 
•4ees«*a»d any other cos t s associated with any such ac t ion , '** 
4- Termination, Should Lessee be in d e f a u l t of the terms and 
c o n d i t i o n s provided h e r e i n , th is Airport Lease Agreement shall 
t e r m i n a t e t h i r t y "(30) -days after Lessor has no t i f i ed Lessea i n 
w r i t i n g of Les sor ' s i n t e n t to terminate th i s Lease Agreement, unless 
4 
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t e n a n t remedies de fau l t prior to the expirat ion of the 30-day 
p e r i o d . Such n o t i c e s h a l l be given by n o t i f y i n g each member of the 
Board of L*B*tt by c e r t i f i e d mail , return r e c e i p t requested. Notice 
• h a l l be deemed given two (2) days a f ter p o s t i n g . 
5 . N o t i c e s . Any n o t i c e by Lessee to Lessor must be served by 
a recognized overnight messenger s e r v i c e , c e r t i f i e d or registered 
m a i l , postage prepaid, addressed to Lessor , at P. 0. Box 51, 
Hurricane, Utah 84771, or at such other address as Lessor may 
d e s i g n a t e by w r i t t e n n o t i c e . 
Any n o t i c e by Leseor to Lessee must be served by a recognized 
o v e r n i g h t messenger s e r v i c e , c e r t i f i e d or reg i s tered mai l , postage 
p r e p a i d , addressed to Less i^ , at P. 0. Box 225, Hurricane, Utah 
B4771, or a t such other address as L a s s i e may designate by vritten 
n o t i c e « 
6 . L e s s e e ' s Right t o Make Improvements. . Lessee may make 
improvements t o the common areas, such as resurfacing the runway, or 
as the need or purpose of the Lessee a r i s e s , upon approval of the 
L e s s o r , which approval w i l l not be unreasonably withheld. 
7* Lessor* a Reservations. Lessor or assignee reserves the 
r i g h t to s e l l , ass ign or otherwise convey the Xirport and i t s 
f a c i l i t i e s , s u b j e c t to Lessee ' s r ights and ob l igat ions under th i s 
A i r p o r t Lease Agreement. 
8. Maintenance. .Lessee agrees to maintain the a irs tr ip and 
i t s f a c i l i t i e s in the same or better c o n d i t i o n , normal wear and tear 
- e x c e p t e 4 ^ ^ ^ inc luding but not limited to 
performing the fo l lowing duties in connect ion therewith; paint, 
-5-
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l e v e l , compact, remove weeds, repair and o i l the surface covering 
t h e a i r s t r i p f be responsible for the payment of water charges 
i n c u r r e d in providing for s u f f i c i e n t i r r i g a t i o n of any landscaping, 
m a i n t a i n , replace and repair any sprinkler system u t i l i z e d in *he 
i r r i g a t i o n of the a irport safety areas, maintain, replace and repair 
any runway. l i g h t i n g system,.... beacon,. __ And .....equipment associated 
t h e r e w i t h , and be respons ib le for the payment of a l l e l e c t r i c b i l l s 
a s s o c i a t e d with the operation of any runway l i g h t i n g and beacon 
s y s t e m s . 
Lessee further agrees to i n s t a l l and maintain " in a t least two 
(2) appropriate l o c a t i o n s , signs informing a l l users of the airstrip 
of t h e fo l lowing information: the ex i s t ence of the Hurricane 
A i r p o r t approximately two (2) mi les away; t h a t a l l takeoffs and 
l a n d i n g s , when weather and winds permit, should be made in a 
s o u t h e r l y d i rec t ion* Lessee agrees to pay a l l c o s t s of maintenance 
^ ^ ^ t f i ^ ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g g ^ g f but not l imited t o : t a x e s , insurance, 
and t h e maintenance contemplated above. I t i s the i n t e n t of t h i s ' 
Lease that i t s h a l l be a " tr ip le -ne t lease* with no coats payable by 
L e s s o r . 
9 . Pte of Airport at Own Risk. I t i s further agreed that in 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the granting of th i s Airport Lease Agreement and 
i t s f a c i l i t i e s , Lessee , i t s members, l i c e n s e e s , the i r guests and 
i n v i t e e s sha l l use ^he airport and i t s f a c i l i t i e s s t r i c t l y at their 
gwri^risk, and Lessor s h a l l not be responsible to Lessee or any o ther 
^^^^^M^MtPMmOMM^^ILJP^ anY . ^ a g e s t o property or claims 
pob*AccounT* ;^^ to persons a r i s i n g from any act, 
jgBUfttatW negligence .^ja&JtMOV , i t s a g ^ | ^ , ^ a m i a g ^ n t a t i v e s , or 
w 
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*^  
employees i n the operation of the a i r p o r t , inc luding, but not 
l i m i t e d t o , the manner of storage or parking of aircraft , the 
cond i t i on of the a i r s t r i p or f a c i l i t i e s or operation or storage of 
equipment thereon , f i r e from any source , l i g h t i n g on runways, 
operat ion of weather or wind devices and i n d i c a t o r s , or quality or 
c o n d i t i o n of "any" g a s o l i n e , o i l y s u p p l i e s , goods service¥#'~"of parts" 
furnished t o L e s s e e , i t s members, l i c e n s e e s , t h e i r guests or 
i n v i t e e s . Lessor s h a l l not be held re spons ib le or l i a b l e in any 
manner, inc luding damages, for any a c t i o n taken by Federal, State, 
County or Local governing bodies or agencies or other divis ions of 
such governments, which action prevents Lessor now or in the future 
from using or opera t ing the land as an a i r p o r t . Lessor agrees to 
take reasonable care in ktcping the a irport lands- subject to th i s 
Airport Lease Agreement continuously q u a l i f i e d under a l l Federal, 
S t a t e , County and Local laws. Lessee s h a l l have the duty to inform 
i t s members, l i c e n s e e s , the ir guests and i n v i t e e s who use the 
a i r p o r t or i t s f a c i l i t i e s of a l l of the terms of t h i s covenant and 
t h a t the use of the airport i s s t r i c t l y at t h e i r own r i sk . The 
Lessee or user , as the case may be, hereby agrees t h a t they w i l l 
indemnify and hold harmless the Lessor, i t s agents , employees, 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , succes sors , or ass ignees from a l l actions or 
proceedings to recover damages for any i n j u r i e s to personi or 
property whether such action i s i n s t i t u t e d and commenced by the 
L e s s e e , u s e r , or t h e i r guests or i n v i t e e s or any third part ies , 
Inc luding a l l of L e s s o r ' s costs and reasonable a t torney ' s f ees , 
10, ^ Insurance . 'Lessee agrees to provide a l l r i sk l i a b i l i t y 
insurance as i s commonly provided for p r i v a t e - a i r p o r t s , which shal l 
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^^^LJ*eOi8i5Xfe^-nd^^cy^JUin„ch Development, Inc. as addit ional insureds 
The l i m i t plJL l a b i l i t y , coverage shal l be s e t by mutual agreement, 
^^LmJ^^^^li^c^^ s h a l l ^bfi^isaih^is^t^^toM^he reasonable approval of 
Lft;S3rd-rw,v^.»s 
1 1 . Amendments. This Airport Lease Agreement may be amended 
~ from ^tirnt to-- time upon such terms' and condi t ions •- as -may -be 
determined by Lessor and Lessee any time pr ior t o the expiration of 
t h i a Lease, In making such a decis ion, any v o t e of Lessor, or Sky 
Ranch Development, I n c . , as an owner of any l o t ( s ) s h a l l not be 
c o u n t e d . 
1 2
 • S e v e r a b i l i t y . In the event that any one of thase 
agreements , c o n d i t i o n s , covenants or r e s t r i c t i o n s or any part of 
$&ch one thereof i s declared to be inva l id , or vo id , the remaining 
agreements , c o n d i t i o n s , r e s t r i c t i ons and covenants, or parts 
t h e r e o f , not i n v a l i d or vo id , shal l remain in f u l l force and effect 
and s h a l l be binding upon the part ies and person mentioned therein* 
Thie Airport Lease Agreement sha l l inure t o the benef i t of and 
be b inding on the p a r t i e e hereto, their r e s p e c t i v e representatives, 
h e i r s , adminis trators , executor, successors or ass ignees . This 
Lease s h a l l supercede any previous Lease on the subject premises 
whether wri t ten or o r a l . 
DATED this 7f?l&*V of / U A ^ / ? ^ J.9 9 0 . 
LESSOR: GRASSY MEADOWS AIRPOFT, INC. 
Hidhiel Gi trfngley 
I t s Pres ident 
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I t s Prtsidex 
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DESO.IPTI0H OP XUKW1T FOR BXTltliiCH 
Beginning i t a point S 0*10*05.4" V 230.00 feet along the Section 
Line and H 8*»*$1'44* W 555.01 feet froa the S « t 1/4 Comer of 
Section 28, Township 42 South, Rang* 13 Beat, Salt Lake Bue and 
Meridian; iad naming thence S Q'10'05" W 4496.11 .foot; thtace R 
i9*51'27" W 160.00 fee t ; theace H O'lO'OS" E 4496.10 feet; tbtnc* 
S 89*51'44" S 160.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 16.515 acres 
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RESTATED, SUPPLEMENTARY AND AMENDED 
DECLARATION OF 
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS FOR 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PLANNED DEVELOPMENT 
:.. _ _(_P_ha.s.e_._I a n d _Pha.se._JI_) 
This declaration is made and executed this fourth day 
of July, 1990 by Sky Ranch Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
as successor in interest to Michael 0. Longley, Laura Ellen 
Longley, William F. Longley, Helene M. Longley, and Larry G. 
Watts, and to Wasco, a Utah general partnership, (Hereinafter 
referred to as "Declarant".) 
RECITALS 
A. Declarant is the record owner (legal or equitable) of 
those certain parcels of real property (the Property)irdescribed^ 
rin Exhibits. "A" and "B" of this Restated Supplementary Amended,.. 
Declaration- Declarant has created on the Property a planned 
development with certain Common Areas that may be added in the 
future for the benefit of the Development and the Owners of Lots 
therein. 
B. Declarant desires to provide for the preservation and 
enhancement of the property values and amenities of the Property 
for the maintenance of the future Common Areas. SB®: this end and 
£or**BRe*istenriefit of the Property and of the Owners thereof, the 
.Declarant desires to subject the Property described in Exhibits 
"A" and "B," Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Subdivision and Grassy 
Meadows Sky Ranch Phase II respectively, of this Declaration tb 
--the covenants, restrictions,,^easements, charges and liens, 
..hereinafter'set forth}* each and all of which are for the benefit 
of the Property and each Owner thereof. 
C. Declarant deems it desirable, for the efficient 
preservation of the values and amenities of the Property, to 
create an entity which possesses the power to maintain and 
administer the Common Areas, to collect and disburse the 
assessments and charges hereinafter provided for, and otherwise 
to administer and enforce the provisions of this Declaration. 
For such purpose Declarant has, in conjunction with recordation 
of this Declaration, caused or will cause to be incorporated 
under the laws of the State of Utah, as a non profit corporation, 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION. 
D. Declarant reserves the right to annex ^(^fi^^^^^^pTiasjqs 
to the development whose Owners will become Members of the 
Association and will be entitled and subject to all rights, 
powers privileges, covenants; restrictions, easements charges, 
and liens hereinafter set fortgh* 
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E. This Restated Supplementary and Amended Declaration 
shall supplement, amend and supercede that certain Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Grassy Meadows Sky 
Ranch Planned Development, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Washington County, State of Utah on August 23, 1984, 
in Book 357, pages 64-92, Document 265521, Official Records of 
Washington County, State of Utah. 
- NOW, THEREFORE-, for the foregoing purposes.,-.Declarant—-
declares that the Property is and shall be held, transferred, 
sold, conveyed and occupied subject to the covenants, conditions, 
restrictions, easements, charges and liens hereinafter set forth 
in the plats recorded heretofore and concurrently herewith. 
I. DEFINITIONS 
When used in this Declaration (including in that portion 
hereof under "RECITALS") the following terms shall have the 
meaning indicated. 
1- Declaration shall mean and refer to this instrument as 
the same may hereafter be modified, amended, supplemented, or 
expanded^in accordance with the provisions^hereof (and in 
particular m accordance with the provisions of Article XI) 
concerning amendments or supplements to this Declaration which 
are to occur In conjuncriorCiauJLb^thJ' expansion of Ore-—• ' 
Devel opmeirT; """" ~~ : ' " ""* 
2. Plat shall mean and refer to the Phase I portion of the 
plat of the "GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PLANNED DEVELOPMENT" 
consisting of 1 page, executed and acknowledged by Declarant, 
prepared and certified by Reid Pope, a registered Utah Land 
Surveyor, and recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of 
Washington County, Utah on the 23rd day of August, 1984, in Book 
357 at page,63 as Entry No. 265520, and to the Phase II portion 
of the plat of "GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PLANNED DEVELOPMENT" 
consisting of 1 page, executed and acknowledged by the Declarant, 
prepared and certified by Lloyd Reid Pope, a registered Utah land 
Surveyor, and recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
Washington County, State of Utah, on the 16th day of July 
__, 1990, in Book 567 , at Page 1 as Entry .No. 368242 , as 
the same will hereafter be modified, amended, supplemented or 
expanded in accordance with the provisions of Article XI 
concerning amendments or supplements to this Declaration which 
are to occur in conjunction with the expansion of the Development 
as herein provided. 
3. Property shall, mean and refer to all of t-hg r.^^ 
lMropertT*which is covered by the Phase I Plat, a description of 
whi-©k^^.stated^ilWExhibit "A", of this Declaration, and by all 
of the real property which is covered by the Phase II Plat, a 
"description of which is stated in Exhibit "b" of this 
3 
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IWCIParation, 'and such portions of additional land which oiv^ i^ De 
awaked to the Developmenk^^g^avided herein. 
4 . Lot shall mean and refer to any of the separately 
numbered and individually described plots of land shown as Phase 
I of the Plat. Upon recordation of this Restated, Supplementary, 
and" Amended Dec'lara'tl"on"""Tor" addltIbhal land, Lot" shalI ihclude 
the separately numbered and individually described plots of land 
shown on the Plats of the addirional lands. 
5. Common Areas Shall mean and refer to those portions of 
property which are not included within the Lots, including all 
improvements other than utility lines now or hereafter 
constructed or located thereon and includes facilities leased by 
the Association for the benefit and use of the members and may 
include an airstrip and/or adjacent pond area. 
6. Living Unit shall mean and refer to a structure which is 
designed and intended for use and occupancy as a residence, 
together with all improvements located on the Lot concerned which 
are used in conjunction with such residence. 
7. Owner shall mean and refer to the person who is the 
owner of record (in the office of the County Recorder of 
Washington County, Utah) of a fee or an undivided fee interest in 
the Lot. Notwithstanding any applicable theory relating to a 
mortgage, deed or trust, or like instrument, the term Owner shall 
,not mean or include a Mortgagee or a beneficiary or trustee under 
a deed of trust unless and until such party has acguired title 
pursuant to foreclosure or any arrangement or proceeding in lieu 
thereof. 
8. Association shall mean and refer to GRASSY MEADOWS SKY 
RANCH LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah nonprofit corporation* 
9. Articles and Bylaws shall mean and refer to the 
Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the Association. 
10. Board of Trustees and the Board shall mean and refer to 
the Board of Trustees of the Grassy Meadows Landowners 
Association. 
11. f^f&Wfl^ s^neB. 1 mean and refer to every person who holds 
membership in the"Association. 
12. Mortgagee shall mean any person named as a first 
mortgagee or beneficiary under or holder of a first deed of 
trust. 
13. Development shall mean and refer to the Grassy Meadows 
Sky Ranch Planned Development created by this Restated, 
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Supplementary and Amended Declaration as it exists at any given 
time, including .future addition as allowed by this Declaration. 
14.' Declarant shall mean and refer to Sky Ranch 
Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, as successor in interest 
to Michael 0. Longley, Laura Ellen Longley, William F. Longley, 
Helene M. Longley and Larry G. Watts, and to Wasco, A Utah 
general partnership, its successors and assigns, or to any 
- successor-or -assign „o.f_ -all or ..substantially, all__.of-._i.ts .interest 
in the development of the Property. 
15. Front Yard Area shall mean and refer to the yard area 
of each Lot extending from the street to the fence line which 
shall be located fifteen feet (15') inside the owner's property 
line. 
16. Supp]ementary Declaration shall mean and refer to any 
supplementary declaration of covenants, conditions and 
restrictions, or similar instrument, which extends the provisions 
of the Declaration to all or any portion of additional lands and 
contain such complementary or amended provisions for such 
additional land as are herein required by the Declaration. 
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
The property which is initially associated with the Development 
and which is and shall be held, transferred, sold, conveyed and 
occupied subject to the provisions of this Restated,-
Supplementary and Amended Declaration consists of the real 
property situated in Washington County, State of Utah, and more 
. particularly described in Exhibits "A" and MB", attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
TOGETHER WITH all easements, rights-of-way, and other 
appurtenances and rights incident to, appurtenant to, or 
accompanying the above-described parcel of real property. 
ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS SUBJECT TO: all liens for current and 
future taxes, assessments, and charges imposed or levied by 
governmental or quasi-governmental authorities, all Patent 
reservations and exclusions; any mineral or oil reservations of 
record and rights incident thereto; all instruments of record 
which affect the above-described land or any portion thereof, 
including, without limitation, any mortgage or deed of trust; all 
visible easements and rights-of-way; all easements and rights-of-
way of record; any easements, rights-of-way, encroachments or 
discrepancies otherwise existing; an easement for each and every 
pipe, line, cable, wire, utility line, or similar facility which 
traverses or partially occupies the above-described land at such 
time as construction of all Project improvements is complete; and 
all easements necessary for ingress to, egress from, maintenance 
5 
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of, and replacement of all such pipes, lines, cables, wires, 
utility lines, and similar facilities. 
RESERVING UNTO DECLARANT, however, such easements and rights of 
ingress and egress over, across, through, and under the above 
descrTbed 1 and and any improvements -now or her eaf ter -^constructed-
thereon as may be reasonably necessary for Declarant or for any 
assignee or successor of Declarant (in a manner which is 
reasonable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Declaration): (i) To construct and complete improvements as 
Declarant deems to be appropriate, and to do all things 
reasonable, 
necessary or proper in connection therewith; (ii) To improve 
portions of the Property with such other or additional 
improvements, facilities, or landscaping designed for the use and 
enjoyment of all the Owners of Declarant or said assignee or 
successor shall determine to building its sole discretion; (iii) 
To improve portions of the Property with such other or additional 
improvements, facilities, or landscaping designed for the use and 
enjoyment of all the Owners or Declarant or as such assignee or 
successor may reasonably determine to be appropriate. If, 
pursuant to the foregoing reservations, the above described land ' 
or any improvement thereon is traversed or partially occupied by 
a permanent improvement or utility line, a perpetual easement for 
such improvement or utility line shall exist. With the exception 
of such perpetual easements, the reservations hereby affected 
shall, unless sooner terminated in accordance with their terms, 
•and Restated, Supplementary and Amended Declaration is filed for 
record in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington County, 
Utah. 
III. MEMBERSHIP AND VOTING RIGHTS 
1. Membership. Every Owner shall be a Member of the 
Association. Membership in the Association shall be mandatory, 
shall be appurtenant to the Lot in which the Owner has the 
necessary interest, and shall not be separated from the Lot to 
which it appertains. 
2. Voting Rights. The Association shall have the following 
described three classes .of voting membership: 
Class A. Class A Members shall be all the Owners whose 
Lots abut and are adjacent by taxiway access to the Grassy 
Meadows Sky Ranch Airstrip, other than the Declarant. Class A 
Members shall be entitled to one vote for each Lot in which the 
interest required for membership in the Association is held. In 
no event, however, shall more than one Class A vote exist with 
respect to any Lot. Owners of commercial and/or light 
manufacturing Lots are Class A members. 
6 
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Class B. The Class B Member shall be the Declarant. 
The Class B Member shall be entitled to five (5) votes for each 
Lot in which it holds the interest required for membership in the 
Association- The Class B. membership shall automatically cease 
and be converted to Class A membership on the first to occur of 
the following events: 
(a) When the total number of votes held by all Class A 
and C Members equals the total number of votes held by the Class 
B Member. """' ~~ '""' "~" "" " """ '" 
(b) The expiration of fifteen (15) years after the 
date on which this Restated, Supplementary, and Amended 
Declaration is filed for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of Washington County, Utah. 
Class C. Class*,CMembers.^shaU.^be all the Owners whose* 
L@ts do not abut and are not adjacent to the Grassy Meadows Sky 
Ranch Airstrip, other than the. Declarant. Class C Members shall 
£>e entitled to one-half vote for each Lot in which the interest 
required for membership in the Association is held-- In no event,, 
however, shall more than one-half ,JClass C vote exist with respect 
to any such Lot. Provided however, that any Class C Lot Owner, 
upon payment to the Association of the sum of two thousand 
dollars, ($2,000.00) may elect to become a Class A Member and 
'.shall automatically thereafter be treated as a Class A Member for 
all purposes as set forth herein, including voting rights, 
regular use of the airstrip and shall be subject to the 
as^ assisments provided for in Part V hereof infra. 
3. Multiple Ownership Interests. In the event there is 
more than one Owner of a particular Lot, the vote relating to 
such Lot shall be exercised as such Owners may determine among 
themselves. A vote cast at any Association meeting by any of 
such Owners, whether in person or by proxy, shall be conclusively 
presumed to be the vote attributable to the Lot concerned unless 
an objection, is immediately made by another Owner of the same 
Lot. In the event such an objection is made, the vote involved 
shall not be counted for any purpose whatsoever other than to 
determine whether a quorum exists. 
IV PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMON AREAS 
1. Acquisition. As presently constituted, no common areas 
are included within Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned Development. 
The Association may however, purchase, lease or otherwise acquire 
parcels of land, amenities or other facilities for inclusion as 
Common Areas in the planned development and assess the value 
given to the individual owners as provided for in Article V (4)-
Special Assessments, of these covenants. 
2. Easement of Enjoyment. £ach member shall have a right 
and easement of use and enjoyment'including, but not limited to, 
the right of ingress and egress to and from his Lot and in and 
7 
GMP 00414 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to, the Common Areas. Such right and easement shall.be 
appurtenant to and shall pass with title to each Lot and in no 
event shall be separated therefrom. CAny Member may permit any 
lGBEGmf*'9mK}QntT-act pur-chaser^a^^^ Lot* 
3. Form For Conveyancing.. Any deed, lease, mortgage, deed 
of trust, or other instrument conveying or encumbering title to a 
Lot shall describe the interest or estate involved substantially 
as follows: 
Lot No. contained within the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch 
Planned Development, Phases I or II, as the case may be, as 
the same is identified in the Plats recorded in the office 
of the Washington County Recorder, and in the Restated 
Supplementary, and Amended Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions of the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch 
Planned Development, Phase I and Phase II, (the Declaration) 
recorded in Book at Page as Entry No. of the 
official records of Washington County, Utah, TOGETHER WITH a 
right and easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common 
Areas described, and as provided for, in the Declaration. 
SUBJECT TO all of the provisions of the Declaration, and 
subject, also, to liens for current taxes. 
Whether or not the description employed in any such instrument is 
in the above-specified form, all provisions of this Declaration 
•shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of any party 
who acquires any interest in a Lot. 
.4. Limitation on Easement. A member's right and easement 
of use and enjoyment concerning the Common Areas shall be subject 
to the-following: 
(a) The right of the Association to suspend a Member's 
right to the use of any amenities included in the Common 
Areas for any period during which an assessment on such 
Member's Lot remains unpaid and for a period not exceeding 
ninety (90) days for any infraction by such member or his 
guest or invitee of the provisions of this Declaration or of 
any rule or regulation promulgated by the Association; 
(b) 'The right of the Association to impose reasonable „ 
limitations on the number of guests per Member who at a$j|k 
^ g w n ^ time are permittad^iia^use- the Common Areas,% 
(c) The right of the County of Washington and any other 
governmental or quasi-governmental body having jurisdiction 
over the property to access and rights of ingress and egress 
over and across any street, parking area, walkway, or open 
spaces contained within the Property for purposes of 
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I 
providing police and fire protection and providing any other 
governmental or municipal service; 
(d) The right of the Association to dedicate or transfer 
all or any part of the Common Areas to any public agency or 
authority for such purposes and subject to such conditions 
as may be agreed to by the Association. Any such dedication 
or transfer must, however, be assented to by two-thirds 
(2/3) of thevote of each class of membership which Members 
present in person or by proxy are entitled to cast at a 
meeting duly called for the purpose. Written or printed 
notice setting forth the purpose of the meeting and the 
action proposed shall be sent to all Members at least ten 
(10) days, but not more than thirty (30) days prior to the 
meeting date. 
5. Encroachments. If any portion of an improvement 
constructed by Declarant, his successors or assigns, encroaches 
upon the Common Areas or other Lots, as a result of the 
construction, reconstruction, repair, shifting, settlement or 
movement of any portion of the development, a valid easement for 
the encroachment and for the maintenance of the same shall exist 
so long as the encroachment exists. 
V. ASSESSMENTS 
1. Personal Obligation and Lien. Each Owner expressly 
excluding the Declarant for each Lot owned by it, shall, by 
acquiring in any way becoming vested with his interest in a Lot, 
be deemed to covenant and agree to pay to the Association the 
monthly and the special assessments described in this Article, 
together with the hereinafter provided for interest and costs of 
collection. All such amounts shall be, constitute, and remain: 
(a) a charge and continuing lien upon the Lot with respect to 
which such assessment is made; and (b) the personal obligation of 
the person who is the owner of such Lot at the time the 
assessment falls due. No Owner may exempt himself or his Lot 
from liability for payment of assessments by waiver of his rights 
concerning the Common Areas or by abandonment of his Lot. Any 
such liens, however, shall be subordinate to the lien or 
equivalent security interest of any first Mortgage on the unit 
recorded prior to the date any such common expense assessments 
become due. Provided however, that any such assessments as to 
Class C Members shall be one-half of the amount of such 
assessments as are made upon Class A. Members. The Declarant 
shall pay assessments on only the lots owned by Declarant in 
Phase I. The lots in additional phases for development will be 
assessed upon the sale to an owner. 
2. Purpose of Assessments. Assessments levied by the 
Association shall be used exclusively for the purpose of 
promoting the maintenance, health, safety, and welfare of 
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residents of the Property, The use made by the Association of 
funds obtained from assessments may include payment of the cost 
of: taxes and insurance on the Common Areas; lease of off-
property facilities for use of the Common Areas; management and 
supervision of the Common Areas; establishing and funding a 
reser-ve—to..jcov.er.._3na_jor...repair or replacement of improvements 
within the Common Areas; and any expense necessary or desirable 
to enable the Association to perform or fulfill its obligation, 
functions, or purposes under Declaration or its Articles of 
Incorporation. 
3. Base for Assessment. Each lot, whether improved with a 
Living Unit or unimproved, which has been conveyed to an Owner 
shall be assessed at a same and equal rate, provided that the 
amount of assessments due from Class C Members shall be one-half 
of the amounts assessed against Class A. Members. For the 
purpose of assessment, the term "Owner11 shall expressly exclude 
the Declarant only. Commercial lots and/or light manufacturing 
lots that the Declarant intends to annex into the Development 
will be assessed upon conveyance to an owner and are considered 
Clas A lots. These lots will be assessed the same rate as a 
Class A lot plus a percentage of sales to compensate for the 
additional maintenance of the runway or other Common Areas that 
may be needed as a result of the Owner's business activity. 
These additional assessments shall be charged for the additional 
maintenance costs only and are not intended to subsidize any 
other membership classes. 
4. Special Assessments. In addition to the monthly 
assessments authorized above, the Association may levy special 
assessments for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part: 
(a) any expense or expenses not reasonably capable of being fully 
paid with flmds generated by monthly assessments; or (b) the cost 
of any construction , reconstruction, or unexpectedly required 
repair or replacement in connection with the Common Areas. Any 
such special assessment must be assented to by more than fifty 
percent (50 %) of all votes which Members present in person or 
represented by proxy are entitled to cast at a meeting duly 
called for the purpose. Written notice setting forth the purpose 
of the meeting shall be sent to all Members at least ten (10) 
days but not more than thirty (30) days prior to the meeting 
date. 
5. Quorum Requirements. The quorum required for any action 
authorized by Section 4 above shall be as follows: at the first 
meeting called the presence of Members or of proxies entitled to 
cast fifty percent (50 %.) of all outstanding votes shall 
constitute a quorum. If a quorum is not present at the first 
meeting or any subsequent meeting, another meeting may be called 
(subject to the notice requirements set forth in Section 4) at 
which a quorum shall be one-half of the quorum which was required 
at the immediately preceding meeting. No such subsequent meeting 
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shall be held more than forty-five (45) days following the 
immediately preceding meeting. 
6. Equal Rate of Assessment. Both monthly and special 
assessments shall be fixed at a uniform (equal) rate for all 
Lots, subject to the provision of paragraph 3 above regarding the 
Declarant, or its assigns and subject to the provision for 
differing assessment rates as between Class A and Class C 
Members. However, unegual assessments may be assessed against— 
the Lots as provided for in Article VII paragraphs 5, 11, and 12. 
7. Monthly Assessment Due Dates, The monthly assessments, 
or periods set by the Board of Trustees, provided for herein 
shall commence as to all Lots on the date a deed is delivered to 
the first purchaser of a Lot, contract of sale, or agreement as 
stated in Earnest Money Agreement prorations. The first monthly 
assessment shall be adjusted according to the number of days 
remaining in the month of conveyance. At least 15 prior to the 
effective date of any change in amount of the monthly assessment 
the Association shall give each Owner written notice of the 
amount and the first due date of the assessment concerned. 
8. Certificate Regarding Payment. Upon the request of any 
Owner or Prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of a Lot the 
Association shall issue a certificate stating whether or not all 
assessments respecting such Lot are current and, if not, the 
amount of the delinquency. Such certificate shall be conclusive 
in favor of all persons who in good faith rely thereon. 
9. Effect of Non-payment — Remedies. Any assessment not 
"paid when due shall, together with the hereinafter provided for 
interest and costs of collection, be, constitute and remain a 
continuing lien on the Lot, provided, however, that any such lien 
will be subordinate to the lien or equivalent security interest 
of any first mortgage on the Lot recorded prior to the date any 
such assessments become due. The person who is the Owner of the 
Lot at the time the assessment falls due shall be personally 
liable for payments. However such liability shall not pass to 
the Owner's successors in title. If the assessment is not paid 
within thirty (30) days after the date on which it becomes 
delinquent, the amount thereof shall bear interest from the date 
of delinquency at the rate of eighteen percent (18 %) per annum 
plus late payment service charge equal to twenty-five percent (25 
%) of each delinquent amount due and the Association may, in its 
discretion, bring an action either against the Owner who is 
personally liable or to foreclose the lien against the Lot. Any 
judgment obtained by the Association shall include reasonable 
attorney's fees, court costs, and each and every other expense 
incurred by the Association in enforcing its rights. 
10. Tax Collection from Lot Owners by Washington County 
Authorized. It is recognized that under the Declaration the 
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Association will own the Common Areas and that it will be 
obligated to pay property taxes to Washington County. If is 
further recognized that each Owner of a Lot as a Member of the 
Association and as part of his monthly common assessment will be 
required to pay to. the Association his pro rate share of such 
taxes. -Notwithstanding -anything to .the contrary, contained -in the 
Declaration, or otherwise, Washington County shall be, and is, 
authorized to collect such pro rata share (on equal basis) of 
taxes directly from each Owner by inclusion of said share with 
the tax levied on each Lot. To the extent allowable, Washington 
County is hereby directed so to do. In the event that the 
assessor shall separately assess Common Areas to the Association, 
the Board of Trustees may require the unit owners, including the 
Declarant to pay a special assessment, on a pro rata basis, for 
property taxes. 
11- Special Service District for Paving Roads. Declarant, 
for each Lot owned by it, and each Owner shall, by acquiring or 
in any way becoming vested with his interest in- a Lot, be deemed 
to covenant and agree to accept, belong to any pay those 
proportionate amounts of money and assessments due when.and if a 
Special Service District may be organized for paving the roads in 
and around the property. 
VI. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
1. Maintenance of Lots and Living Units. Each Lot and 
Living Unit shall be maintained by the Owner thereof so as not to 
detract from; the appearance of the Property and so as not to 
affect adversely the value or use of any other Lot or Living 
Unit. The Association shall have no obligation regarding 
maintenance or care of Lots or Living Units except as provided in 
Paragraph 2 of this Article VI. 
2. Operation and Maintenance by Association. The 
Association, by its duly delegated representative, shall provide 
for such maintenance and operation of the Common Areas as may be 
necessary or desirable to make them appropriately usable in 
conjunction with the Lots and to keep them clean,- functional, 
attractive and generally in good condition and repair. The 
Association shall maintain the Front Yard Areas of each Lot 
including, but not by way of limitation, grass, fences, 
landscaping, shrubs, watering and the sprinkling system. In 
addition, the Association shall maintain, any and all Common 
Areas acquired. 
Twice annually, or at times to be decided by the Board of 
Trustees, spraying to control weeds along and in the roadways and 
fence lines will occur* The costs associated with this spraying 
shall be added and become part of the assessment to which each 
Lot is subject. 
12 
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Notwithstanding the provisions regarding Lot and Living Unit 
maintenance by Owners, in the event an Owner of any Lot in the 
Property shall fail to maintain his Lot and the exterior of his 
Living Unit situated thereon in a manner satisfactory to the 
Architectural Control Committee or the Board, the Association, 
after approval by 2/3 vote of the Board, shall have the right, 
through its agents, employees, or through an independent 
contractor to enter upon his Lot and repair, maintain, and 
i- — -- -'restore the portion of the Lot maintainable by the Owner and the -
exterior of his Living Unit and any other improvements erected 
thereon (but not the interior of his Living Unit). The cost of 
i such exterior maintenance shall be added to and become part of 
the assessment to which Lot is subject. 
3. Water. Culinary and irrigation water is available 
through the purchase of shares of stock in the Hurricane Valley 
Mutual Water Company. The purchase of shares of stock in the 
company and the payment for water usage are the responsibility of 
the individual lot owners. 
4. Insurance. The Association shall secure and at all 
times maintain the following insurance coverages: 
(a) A policy or policies of fire and casualty 
insurance, with extended coverage endorsement, for the full 
insurable replacement value of all improvements comprising a part 
of the Common Areas. The name of the insured under each such 
) policy shall be in form and substance similar to: "Grassy 
Meadows Sky Ranch Land Owners Association for the use and benefit 
of the individual Lot Owners and Mortgagees, as their interests 
may appear". 
(b) A comprehensive policy or policies insuring the 
Owners, the Association, and its directors, officers, agents and 
employees against any liability incident to the ownership use or 
operation of the Common Areas which may arise among themselves, 
to the public, and to any invitees or tenants of the Property or 
\ of the Owners. Limits of liability under such insurance shall 
not be less than $1,000,000.00 for all claims for personal injury 
I and/or property damage arising out of a single occurrence, such 
i coverage to include protection against water damage, liability 
for non-owned or hired automobile, liability for property of 
others, and such other risks as shall customarily be covered with 
respect to projects similar in construction, location and use. 
Such policies shall be issued on a comprehensive liability basis, 
shall provide a cross liability endorsement pursuant to which the 
rights of the named insureds as between themselves are not 
prejudiced, and shall contain "a severability of interest" clause 
or endorsement to preclude the insurer from denying the claim of 
an Owner in the Development because of negligent acts of the 
Association or other Owners. 
13 
GMP 00419 
0 3 6 8 2 4 3 BK 0 5 6 7 PG O O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v*^ , 
(c) A comprehensive policy or policies as required by 
Sky Ranch Airport, Inc. in its lease with the Association to 
cover any and all liabilities for operating the airstrip. 
The following additional provisions shall apply with respect to 
insurance^ 
(1) In addition to the insurance described above, the 
Association shall secure and at all times maintain insurance 
against such risks as are or hereafter may be customarily insured 
against in connection with developments similar to the Property 
in construction, nature, and use. 
(2) All policies'shall be written by a company holding a 
rating of Class IV or better from Best's Insurance Reports or 
other similar standard yielding this minimum quality of insurer. 
Each insurer must be specifically licensed in the State of Utah. 
(3) The Association shall have the authority to adjust 
losses. 
(4) Insurance secured and maintained by the Association 
shall not be brought into contribution with insurance held by the 
individual Owners or their Mortgagees. 
(5) Each policy of insurance obtained by the Association 
shall, if reasonable possible, provide, a waiver of the insurer's 
•subrogation rights with respect to the Association, the Owners, 
and their respective directors, officers, agents, employees, 
invitees, and tenants; that it cannot be cancelled, suspended, or 
invalidated due to the conduct of any particular Owner or Owners; 
that it cannot be cancelled, suspended, or invalidated due to the 
conduct of the Association or of any director, officer, agent or 
employee of the Association without a prior written demand that 
the defect be cured; that any "on other insurance11 clause therein 
shall not apply with respect to insurance held individually by 
the Owners. 
(6) Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary herein; 
so long as the Mortgagee or its designed holds a mortgage or 
beneficial interest in a trust deed on a Lot in the Development 
or owns a Lot, insurance policies shall meet all requirements and 
contain such other coverage and endorsements as may be required 
from time to time by the Mortgagee or its designee. 
(7) Fidelity Coverage. The Association shall maintain 
fidelity coverage to protect against dishonest acts on the part 
of trustees, officers, manager, employees of the Association and 
all others (including volunteers) who handle, or are responsible 
for handling, funds of the Association. Such fidelity bonds 
shall: 
14 
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(a) name the Assoc ia t ion as an obl igee as t he name 
insured: 
(b) be written in an amount sufficient to provide 
protection which is in no event less than one and one-half (1-
1/2) times the Association's estimated annual operating expenses 
and reserves; 
(c) contain waivers of any defense based upon the 
exclusion of volunteers or persons who serve without compensation 
from any definition of "employee" or similar expression; and 
(d) provide that they may not be cancelled or 
substantially modified (including cancellation for nonpayment of 
premium) without at least thirty (30) days7 prior written notice 
to all first Mortgagees of Lots. 
(8) Mortgagee Clause. All policies of hazard insurance 
must contain or have attached the standard mortgagee clause 
commonly accepted by private institutional mortgage investors in 
the area in which the mortgaged premises are located. The 
mortgagee clause must provide that the insurance carrier shall 
notify the first Mortgagee (or trustee) named at least ten (10) 
days in advance of the effective date of any reduction in or 
cancellation of the policy. 
(9) Review of Insurance. The Board shall periodically, and 
whenever requested by twenty percent (20%) or more of the Owners, 
review the adequacy of the Association's insurance program and 
shall report in writing the conclusion reached action taken on 
such review to the Owner of each Lot and to the holder of any 
•mortgage on any Lot who shall have requested a copy of such 
report. Copies of every policy of insurance procured by the 
Board shall be available for inspection by the Owner. 
(10) Lots Not Insured by Association. The Association 
shall have no duty or responsibility to procure or maintain any 
fire, liability, extended coverage or other insurance covering 
any Lot, any Living Unit thereon or acts and events thereon. 
Accordingly, each Owner shall secure and keep in force at all 
times fire and extended coverage insurance which shall be equal 
to or greater than that commonly required by private 
institutional mortgage investors in the area in which the 
Mortgaged premises are located. The policy shall provide, as a 
minimum, fire and extended coverage insurance on a replacement 
cost basis in an amount not less than that necessary to comply 
with any co-insurance percentage stipulated in the policy. The 
amount of coverage shall be sufficient so that in the event of 
any damage or loss to the Mortgaged, premises of a type covered by 
the insurance, the insurance proceeds shall provide at least the 
lesser of: (i) compensation equal to the full amount of damage 
or loss, or (ii) compensation to the first Mortgagee under the 
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Mortgage equal to the full amount of the unpaid principal balance 
of the Mortgage Loan. 
(11) Unacceptable Policies. Policies are unacceptable 
where: (i) under the terms of the carrier's charter, bylaws or 
policy, contributions .or assessments may be made against the Lot 
Owner or Mortgagee or Mortgagee's. designee; or (ii) by~the terms 
of the carrier's charter, bylaws or policy, loss payments are 
contingent upon action by carrier's board of directors, 
policyholders, or members; or (iii) the policy includes any 
limiting clauses (other than insurance conditions) which could 
.prevent Lot Owner, Mortgage or Mortgagee's Designee from 
collecting insurance proceeds. 
(12) The Development is not located in an area identified 
by the Housing and Urban Development as an area having special 
flood hazards. In the event that at some future time the 
Development should be declared to be in such flood area, a 
blanket policy of flood insurance on the Project shall be 
maintained in the amount of the aggregate of the outstanding 
principal balances of the mortgage loans on the Living Units 
comprising the Development or the maximum limit of coverage 
available under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as 
amended, whichever is less. The name of the insured under each 
required policy must be in form and substance as that required by 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation at any given time. 
\5. Airstrip. Grassy Meadows Land Owners Association has entered 
into or will enter into an exclusive lease agreement with Grassy 
Meadows Airport, Inc. for the use of the airstrip by the Lot 
Owners, their guests and invitees and other persons wishing to 
use the airport facility. Charges made to the Association 
through this lease agrement shall be passed along to the members 
through proration and shall become part of the assessment 
described in Article V of these covenants. 
6. Manager. The Association .may carry out through a Manager any 
of its functions which are properly the subject of delegation. 
Any manager so engaged may be an independent contractor or an 
agent or employee of the Association. The manager shall be 
responsible for managing the Property for the benefit of the 
Association and the Owners, and shall, to the extent permitted by 
law and the terms of the agreement with the Association, be 
authorized to perform any of the functions or acts required or 
permitted to be performed by the Association itself. 
7. Terms of Management Agreement. Any agreement .for 
professional management of the Development, or any other contract 
providing for services of the Declarant, sponsor, or builder, may 
not exceed three (3) years. Any such agreement must provide for 
termination by either party without cause and without payment of 
a termination fee on ninety (90) days or less written notice. 
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VII. USE RESTRICTIONS 
1. Use of Common Areas. The Common Areas shall be used 
only in a manner consistent with their community nature and with 
the use restrictions applicable to Lots and Living Units. No 
admission fees, charges for use, leases, or other income-
generating arrangement of any type-shall be employed -or entered-
into with respect to any portion of the Common Areas unless voted 
upon and approved according to the procedures adapted for the 
approval of special assessments in Article V paragraph 5 and 6. 
2. Use of Lots and Living Units. All Lots are to be 
improved with Living Units and are restricted to such use. Each 
Lot shall be improved with a Living Unit, each to be used only as 
a residence. No Lot or Living Unit shall be used, occupied, or 
altered in violation of law, so as to create a nuisance or 
interfere with the rights of any Owner or in a way which would 
result in an increase in the cost of any insurance covering the 
Common Areas. Notwithstanding this paragraph, Declarant, its 
successors and assigns have planned for and it is their intent to 
develop certain portions of lands to be annexed in the future as 
commercial Lots. 
3. Building Setbacks. The set back for buildings located 
in the development shall be: Front 50', Side 25"., backyard 120" 
when located on airstrip, otherwise 25' • Where the back lot line 
fronts on the airplane landing strip, no foliage may be planted 
or maintained whose height is in excess of 3 feet within the 120' 
safety zone. This paragraph shall not affect the power delegated 
to the Architectural Control Committee to grant variance to the 
set back requirements in appropriate circumstances. 
4. Minimum Square Footage. The minimum square footage 
requirements for any Living Unit shall be 1,500 square feet of 
finished interior feet on the' ground level exclusive of garages, 
patios, balconies, decks or other semi-external space. Each 
Living Unit shall be improved with an attached or detached garage 
with a minimum sguare footage requirement of 400 square feet of 
finished interior feet. 
5. Fences. All fences throughout the community shall be 
three (3) rail double lodge pole pine fencing, at least 4' high 
or other fencing approved by the Architectural Control Committee. 
All fences shall be installed within 6 (six) months of purchase 
at the expense of the owner. Thereafter, all fences shall be 
maintained by the Association. In the event the Owner fails to 
complete all or part of the fencing required by this paragraph, 
the Association may in its discretion, construct or cause to be 
constructed the fences required. The costs of said construction 
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shall be assessed to the owner of the Lot as provided for in 
Article V of these covenants. 
6. Non-Residential Use. Except as to the Declarant, no part 
of the Property shall be used for any commercial, manufacturing, 
mercantile,- storing, vending, or other such non-residential 
purposes, with the exception that an owner may store, buy and 
sell operational aircraft on his Lot. Declarant, its successors 
of assigns, may use the Property for a model home site display, 
and as a sales office during the construction and sales period, 
%onauctrvcertain commercial 'operations on lands owned by it 
adjacent to the airstrip, including, but not limited to, fixed 
base operations for refueling aircraft and purposes incident 
thereto, construction and sale or leasing7 of aircraft storage and 
hanger space, scenic tour flights and such other business 
operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate; provide^ 
however,that any such commercial operations or activities 
conducted by the Declarant, its successors or assigns, shall be* 
consistent with, and shall not unreasonably interfere or restrictjjl 
the Owner's beneficial use and enjoyment of their Lots or the 
Property, as set forth in this Declaration.. Notwithstanding this -* 
.paragraph, Declarant, its successors or assigns, have planned and 
rt is their intent to develop certain portions of land to b% 
.annexed into the property as—Commercial Lots. 
7. Sign. No sign or billboard of any kind shall be 
displayed to the public view on any portion of the Property or 
•any Lot advertising the property for sale or rent except signs 
used by Declarant, its successor ar assigns, to advertise the 
property during the construction and sales period, provided that 
each unit owner shall be allowed to display no more that 2 "for 
sale", or "for rent" sings in the unit windows and said signs 
shall be no more than 12" x 14" in size. 
8. Quiet Enjoyment. No noxious or offensive trade or 
activity shall be carried on upon any Lot or any part of the 
Property, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may 
become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood, or which 
shall in any way interfere with the quiet enjoyment of each of 
the Owners of his respective Living Unit or which shall in any 
way increase the rate of insurance. 
9. Temporary Structures. Equipment, Motor Vehicles, Etc. 
No structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, 
shack, garage, barn or other out building shall be used on Lot at 
any time as a residence, either temporarily or permanently. No 
mobile home, trailer, camper, boat, truck larger than 3/4 ton 
flat bed truck, aircraft or similar equipment or vehicle not in 
running condition shall be permitted to be parked upon any Lot, 
except the Owner may park and occupy a mobile home or trailer on 
his Lot for the maximum period of one year while his Living Unit 
is under construction. The equipment and vehicles previously 
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described may be parked within a garage, hangar or facility 
properly screened from the view of others and approved by the 
Architectural Control Committee. No motor vehicle whatsoever may 
be parked on any common street or driveways, but shall be kept in 
the parking area. An Owner may construct a hangar guest house 
subject to approval of the Architectural Control Committee, 
providing a main house pad is set aside for the future permanent 
residence. 
10. Animals. """ Horses or similar animals""may ~be bre~d and/or ~ 
raised on the individual lots subject to approval of the 
Architectural Control Committee. However, the allowable number 
of the foregoing animals shall not exceed three (3) animals per 
acre. Dogs, cats and other household pets may also be kept on 
the Lots. All large animals must be kept within a sturdy 
enclosure and are not allowed on the common areas except they be 
under a means of adequate control. All household pets must be 
leashed while in the Common Areas. 
11. Weeds. Weed are those noxious plants allowed to grow 
by the Owner and do not include those native plants now growing 
on the Lots and Property. The Owner is responsible for 
controlling and removing weeds growing on his Lot. Twice 
annually or at additional times determined by the Association or 
Board of Trustees, weeds growing in the Front Yard Areas, Common 
Areas, and other areas will be mowed or disked by the 
Association. At these times the Owner may, by giving notice to 
the Association, arrange for the removal of his weeds, and the 
Association shall add the costs of removal or mowing to the 
Owner's monthly assessment. Any weeds not controlled or removed 
•by the Owner prior to the dates of removal as set by the 
Association, shall be mowed or removed by the Association and the 
costs and at the Boards' option, a penalty fee, to be determined 
by the Association, shall be added to the monthly assessment of 
the Owner. 
12. Garbage Removal and Animal Wastes. All rubbish, trash, 
garbage and animal wastes shall be regularly removed from the 
Property by the owner, and shall not be allowed to accumulate 
thereon. In the event that the Owner fails to comply with this 
provision, the Association may remove or cause to be removed, the 
garbage and animal wastes and include the costs in the Owner's 
monthly assessments. 
13. Utilities. All utilities, including electrical service 
to the Living Units, shall be installed and constructed 
underground. In addition,. any utility service to any out 
building shall also be installed and constructed below the 
ground. 
14. Electronic Antennas and Stove or Chimney Flues. No 
television, radio, or other electronic antenna or device of any 
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type shall be erected, constructed, placed or permitted to remain 
on any of the Living Units or structures on the Lots in said 
tract unless and until the same shall have been approved in 
writing by the Architectural Committee of the Association. No 
stove flue, chimney or other similar venting system shall be 
installed-to the exterior of. the Unit, nor shall any heating 
device be installed other than that provided with the unit 
without the written approval of the Architectural Control 
Committee. 
15. Airstrip. The airstrip may be used by the Owner/ his 
guests and invitees solely for the non-commercial, i.e. scheduled 
airline service, taxiing, take-off and landing of aircraft and 
for incidental purposes, including the buying and selling of 
operational aircraft, related thereto. Under no circumstances 
shall anyone cause any aircraft or other vehicle to be parked or 
tied down on any part of the airstrip or safety area. The Owner 
shall provide sufficient parking and tie down facilities on his 
Lot for all aircraft operated or used by Owner, his guests or 
invitees. Furthermore, any use of the airstrip shall be at the 
user's own risk. 
16. Exception for Declarant. Notwithstanding the 
restrictions contained in this Article VII, for the fifteen-year 
period following the date of which this Restated, Supplementary 
and Amended Declaration is filed for record in the office of the 
County Recorder of Washington County, Utah, Declarant, or its 
••assigns or successor, shall have the right to use any Lot or 
Living Unit owned by it any part of the Common Areas reasonably 
necessary or appropriate, including, but not limited to, a model 
or other temporary structure as a sales office, in furtherance of 
any construction, marketing, sales, management, promotional, or 
other activities designed to accomplish or facilitate improvement 
of the Common Areas or improvement and/or sale of all Lots owned 
by Declarant. ^Declarant may also conduct collateral, commercial -
businesswaotda^ty on the Project, including, but not limited to, . 
conducting fixed base operations for the fueling and maintenance 
of aircraft and purposes incident thereto, construction and sale 
or leasing of aircraft hanger space, scenic air tour services and 
Light manufacturing.,. ^  
VIII. ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
1. Architectural Control Committee. The Board of Trustees 
of the Association shall appoint a committee the function of 
which shall be to insure that all exteriors of Living Units and 
landscaping within the Property harmonize with existing 
surroundings and structures. The Committee need not be composed 
of Owners. If such a Committee is not appointed the Board itself 
shall perfo3:m the duties required of the Committee. 
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2. Submission to Committee. No Living Unit, accessory or 
addition to a Living Unit, landscaping or other improvement of a 
Lot shall be constructed, maintained, or accomplished and no 
alteration, repainting, or refurbishing of the exterior of any 
Living Unit shall be performed, unless complete plans and 
specifications therefor have first been submitted to and approved 
by the Architectural Control Committee. 
3- Standard... In deciding whether^ to approve or disapprove 
plans and specifications submitted to it, the Committee shall use 
its best judgment to insure that all improvements, construction, 
landscaping, and alterations on Lots within the Property conform 
to and harmonize with existing surroundings and structures. The 
Board may formulate general guidelines and procedures. The 
adopted guide lines and procedures shall be incorporated in the 
Book of Resolutions of the Association and the Architectural 
Control Committee, or.the Board, as the case may be, shall act in 
accordance with such guidelines and procedures. 
4. Approva 1 Procedure. Any plans and specifications 
submitted to the Committee shall be approved or disapproved by it 
in writing within thirty (30) days after submission. In the 
event the committee fails to take any action within such ;-period 
it shall be deemed to have approved the material submitted. 
5. Constructi on. Once begun, any improvements,;.^ -
construction, landscaping or alterations approved by the 
Committee shall be diligently prosecuted to completion. If 
reasonably necessary to enable such improvements, construction, 
landscaping or alteration, the person or persons carrying out the 
'same shall be entitled to temporary use and occupy unimproved 
portions of the Common Areas in the vicinity of the activity. 
6. Disclaimer of Liability. Neither the Architectural 
Committee, nor any member thereof acting in good faith shall be 
liable to the Association or to any Owner for any damage, loss or 
prejudice suffered or claimed on account of (a) the approval or 
rejection of, or the failure to approve or reject, any plans, 
drawings and specification, (b) the construction or performance 
of any work, whether or not pursuant to approved plans, drawings 
and specifications., (c) the development or manner of development 
of any of the Property, or (d) any engineering or other defect in 
approved plans and specifications. 
7. Nonwaiver. The approval by the Architectural Committee 
of any plans and specifications for any work done or proposed 
shall not constitute a waiver of any right of the Architectural 
Committee to disapprove any similar plans and specifications. 
8. Completion of Construction. Once, begun, any 
improvements, construction, landscaping or alterations approved 
by the Architectural Committee shall be diligently prosecuted to 
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completion in strict accordance with the plans and specifications 
approved by the Architectural Committee. 
9. Exception for Declarant. The foregoing provisions of 
this Article VIII shall not apply to any improvements, 
-construction, landscaping or. alteration .which is. carri_ed„ out by. 
Declarant on any Lot or on any part of the Common Areas and which 
occurs at any time during the fifteen year period following the 
date on which this Restated, Supplementary Amended Declaration is 
filed for the record in the office of the County Recorder of 
Washington County, Utah. Declarant shall further have the right 
to designate the location and design of any Common Area amenities 
including.recreational amenities or green areas, provided that 
the Declarant shall not be required to provide any such amenities 
by virtue of this paragraph. 
10. Declarant's Obiigation. Declarant hereby covenants in 
favor of each Owner that all improvement of the Common Areas 
accomplished by it shall be architecturally compatible with 
respect to one another. 
IX. CONDEMNATION 
If at any time or times the Common Areas or any part thereof 
shall be taken or condemned by any authority having the power of 
eminent domain, all compensation and damages shall be payable to 
the Association and shall be used promptly by Association to the 
extent necessary for restoring or replacing any improvements on 
the remainder of the Common Areas. Upon completion of such work 
and payment in full therefor, any proceeds of condemnation then 
or thereafter in the hands of the Association which are proceeds 
for the taking of any portion of the Common Areas shall be 
disposed of in such manner as the Association shall reasonably 
determine; provided,, however, that in the event of a taking in 
which any Lot is eliminated, the Association shall disburse the 
portion of the proceeds of the condemnation award allocable to 
the interest of the Owner of such Lot to such Owner and any first 
Mortgagee of such Lot, as their interests shall appear, after 
deducting the proportionate share of said Lot in the cost of 
debris removal. 
X- ' RIGHTS OF FIRST MORTGAGEES 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Declaration, 
the following provisions concerning the rights of first Mortgagee 
shall be in effect: 
1 • Preservation of Regulatory Structure and Insurance. 
Unless the holders of 100 % of all first Mortgagees and 75 % each 
of Classes A and C of the Lot Owners shall have given their prior 
written approval, the Association shall not be entitled: 
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(a) by act or omission to change, waive or abandon any 
scheme of regulations, or enforcement thereof, pertaining to the 
Architectural design of the exterior appearance of Living Units, 
the exterior maintenance of Living Units under certain conditions 
provided in Section 2 of Article VI, or the upkeep of the Common 
Areas of the Property? 
(b) to fail to maintain fire and extended coverage on 
insurable portions of the Common Areas on a current: replacement 
"cost basis in an amount not less than one hundred percent ("100"%)* 
of the insurable value (based on current replacement costs); or 
(c) to use hazard insurance proceeds for losses to the 
Common Areas for other than the repair, replacement or 
• reconstruction of improvements on the Common Areas. 
2. Preservation of Common Area; Change in Method of 
Assessment. Unless the Association shall receive the prior 
written approval of (1) at least 100% of all first mortgagees 
(based on one vote for each Mortgagee) of the Lots and (2) the 
Owners of at least seventy-five percent (75 %) of the Lots in 
each of Classes A and C (not including Lots owned by Declarant) 
the Association shall not be entitled: 
(a) by act or omission to seek to abandon, partition, 
subdivide, encumber, sell or transfer the Common Areas, except 
to grant easements for utilities and similar or related purposes, 
} as herein elsewhere reserved; or 
(b) to change the ration or method of determining the 
•obligations, assessments, due or other charges which may be 
levied against a Lot or the Owner thereof. 
Neither this Article X nor the insurance provision contained in 
Article VI may be amended without the prior approval of all first 
Mortgagees. 
| 3. Notice of Matters Affecting Security. The Association 
shall give written notice to any first Mortgagee of a Lot 
requesting such notice wherever: 
• 
(a) there is any default by the Owner of the Lot subject to 
the first mortgage in performance of any obligation under this 
Declaration or the Articles or Bylaws of the Association which is 
not cured within thirty (30) days after default occurs; or 
(b) there occurs any substantial damage to or destruction 
of any Living Unit or any part of the Common Areas involving an 
! amount in excess of, or reasonable estimated to be in excess of 
$15,000.00. Said notice shall be given within ten (10) days 
after the Association learns of such damage or destruction; or 
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(c) there is any condemnation proceedings or proposed 
acquisitions of a Living Unit or of any portion of the Common 
Areas within ten (10) days after the Association learns of the 
same; or 
(d) any of the following matters come up for consideration 
or effectuation" by -the Association: 
(i) abandonment or termination of the Planned Unit 
Development established by this Declaration; 
(ii) material amendment of the Declaration or the 
Articles or Bylaws of the Association; or 
(iii) any decision to terminate professional 
management of the Common Areas and assume self-management by the 
Owners. 
4. Notice of Meetings. The Association shall give to any 
first Mortgagee of a Lot requesting the same, notice of all 
meetings of the Association; and such first Mortgagee shall have 
the right to designate in writing a representative to attend all 
such meetings. 
5. Right to Examine Association Records. Any first 
Mortgagee shall have the right to examine the books, records and 
audit financial statements of the Association. 
6. Right to Pay Taxes and Charges. First mortgagees may, 
jointly or singly, pay taxes or other charges which are in 
default and which may or have become a charge against any portion 
of the Common Areas and may pay overdue premiums on hazard 
insurance pdlicies, or secure new hazard insurance coverage on 
the lapse of a policy, for the Common Areas; and first Mortgagees 
making such payments shall be owed immediate reimbursement 
therefor from the Association. Declarant, for the Association as 
owner of the common Areas, hereby covenants and the Association 
by acceptance of the conveyance of the Common Areas, whether or 
not it shall be so expressed in such conveyance, is deemed to 
covenant and agree to make such reimbursement. 
7. Exemption from any First Right of Refusal. Any first 
mortgagee any purchaser therefrom who obtains title to the Lot 
pursuant to the remedies provided in the first Mortgage, or by 
foreclosure of the first Mortgage, or by deed or assignment in 
lieu of foreclosure, or by sale pursuant to any power of sale or 
otherwise shall be exempt from any "right of first refusal" which 
would otherwise affect the Lot. 
8. Rights Upon Foreclosure of Mortgage. Each holder of a 
first Mortgage (or deed of trust) on a Lot and any purchaser from 
it who comes into possession of the Lot by virtue of foreclosures 
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of the Mortgage, or by deed or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, 
or pursuant to power of sale or otherwise will take the Lot free 
of and shall not be liable, for, any claims for unpaid assessments 
and charges against the Lot which accrue prior to the time such
 t 
holder comes into possession of the Lot. 
9. Restrictions Without Approval of Mortgagees. Except as 
to the Association's right to grant easements for utilities and 
similar or related -purposes., the .Development's common Areas may ._. 
not be alienated, released transferred, hypothecated, or 
otherwise encumbered without the approval of all holders of first 
Mortgage liens on the lots. 
10. Mortgagees Rights Concerning Amendments. Except as 
concerns the right of Declarant to amend the Declaration and 
related documents as contained in Article XII of the Declaration, 
no material amendment to the Declaration, Bylaws or the Articles 
of Incorporation of the Association shall be accomplished or 
effective unless at least 100% of the Mortgagees (based on one 
vote for each Mortgagee) of the individual Lots have given their 
prior written approval to such amendment. 
XI. ANNEXATION OF ADDITIONAL LAND 
1. Annexation By Declarant. Declarant may expand the 
Property subject to this Declaration by the annexation of 
additional land for common areas or for subdivision into 
additional residential and commercial lots. The annexation of 
such land shall become effective upon the recordation in the 
office of the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah, of a 
Supplementary DecJLaration which (i) describes the land to be 
'annexed or incorporated by rererence the i3'esi:iOption or the 
aScTitibnal land, (ii) decjLargSM^ t^at annexed land is 
gola7~cuTrEeyea, encirmgeFed^^ Teased, occ 
61 the Pr^pePEy^up^ect^To^the^ 
improved aspart 
sets forth"such _ aration, (j n i 
a^^tional^Tlmi tat ions
 f restrictions, covenants ancT"*cbnditions as 
aT^appiTcaLie to the annexed larKL__and_ (iv) states when such ^ ' 
Ion becomes appLJicabTe to. the annexed land •mexati p pmes—a^a j, pig T.CL the annexed lan . When such' 
annexation becomes effective, the annexed land ^Hall become part 
of the Property, Such annexation may be accomplished in one or 
more annexations without limitations as to size or location. 
2. Limitation on Annexation. Declarant's right to annex 
said land to the Property shall be subject to the following 
limitations, conditions and right granted to the Declarant: 
(a) Declarant shall not effectuate any annexation of 
land which would cause the total number of living units 
existing on, or planned for, the Property to exceed 150 
total Lots, or 106 units in the additional property after 
Phase I and II. 
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(b) Declarant's right to annex land to the Property 
shall expire fifteen (15) years after this Declaration is 
filed for record in the office of the County Recorder of 
Washington County, Utah. 
(c) Additional Living Units when constructed shall be 
compatible with existing structures on the Property, 
provided that such determination shall be made in the 
discretion of Declarant (with respect to Living Units or 
Common Area improvements built by Declarant or their 
assigns), or as approved by the Architectural Control 
Committee. 
(d) The configuration of annexed land as to lot si2e, 
common areas and the nature, quantity or quality of 
improvements shall be in discretion of the Declarant or its 
assigns,. No assurances can therefore be given. 
(e) Declarant reserves unto itself and its assigns the 
right to create limited Common Areas and facilities within 
any portion of the annexed land. No assurances can 
therefore be made with respect to such items, 
3. Supplementary Declaration. The annexation authorized 
under the foregoing section shall be made by filing of record a 
Supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions or similar instrument, with respect to the 
additional property which shall extend the plan of this 
Declaration to such property. 
Such Supplementary Declaration contemplated above may 
contain such complimentary additions and modifications of the 
covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in this 
Declaration -as may be necessary to_ref.lect the different: 
character, if any, ofthe added property and as are not 
inconsistent With the plan of the Declaration, ' 
The recordation .of such Supplementary Declaration shall 
constitute and effectuate the annexation of the said real 
property described therein, making said real property subject to 
this Declaration and subject to the functions, powers and 
jurisdiction of the Association and thereafter all of the Owners 
of Lots in said real property shall be automatically be members 
of the Association. 
4- Declarant's Right to Amend. Until the right to enlarge 
the Development through the addition of tracts or subdivisions 
terminates, Declarant shall have, and is hereby vested with, the 
right to unilaterally amend the Declaration as may be reasonably 
necessary or desirable: (i) to more accurately express the 
intent of any provisions of the Declaration in the light of then 
existing circumstances or information; (ii) to better insure, in 
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light of then existing circumstances or information, workability 
of the arrangement which is contemplated by the Declaration; or 
(iii) to facilitate the practical, technical, administrative or 
functional integration of any additional tract of subdivision 
into the Development. 
5. Expansion of Definitions. In the event the Property is 
expanded the definition used in this Declaration automatically 
shall be expanded to encompass and refer to the Property as so 
expanded. E.g., "Property" shall mean the real property 
described in Article II of this Declaration plus any additional 
real property added by a Supplementary Declaration or by 
Supplementary Declarations, and reference to this Declaration 
shall mean this Declaration as so supplemented. 
XII. MISCELLANEOUS 
1. Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given 
to any Owner under the provisions of this Declaration shall have 
deemed to have been properly furnished if delivered or mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the person named as the Owner, at the latest 
address for such person as reflected in the records of the 
Association at the time of delivery or mailing the same.to the 
Managing Agent or President of the Association. Any notice 
reguired or permitted to be given to the Architectural Control 
Committee may be given by delivering or mailing the same to the 
Chairman.or any member of such committee. 
2. Pules and Regulation. The Association shall have 
authority to promulgate and enforce such reasonable rules, 
regulations, and procedures as may be necessary or desirable to 
aid the Association in carrying out any of its functions or to 
insure that the Property is maintained and used in a manner 
consistent with the interests of the Owners. 
i 
. 3. Amendment. Any amendment to this Declaration shall 
require: (a) the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) 
of all Class A and C membership votes which Members cast at a 
meeting duly called for such purpose; and, (b) so long as the 
Class B membership exists the written consent of Declarant. 
Written notice setting forth the purpose of the meeting.and the 
substance of the amendment proposed shall be sent to all Members 
at least ten (10) days but not more than thirty (30) days prior 
to the meeting date. The quorum required for any such meeting 
shall be as follows: At the first meeting called the presence of 
members or of proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60%) of all 
the votes of the class A and C membership shall constitute a 
guorum. If a quorum is not present at the first meeting or any 
subsequent meeting, another meeting be called (subject to the 
notice requirement set forth in the foregoing portion of this 
Section 3) at which a quorum shall be one-half of the quorum 
which was required at the immediately preceding meeting. Np 
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subsequent meeting shall be held more than forty-five (45) days 
following the immediately preceding meeting. Any amendment 
authorized pursuant to this Section shall be accomplished through 
the recordation of an instrument executed by the Association (and 
by the Declarant if the Class B membership then exists). In such 
instrument an officer or director of the Association shall 
"certify that the vote required by this Section for amendment 'has 
occurred. Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the 
contrary, until eighty percent (80%) of the lots in the 
Development (including additional phases as may be added) have 
been sold to purchasers, Declarant shall have, and is hereby 
vested with, the right to unilaterally amend this Declaration as 
may be reasonably necessary or desirable; (a) to more accurately 
express the intent of any provision of this Declaration in light 
of then existing circumstances, information or mortgagee 
requirements, or (b) to better insure, in light of then existing 
circumstances or information, workability of the arrangement 
which is contemplated by this Declaration. 
4. Consent in Lieu of Vote. In any case which this 
Declaration requires for authorization or approval of a 
transaction the assent or affirmative vote of a stated percentage 
of the votes present or represented at a meeting, such 
requirement may be fully satisfied by obtaining, with or without 
a meeting, consents in writing to such transaction from Members 
entitled to cast at least the stated percentage of all membership 
votes outstanding in connection with the class of membership 
concerned. The following additional provisions shall govern any 
application of this Section 4: 
(a) All necessary consents must be obtained prior to 
the expiration of ninety (90) days after the first consent 
is-giv^n by any Member. 
(b) The. total number of votes required for 
authorization or approval under this Section 4 shall be 
determined as of the date on which the last consent is 
signed. 
(c) Except as provided in the following sentence, any 
change in ownership of a Lot which occurs after consent has 
been obtained from the Owners thereof shall not be 
considered or taken into account for any purpose. A change 
in ownership which would otherwise result in an increase in 
the total number of class A and C votes outstanding shall, 
however, be effective in that regard and shall entitle the 
new Owner to give or withhold his consent. 
(d) Unless the consent of all Members whose 
memberships are appurtenant to the same Lot are secured the 
consent of none of such Members shall be effective. 
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5. Reserve Fund. The Association shall establish adequate 
reserve to cover the cost of reasonably predictable and necessary 
major repairs and replacements of the Common Areas and exterior 
maintenance and shall cause such reserve to be funded by regular 
monthly or other periodic assessments against the Lot Owners 
rather than by special assessments, 
6. Lease Provisions, Any Owner may lease his lot or Living 
Unit, provided,, however, .that anyplease agreement^between a Let 
Owner and the Lessee must be in writing and must provide, 
interalia, that: 
(a) The terms of the Lease shall in all respects be 
subject to the provisions of the Declaration, Articles of 
Incorporation of the Association and the Bylaws; and 
(b) Any failure of the Lessee to comply with the terms 
of such documents shall constitute a default under the 
lease. 
7. Purchase of Airstrip. The Association expressly 
reserves the right of purchase or otherwise accept fee ownership 
of the airstrip from Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. , its successors 
or assigns at some future date, 
8. Declarant's Rights Assignable. All or any portion of 
the rights of Declarant under this Declaration or in any way 
relating to the Property may be assigned. 
9. Interpretation. The captions which precede the Articles 
and Sections of this Declaration are for convenience only and 
shall in no way affect the manner in which any provision hereof 
is construed. Whenever the context so requires, the singular 
shall include the plural, the plural shall include the singular, 
the whole shall include any part thereof, and any gender shall 
include both other genders. The invalidity or unenforceability 
of any portion of this Declaration shall not affect the validity 
or enforceability of the remainder hereof. 
10. Covenants to Pun With Land. This Declaration and all 
the provisions hereof shall constitute covenants to run with the 
land or equitable servitudes, as the case may be, and shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of Declarant and all 
parties who hereafter acquire any interest in a Lot or in the 
Common Areas, all parties who hereafter acquire any interest in 
a Lot or in the Common Areas shall be subject to the terms of 
this Declaration and the provisions of any rules, regulations, 
agreements, instruments, and determinations contemplated by this 
Declaration and failure to comply with any of the foregoing shall 
be ground for an action by the Association or any aggrieved Owner 
for the recovery of damages, or for injunctive relief, or both. 
By acguiring any interest in a lot or in the common areas, the 
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party acguiring such interest consents to, and agrees to be bound 
by, each and every provision of this Declaration. 
11. Effective Date, This Restated, Supplementary, 
and Amended Declaration and any amendment hereof shall take 
effect upon its being filed for record in the office of- the -- -
County Recorder of Washington County, Utah. 
EXECUTED the day and year first above written. 
SKY RANCH DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
Michael 0. Longley, President 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
ss. 
On the day of July, 1990, personally appeared before 
me Michael 0. Longley, who duly acknowledged to me that he is the 
President of Sky Ranch Development, Inc., -a Utah corporation, and 
that he executed the same on behalf of the said corporation, 
pursuant to authorization of its Board of Directors or a 
resolution of the said Board of Directors authorizing the same. 
:?x; l>-*^an^a& 
\ > \ 
Notary Public 
Res iding in: yrA 
My Commission expires : 10. ^ ^C/f 
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Exhibit A 
Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Subdivision 
All of the Lots located in the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch 
Subdivision, Washington County/Utah, include Lots 1 through 12, 
14 through 16, and 17 through 25. 
Exhibit B 
Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Phase II 
Grassy 
described as 
Beginning at 
Subdivision 
section line 
south, range 
767.45 feet 
0 11'13" W 1 
23'13n W 221 
0 10'05H E 2 
point of beg 
Meadows Sky Ranch Phase II, more particularly 
the southeast corner of Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch 
said point being S 0 10'05" W 1875.00 feet along the 
from the east 1/4 corner of Section 28, township 42 
13 west, SLB&M; and running thence S 0 10'05" W 
to the southeast corner of said Section 28; thence S 
484.04 feet along the section line; thence S 26 
.28 feet; thence N 89 49'55" W 466.75 feet; thence N 
450.00 feet; thence S 89 49'55" E 565.00 feet to the 
inning. 
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SECOND RESTATED, SUPPLEMENTARY AND AMENDED 
DECLARATION OF 
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS FOR 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PLANNED DEVELOPMENT 
This Second Restated, Supplementary and Amended Declaration for Grassy Meadows 
Sky Ranch Planned Development is made and executed this£y3fay of October, 2002 by SKY 
RANCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation, and successor Declarant of said development. 
RECITALS 
A. Declarant and/or its predecessors were and are the record owners (legal or 
equitable) of those certain parcels of real property (the Property) described in Exhibits "A" and 
"B" of this Second Restated Supplementary and Amended Declaration. In 1984, the original 
Declarant commenced on the Property Phase 1 of a planned development, with the potential 
addition of additional phases and certain Common Areas that could be (and many of which have 
been) added in the future for the benefit of the Development and the Owners of Lots therein. As 
of the execution of this document, Phases 1,2,3,4,5A and 5C have been incorporated within 
the development (See Exhibit "A"), and several additional phases are contemplated (See Exhibit 
B. Declarant desires to provide for the preservation and enhancement of the Property 
values and amenities of the Property and for the maintenance of the future Common Areas. To 
this end and for the benefit of the Property and of the Owners thereof, the Declarant desires to 
subject the Property described in Exhibit "A" Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Subdivision and all 
subsequent Phases that may be annexed thereto as described in Exhibit "B," to this Second 
Restated, Supplementary and Amended Declaration, including all of the covenants, restrictions, 
easements, charges and liens hereinafter set forth, each and all of which are for the benefit of the 
Property and each Owner thereof. 
C. Declarant deems it desirable, for the efficient preservation of the values and 
amenities of the Property, to create an entity which possesses the power to maintain and 
administer the Common Areas, to collect and disburse the assessments and charges hereinafter 
provided for, and otherwise to administer and enforce the provisions of this Declaration. For 
such purpose Declarant has, at the time of the recordation of the original Declaration on August 
23,1984, caused to be incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah, as a nonprofit 
corporation, GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION. 
D. Deetewt^eeerve-s4heA.rightio annex additional phases to the development (Set 
'Ss^m^&^^d^t Owners will beoDme Members of the Association and who will be entiiJed 
"SRI!! subject to all of the rights, powers, privileges, covenants, restrictions, easements, charges and* 
fens-h ef einaft e^sei lojlh* 
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iiapfiOMemciit^^her than utility l ine^nj^g*^ located thereon and may 
include facilities leased by the Ass©eteti<i>nsi^  may .also 
include an adjacent pond area, but shall.noJJLnj*]^^ 
•aiTOS*- The common areas included within-Grassy Meadows4^^tn&h*Bto 
arc those identified on the plats of the various phases^ oLthfijpjsajecU 
8. Conveyance shall mean actual conveyance of fee title to any Lot to any Owner by a 
warranty deed or other document of title, including entering into an installment sales contract. 
9. Declarant shall mean and refer to SKY RANCH DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, as successor in interest to Michael 0. Longley, Laura Ellen Longley, William R 
Longley, Helene M. Longley and Larry G. Watts, and lo Wasco, a Utah general partnership, its 
successors and assigns, or to any successor or assign of all or substantially all of its interest in the • 
development of the Property. 
10. Declaration shall mean and refer to this instrument, the Second Restated, 
Supplementary and Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Grassy 
Meadows Sky Ranch a Planned Development in'Washington County, Utah, as the same may 
hereafter be modified, amended, supplemented, or expanded in accordance with the provisions 
hereof (and in particular in accordance with the provisions of Article XI) concerning 
amendments or supplements to this Declaration which are to occur in conjunction with the 
expansion of the development. 
11. Development shall mean and refer to the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned 
Development created by this Second Restated, Supplementary and Amended Declaration as it 
exists at any given time, including any future additions thereto as allowed by this Declaration. 
12. ' & g m ^ 
attached hereto and made a part hereofM^i@h*s^^ 
and,.upon which Declarant may-e-xpaji&ilMyJ^  
13. FBO shall mean and refer to any Fixed Base Operation that may be installed on 
that portion of the property shown on the Phase4*Ia<4>etweerrthe airstrip and the individual lots* 
orany other area within the developmenMeWrthePairstrip. Said FBO may include, but is not« 
limited to, facilities for the sale of airplane fuel, a convenience store, lodging units ("casitas"}, 
airplane repair facilities, airplane washing facilitiesfand^any^th^ deemeji 
appwpriffttW desirable by the Declarant. 
14. Front Yard Area shall mean and refer to the yard area of each Lot extending from 
the street to the fence line, which fence shall be located fifteen feet (15') from the street inside 
the Owner's Property line. 
15. ^m^^^!W\fmS^fMye^H^^^^€m^'which- is*designed and inlendgdJQL» 
us^^^^O'eetr^f^^rresidence, togethtTWtt1TTfrimprov ?^ments locafed on the Lot used-in 
coRJw^toirwttirsDCff? e s i d e n ce> 
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m 16. LabshaJJ mean and refer to any .ofihe separati^Mnbered and individually 
% described plots of land shown on any of the Plat maps for the development, and may include both 
residential and commercial lots and hangar units, -.. 
^ 17, Member shalta)&a*^and refer toevery-owner.of property located within the 
% deuelapment, jncludiiig^wners of any lot.(commercial onjesidential),oi.hangar unit(s). 
« 
m 
m 
% 19. CKvner shall meanand refef^ o^^pe^QBAQj&ieiLtit^ ^ho is the owneM^reaonKin 
^ the Office of the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah) of a fee or an undivideiiJfce^ 
m inlerestin any Lot (commercial, residential or hangar unit) or property in Ihe developments 
Notwithstanding any applicable theory relating to a mortgage, deed or trust, or like instrument, 
* the term Owner shall not mean or include a Mortgagee or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of 
% trust unless and until such party has acquired title pursuant to foreclosure or any arrangement or 
fc proceeding in lieu thereof. 
I 
i 
18. Mortgagee shall mean any person or entity named as a first Mortgagee or 
beneficiary under or holder of a first deed of trust. 
20. Plat shall mean and refer to the various plats of the "GRASSY MEADOWS SKY 
PvANCH PLANNED DEVELOPMENT," including the plat for Phase 1 recorded in the Office of 
rd I the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah on the 23 day of August, 1984, in Book 357 
at page 63 as Entry No. 265520, the plat for Phase 2 recorded in the Office of the County 
, Recorder of Washington County, State of Utah, on the 16lh day of July, 1990, in Book 567, at 
page 1 as Entry No. 368242, the plat for Phase 3 recorded in the Office of the County Recorder 
of Washington County, Utah on the 3rd day of May 1991, in Book 600 at page 353 as Entry No. 
i 383163, the plat for Phase 4 recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington 
County, State of Utah, on the 27,h day of July 1992, in Book 671, at page 509 as Entry No. 
411684, the plat for Phase 5A recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington 
County, State of Utah, on the 10,h day of April 1996, in Book 991, at page 504 as Entry No. 
529113, and the plat for Phase 5C recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington 
I County, State of Utah, on the 10lh day of April 1996, in Book 991, at page 517 as Entry No. 
, 529117, and to the plats of subsequent phases that may be recorded and as any and all of the 
same will hereafter be modified, amended, supplemented or expanded in accordance with the 
provisions of Article XI concerning amendments or supplements to this Declaration which are to 
occur in conjunction with the expansion of the Development as herein provided. 
21. Property shall mean and refer to all of the real property which is covered by the 
Phases and Plats that have been recorded as of the date of execution of this Declaration, 
including phases 1,2, 3, 4,5A and 5C, the legal description of which property is given in Exhibit 
"A," of this Declaration, and all of the real property which is covered by (he expandable land 
which may be annexed to the development as provided herein, a description of which is given in 
Exhibit "B" of this Declaration. 
- 22. Supplementary Declaration shall mean and refer to any supplementary declaration 
of covenants, conditions and restrictions, or similar instrument, which extends the provisions of 
this Second, Resiateri, Supplementary and Amended Declaration to all or any portion of the 
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II. DESCRIFHON OF PROPERTY 
The Properly which is associated wilt the Develnnm,„, , „ j i.- ,.. 
transferred, sold, conveyed and occupied subieclto 2 • , h'Ch " a"d sha" bc k l d -
Supplementary and Amended D ^ Z l ^ ^ T ™ " " *""" ReS'a'ed' 
County.StateofUtah.andmorepar.icu.arlTeS w t ^ ^ r ^ ^ * * ' 
incorporated herein by this reference, and whatever S - i • . T ^ 
project as a result of the declarant's right to exnand ,n t H 1 lnC<,T'or2,ed >"'° <1* 
Exhibit B attachedhereto and i * ^ ^ £ £ £ ^ k ™ ^ i » 
all Patent reservations and exclusions' anv m i S ^ t f ^-governmental authorities, 
incident thereto; all instruments oreoordwM I t H i T " T " K""d a n d ri*h,s 
nghts-of-way; all easements and rights-of-way of ~ " J - • - - ? " S a M I " S *"" 
encroachments or discrepancies otherwise a k t * ^ ^ ? ? " • - * ? . 
cable, wire, utility line o, similar facility which tra°velf„r™?- u " ' " *"<*'liM-
described land at such time as construction of al Pro P f ^ ^ " " a b ° V e -
easements necessary for ingress to e T s fe J " T " n p r 0 ; r a e ' " s ls " " P ^ and all 
Pipes, ,ines, cables'wire, S ^ & S T * ' ^ ^ ^ * a" ™> 
hereafter constructed thereon as may be « J ^ ^ g £ T T ? """ " 
successor of Declarant, including the right to ™ L ,
 n ri7 f 0 r i D c d a ' a n ' o r f o ' ^ assiS°* ", 
improvements (inching commfrcia, i ^ ^ ^ S ^ Z T T ' *°* "* 
be appropriate, and to do al, things reasonable, n e i ^ r m r ^ T T '° 
IF THE PROPERTY or any improvement thereon is traversed or partially occupied bv a 
perrnanen, rmprovenren, or utility ,i„e, a perpetua, easement for sEcn i m ^ o ^ t y „„e 
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III. MEMBERSHIP AND YOUNG RIGHTS 
1. Membership. Every Owner shall:be-a member olthe Association. Membershipia^. 
the Association shall be mandatory, shall be appurtenanfio the %9t4&wbtchthe Owner tosifce 
necessary interest, and shall not be separated from the LoWo^ieh4Upp&rtains. ^ 
2. Voting Rights. The Association shall have the following described three classes of 
voting membership: 
glass A. Class A MsfflfcW^ Lots abut and/or who have 
taxiway access to the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Airstrip, other than the Declarant. 
Class A Members shall be entitled to one (1) vole for each Lot in which the interest 
required foMnembership in the Association is held. When more than one (1) person * 
.(^^i^ffHWterest in any Lot, all such persons shall be Members. The vote for such Lob 
sh&Meiexercised as they determine, but in no event3 however, shall more than one Class 
A^v^t^^s^wfeespect io any Lot. Owners.^u&mmercial and/or light manufacteinf 
ij&mtT&also Class A members. 
Class B. The Class BMembershall be the Declarant. The Class B Member shall be* 
^entitled to five (5) votes for each Lot in which it holds the interest required foi^  
membership in the Association. Each group of 5 hangar units/lots in Phase 5C that is 
owned by Declarant, or titled in another party but held in trust by that parry in favor of 
Declarant, shall be considered a single Class B or Class C Lot, whichever the Declarant 
elects. At each election, the Declarant shall be make this determination. For each group, 
which the Declarant elects to be a Class B Lot, the Declarant shall be entitled to 2 V2 
votes. Where the number of hangar units at issue is not divisible by 5, any residual group 
of hangar units less than 5 in number shall also be considered the equivalent of a single 
Class B ioi, entitling the Declarant to 2 Vi votes for that residual group. (For example, if 
the Declarant owned 8 hangar units, he would be entitled to 2 V2 votes for the first 5, and 
2 Vi votes for the remaining 3, thereby giving him a total of 5 votes) Declarant shall have 
the option of either exercising his Class B voting rights for all or any portion of such 
hangar unil lots, or allowing the party holding title in trust for Declarant of these hangar 
units to vole all or any portion of these lots as if they were Class C lots, with ever}7 5 
hangar unifs (and any residual group Jess than 5) being considered one Class C vote.TTiiT 
\ Glass B membership*shall automatically cease and be converted to Class A membership „>% 
I an^WTf^io occur of the following events* 
(a) -When the total number of votes held by all Class A and C Members (not* 
including votes of Class C Members holding property in trust for the Declarant, which'* 
votes shall be numbered among the Declarant's Class B votes for the sake of the -
determination of cessation of Class B voting rights discussed in this paragraph) equalsj^e 
total number of voles held by the Class B Member. As of the execution of this -
DeclaTationfth^tetelnumber of votes held by Class A 2nd Class C members in all phases 
irWpand the total number of votes held by the Declarant (including those held in trust 
forthe Declarant) in all phases is 203* Therefore, notwithstanding any statement the 
"Board of Trustees .may have inserted in -the-"Bylaws-, to-the contrary, Declarant has Class B 
votes as of the date of execution of this Declaration. It shall be cause for automatic 
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dismissal from membership on the Board of Trustees of the Association for board 
members to fail to recognize Declarant's votes, including those held in trust for 
Declarant. 
(b) Tfe^gm-r^ftWDf (EllTfgfrTCTl^^ Regaled 
Re@<^epef4¥fi#h^ 
Class C. Class C Members shall be all the Owners (other than the Declarant or 
his assigns) whose Lots do not abut and are not adjacent to the airstrip, as welhasrownens 
of a group of hangar units in Phase J f l N i a s s C members shall be entitled to one-half, 
(1/2) vote for each Lot in which the interest required for membership in the Association* 
held. For voting purposes, every group of hangar units in Phase 5C owned by a person or 
.entity other than Declarant shall be considered to be one Class CLot. In addition, every^ 
five hanger units titled in another party but neld in trust for Declarant, shall be entitled to • 
one vote the same as any other Class C lot; however, the Declarant shall have the3 
discretion of either voting all or any portion of such lots as Class B votes, or allowing tie 
iparty holding the hangar units in trust fbi Declarant to vote all or any portion of them ai • 
Class C votes, Where the number of hangar units held in trust for Declarant is not 
divisible by 5, any residual group of hangar units less than 5 in number shall also be 
considered the equivalent of a single Class C lot. (For example, if the party holding 
hangar units in favor of Declarant owned 8 hangar units, the first 5 would be considered 
one Clas C Lot, and the remaining 3 would also be considered to be one Class C Lot) * * 
should bt not5d4hat-anycommercial lotsin~Phase:5C are not Class C Lots, but are Class* 
%A Lots. It shall be cause for automatic dismissal from membership on the Board of 
«^Pruste^s«of*thW^gs<5tiation for board members to fail to recognize the..voles.of airytStess* 
@m^mfr^-idmdkgtfchase held in trust for Declarant.. 
3. Conversion from Class C to Class A I>ots in Phase 1 Upon paymenfbv the Lofa» 
vxaervtVCItSEtt of the sum of Two Thousand Dollar^ 
($a$e(J!O0yi^^ Lot owner may elect to become* 
^igl^s^feMei^nfeeir ThesiQj&js^ treated as^Glass A 
Mmtbtr for all purposes as*sat4©pfch*h$m^H^^ use of the airstrip* 
an*shall-be subject to the assessments for a<3H5T?n!TEfSBef pfcfvided for in part V heretrf4rafra»»w 
IfeTOtnrrember also purchases hangar units in*Bhas©-§C, he shall not be required to pay an 
addi4is.Bai4-^ agreement for said hangar units, Class***• 
4. Multiple Ownership Interests. In the event there is more than one Owner of a 
particular Lot, the vote relating to such Lot shall be exercised as such Owners may determine 
among themselves. A vote cast at any Association meeting by any of such Owners, whether in 
person or by proxy, shall be conclusively presumed to be the vole attributable to the Lot 
concerned unless an objection is immediately made by another Owner of the same Lot. In the 
event such an objection is made, the vote involved shall not be counted for any purpose 
whatsoever other than to determine whether a quorum exists. 
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* 5 a n d and ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Shail ™™ Ws o p i ^ 
** addiuonal subdivision plats are recced ^ 
S * Drlarant may regain his cj- B r a fTfo e ntsted accordingi>'-m- •* 
units), e,ve.n,f.pr.&viously-G0Ti.verted to Class A o Qa r ^ ^ ^ e d (including hangar 
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMON A R M • 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
A f oca ,™ ™y>P^chase, lease o, olheLse 1 ,,f T p h a S K o f l h e P ' ° M The 
° ! h " f a c f - *»-lusion as Comro „ ^  ^ / i X „L ' ° ? ' ' " ^ ° f tad' " " " ^ « |>ven to the individual Owners for s u c h ™„ " ^ a"«d d™lopme„,. The assessed value 
Spec a, Assessments of these covenants. The airst, „ , * P r ° V i d e d f o r !» A » ' ^ V ffl -
•«anp ,s privately owned, and is leased to t h e l " ^ " T T " " ™ «™>o» ares, fh 
Jand underlying the taxiways. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g T A A d j r a m P r ° W °»™rs own the ' 
mamtatn the airslripjtnd laxiways. S ' "* ^"^^JSMi^ responsibility to 
2. Easement of Eniovmenf P k 
e ,
~ t i n 5 ^ S 7 o 7 t e J i 0 tie r X n n f " ^ ' ' i g h U " d e a s e ™< of.se.nd 
S ^ ^ K - S»ch right a n ^ ^ S S ^ ^ i ^ m J t i ^ 
'He to each Lot and in no event shall be separated t l l T 1 5 5 3 * " 2 " 1 , 0 ]" d shall paSc with 
^ >I>e right to the use and enjoyment described r ' e t t C ° r a K " p 0 n s u c h M ™ ^ 
Object ,o the provisions of this D e c l a r a t i c h * » Z ! ' . 7""' "" ^ Pm™ « h 
promulgated by the Association and the airstrfn
 Dw /• ^ '">CS a n d teW™s 
P
hr
OT;.,h; ""jtetaMy granting t h e ^ ™ ^ t e " ~ « f « ' ™ * t W b y B d l 
'
h c c f o f >">' <i™8= or costs resulting from I T T 1 'd resPMsiM'- Consequently i„ 
cos. shall be added to that Member's asse I n , Tbe'n 7 ", mS* °' i n v i l «- «* ^ L ' t 
a ! I ° ^ J ! ™ P £ L £ a ! « £ or invitee, unto,!, J k £ 2 a ^ n n ! S i £ e s J H v „0, , i m i l ^ " 
d c V e l
° P m e " ^ «ch member acknowledges" a,
 h / h , f " P ^ P ^ ^ a s i ^ proper t>, inP£his , J " 
community, a*d ,„a, he/she does notpoS ^ ** ^  '° bt "m °1'" 4°r. 
, =")- type or size from „sing , h e airstrip'or rao"tea """""" '** ™°M « « * * « i » W 
j~°<^^S^S^gt^^tlr,!r^ dKd °f *« ««*» 
substarmally as follows: S " Ut s h a " d«cnbe the interest or estate involved 
Sp^ rr'wi,hin a: °err M T S ^ *»«• »-«-
•he Plats recorded in thlMoTof h 7w Z ' L r " "* M m e iS i d e" , i f i« i j» 
Second Restated Supplementary ^ Z t X ^ ^ " " ^ M d f» l h ' 
% 
% 
t 
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described, and as provided for, in the Declaration. SUBJECT TO all of the 
provisions of the Declaration, and subject, also, to liens for current taxes. 
Whether or not the description employed in any such instrument is in the above-specified form, 
all provisions of this Declaration shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of any party 
who acquires any interest in a Lot. 
4. Limitation on Easement. ArMfembe^ Tights 
cgMB^Bm^kB*GermrtatflkTtzs-shalrtwiAjccMcrthe following 
(a) The right of the Association to suspend a Member's right to the use of any 
amenities included in the Common Areas for any period during which an assessment on 
such Member's Lot remains unpaid and for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days for 
any infraction by such Member or his guest or invitee of the provisions of this 
Declaration or of any rule or regulation promulgated by the Association; 
(b) The right of the County of Washington and any other governmental or quasi-
governmental body having jurisdiction over the Property to access and rights of ingress . 
and egress over and across any street, parking area, walkway or open spaces contained 
within the Property for purposes of providing police and fire protection and providing any 
other governmental or municipal service; 
(c) The right of the Association to dedicate or transfer ail or any part of rhe 
Common Areas to any public agency or authority for such purposes and subject to such 
conditions as may be agreed to by the Association. Except to grant easements for utilities 
and similar or related purposes, any such dedication or transfer must, however, be 
assented to in writing by at least 100% of all first Mortgagees (based on one vote for each 
Mortgagee) and in writing by the Owners of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the 
Lots in each of Classes A and C (not including Lots owned by Declarant) at a meeting 
duly called for the purpose. Written or printed notice setting forth the purpose of the 
meeting and the action proposed shall be sent to all Members and mortgagees at leas! ten 
(10) days, but not more than thirty (30) days prior to the meeting date. 
(d) T^right-of;the-Declarant or Association to charge reasonable admission and 
ot^^^^^55001^'1011 Members for the use of the airstrip or any recreational facilities 
sikiated |^ian4h^@0ffii7iBn^%eafpT®vided that such fees .charged by the Association shall 
in^n-0^^y^ff^ot4t^nonpr^fit^eiD^oration status, and^ suoh fees are .approved according to 
th^r#oe^mesaadapte^ sections 4* 
. a n ^ . 
(e) The right of the Association, upon the affirmative vote of 50% of the 
membership, to enter into leases or agreements for outside entities or persons to use the 
airstrip or the common areas or facilities, and to charge a reasonable admission or other 
fee therefor. However, the Declarant or any subsequent owner of the airstrip shall not be 
restricted from using the airstrip for marketing purposes including inviting guests to use 
the runway (which may include jet aircraft, subject (o FAH;s) without needing to gain asy— 
approval from the Association or its members.~"~ 
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(f) The right of the Association to take such steps as are reasonably necessary or 
desirable to protect the Common Area against foreclosure. 
(g) The right of Declarant or successors to grant and reserve easements and rights-of-
way through, under, over and across the Common Area, for installation, maintenance and 
inspection of lines and appurtenances for public or private utilities and construction of 
additional units. 
(h) The right of Washington County or any other governmental entity having 
jurisdiction over the property to levy taxes and issue bonds. 
(i)The right of the Board of Trustees and airstrip owner to publish and enforce rules 
and regulations as provided elsewhere in this Declaration. 
(j) The right of the Association to levy assessments against each Owner for the 
maintenance, protection and preservation of the development in compliance with (his 
Declaration. 
(k) InwsmucLasih^ the right of the .Declarant and any 
^member, or any guests and invitees Declarant or any member, to land jets.and large % 
•"•aircraft on the-airstrip and park the same in the EBO area or on other property in the -
"project. 
5. Encroachments. If any portion of an improvement constructed by Declarant, his 
successors or assigns encroaches upon the Common Areas or other Lots, as a result of the 
construction, reconstruction, repair, shifting, settlement or movement of any portion of the 
development, a valid easement for the encroachment and for the maintenance of the same shall 
exist so long as the encroachment exists. 
6. Declarant reserves unto itself an easement over and to the streets, taxiways, 
underground utilities (including sewer and water lines), common areas and all unimproved lot 
areas for access necessary and incidental to the construction of additional residential, commercial 
and hangar units and of common facilities, including drainage facilities, which the Declarant 
believes may be reasonably necessary, and for the granting of utility easements to third parlies -as 
may be necessary or desirable for the project in the discretion of the Declarant. In connection 
therewith, Declarant may without charge connect to any utility line or use any street or access in 
the project that Declarant deems necessary as part of his development of subsequent phases of 
the project or development of adjacent projects. 
V. ASSESSMENTS 
1. Personal Obligation and Lien. Each Owner, expressly excluding the Declarant for 
each Lot owned by it or held in trust by another entity for it, shall, by acquiring in any way or 
becoming vested with an interest in a Lot, be deemed to covenant and agree to pay to the 
Association the monthly and the special assessments described in this Ariicie, together with the 
hereinafter provided for interest and costs of collection. All assessments shall be, constitute and 
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remain: (a) a charge and continuing lien upon the Lot with respect to which such assessment is 
made and (b) the personal obligation of the person who is the Owner of such Lot at the time the 
assessment falls due. The personal obligation for delinquent assessments shall not pass to an 
owner's successors in title unless expressly assumed by them. No Owner may exempt himself or 
his Lot from liability for payment of assessments by waiver of his rights concerning the Common 
Areas or by abandonment of his Lot. Any such liens, however, shall be subordinate to the lien or 
equivalent security interest of any first Mortgage on the Unit recorded prior to the date any such 
common expense assessments become due. Provided, however, that any such assessments as to 
Class C Members shall be one-half (1/2) of the amount of such assessments as are made upon 
Class A Members.. For assessment purposes, every group of hangar units in Phase 5C owned by 
a person or entity other than Declarant (or by a party holding hangar units in trust for Declarant) 
shall be considered to be one Class C lot, and the owner(s) thereof shall be assessed the same as 
all other Class C members. The Declarant shall pay assessments on only the Lots owned by 
Declarant in Phase I. The Lots in all other phases that Declarant owns, as well as those Lots 
(which includes groups of 5 hangar units) which are titled in another party but held in trust for 
Declarant, will be assessed only upon the sale to an Owner. 
2. Purpose of Assessments. Assessments levied by the Association shall.be used 
exclusively for the purpose of promoting the maintenance, health, safety and welfare of residents 
of the Property. The use made by the Association of funds obtained from assessments maj 
include payment of the cost of: taxes and insurances on the Common Areas; lease of off-property 
facilities for use of the Common Areas; management and supen'ision of the Common Areas; 
establishing and funding a reserve to cover major repair or replacement of improvements within 
the Common Areas; and any expense necessary or desirable to enable the Association to perform 
or fulfill its obligation, functions or purposes under the Declaration or its Articles of 
Incorporation. Other than to defend lawsuits filed in District Court against the Association or for 
the Association to pursue simple actions to collect a delinquent payment of dues, no part of any 
assessment (including special and additional assessments) may be paid to any attorney or law 
firm to pursue any claim, assert any point of view or fund any lawsuit unless 2/3s of the members 
consent to the same in writing. Each dollar spent on attorneys shall be accounted for and made 
part of the annual budget, which budget shall be made available to individual members upon 
request. It shall be cause for automatic dismissal from membership on the Board of Trustees of 
the Association for board members to fail to fulfill the requirements of this section. 
3. Base for Assessment. Each lot, whether improved with a Living Unit or 
unimproved, which has been conveyed to an Owner shall be assessed at a same and equal rale, 
provided that the amount of assessments due from Class C Members shall be one-half (1/2) of 
the amounts assessed against Class A Members. For the purpose of assessment, the term 
"Owner" shall expressly exclude the Declarant only. Commercial Lots and/or light 
manufacturing Lots that the Declarant intends to annex into the Development will be assessed 
upon conveyance to an Owner and are considered Class A Lots. These Lots will be assessed the 
same rate as a Class A Lot plus a percentage of sales to compensate for the additional 
maintenance of the airstrip or other Common Areas that may be needed as a result of the 
Owner's business activity. These additional assessments shall be charged for the additional 
maintenance costs only and are not intended to subsidize any other membership classes. 
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| (a) Until December 31, 2002, the maximum annual base general assessment shall 
I continue to be $500-00 per Unit (or $41.66 per month) as it has been since 1984. 
* (b) Inasmuch as runway and fence upkeep has not occurred in the manner that was 
I contemplated in 1984 when the first CC&'Rs were executed, as of December 31, 2002 the 
| assessment shall undergo a one-time increase of S200 for all units (or in other words, 
shall be $700 per unit), and in addition, from and after December 31, 2002, the general 
assessment shall be automatically increased at least in an amount that corresponds with 
the increase (from December to December) in the Published National Consumer Price 
I Index for southwestern Utah, with the base CPI to be December 31,1990. The Board of 
| Trustees of the Association may in its discretion increase the assessment beyond this 
amount; however, no such increase may be more than fifteen percent (15%) above the 
maximum assessment for the previous year without approval of two-thirds (2/3) of Ihe 
Members of each Class. Any such vote must be taken at a meeting to be called for this 
purpose. 
i 
i 
Special Assessments. In addition to the monthly assessments authorized above, the 
Association may levy special assessments for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part: (a) any 
expense or expenses not reasonably capable of being fully paid with funds generated by monthly 
\ assessments or the reserve fund, or (b) the cost of any construction, reconstruction, or unexpectedly 
) required repair or replacement in connection with the Common Areas. Any such special assessment 
> must be assented to by more than fifty percent (50%) of all votes which Members present in person 
or represented by proxy are entitled to cast at a meeting duly called for the purpose. Written notice 
* setting forth the purpose of the meeting shall be sent to all Members at least ten (10) days but not 
J . more than thirty (30) days prior to the meeting date. Special assessments for the purpose of 
J defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any construction (including new construction), 
reconstruction, repair or replacement of any capital improvement upon the Common Area, including 
fixtures and personal property related ihereto on any phase of the Project, will be allowed only after 
J
 the reserve fund has been expended and not replenished. All special assessments are subject to the 
limitation on funding of law;suits/3egal activities by the Association without the approval of 2/3s of 
the members as described in paragraph 2 above. 
4. Quorum Requirements, The quorum required for any action authorized by Section 
4 above shall be as follows: at the first meeting called the presence of members or of proxies 
entitled to cast fifty percent (50%) of all outstanding votes shall constitute a quorum. If a 
quorum is not present at the first meeting, another meeting may be called (subject to the notice 
requirements set forth in Section 4) at which a quorum shall be one-half (1/2) of the quorum 
which was required at the immediately preceding meeting. No further reduction in the number to 
achieve a quorum shall occur by the calling of subsequent meetings. No such subsequent 
meeting shall be held more than forty-five (45) days following the immediately preceding 
meeting. 
5. Equal Rate of Assessment. Both monthly and special assessments shall be fixed at 
a uniform (equal) rate for all Lots, subject to the provision of Paragraph 3 above regarding the 
exemption for the Declarant, or its assigns and subject to the provision for differing assessment 
raies as berween Class A and Ciass C Members. However, unequal assessments mav be assessed 
against (he Lots as provided for in Article VII, paragraphs 5,11 and 12. 
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6. Monthly Assessment Due Dates. The monthly assessments or periods, set by the 
Board of Trustees, provided for herein shall commence as to all Lots on the date a deed is 
-delivered to the first purchaser of a Lot, contract of sale or agreement as stated in Earnest Money 
Agreement prorations. The first monthly assessment shall be adjusted according to the number 
of days remaining in the month of conveyance. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the effective 
date of any change in amount of the monthly assessment, the Association shall give each Owner 
written notice of the amount and the first due date of the assessment concerned. 
7. Certificate Regarding Payment; Upon the request of any Owner or Prospective 
Purchaser or encumbrancer of a Lot, the Association shall issue a certificate stating whether or 
not all assessments respecting such Lot are current and, if not, the amount of the delinquency. 
Such certificate shall be conclusive in favor of all persons who in good faith rely thereon. 
8. Effect of Non-payment—Remedies. Any assessment not paid when due shall, 
together with the hereinafter provided for interest and costs of collection, be. constitute and 
remain a continuing lien on the Lot, provided, however, that any such lien will be subordinate to 
the lien or equivalent security interest of any first Mortgage on the Lot recorded prior to the date 
any such assessments become.due. The person who is the Owner of the Lot at the time the 
assessment falls due shall be personally liable for payments. However, such liability shall not 
pass to the Owner's successors in title unless expressly assumed by said successor. If the 
assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days after the date on which it becomes delinquent, the 
amount thereof shall bear interest from the date of delinquency at the rate of eighteen percent 
(18%) per annum plus a late payment service charge equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of each 
delinquent amount due and the Association may, in its discretion, bring an action either against 
the Owner who is personally liable or to foreclose the lien against the Lot. Any judgment 
obtained by the Association shall include reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and each and 
every other expense incurred by the Association in enforcing its rights. 
9. Right to Bring Action. Each Owner, by his acceptance of a deed to a Unit, hereby 
expressly grants to the Association, its successors, assigns or agents, the right and power to bring all 
a ctions against such Owner personally for the collection of such charges as a debt and to enforce the 
aforesaid lien by all methods available for the enforcement of such liens, including foreclosure by 
an action brought in the name of the Association in a like manner as a mortgage or deed of trust lien I 
on real property, and such Owner hereby expressly grants to the Association a power of sale in 
connection with said lien. The lien provided for in this Section shall be in favor of the Association 
and shall be for the benefit of all other Unit Owners. The Association, acting on behalf of the Unit 
Owners, shall have the power to bid in an interest foreclosed at foreclosure sale and to acquire and 
hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same. 
11. Non-use and Abandonment; Combining of Lots, No Owner may waive or escape 
personal liability for the assessments provided for herein, nor release the Unit owned by him 
from the liens and charges hereof, by non-use of any Common Area or abandonment of his Unit. 
Owners who combine lots which are shown as distinct lots on the plat must continue to pay a 
separate and distinct assessment for each lot as if they were not combined. If owners who have 
combined iots in the past have not paid for both lots, they must immediately pay all prior 
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m assessments, which they should have paid but did not. Failure to do so will result in a lien being 
v$ 
I 
placed on their property, as described elsewhere in this article. 
12. Tax Collection from Lot Owners by Washington County Authorized. It is 
% recognized that under the Declaration the Association will own the Common Areas and that it 
m will be obligated to pay property taxes to Washington County. It is further recognized that each 
- Owner of a Lot as a Member of the Association and as part of his monthly common assessment 
will be required to pay to the Association his pro rata share of such taxes. Notwithstanding 
^ anything to the contrary contained in the Declaration, or otherwise, Washington County shall be, 
% and is, authorized to collect such pro rata share (on equal basis) of taxes directly from each 
m Owner by inclusion of said share with the tax levied on each Lot. To the extent allowable, 
E Washington County is hereby directed so to do. In the event the assessor shall separately ^ ssess 
Common Areas to the Association, the Board of Trustees may require the Unit Owners, 
* including the Declarant, to pay a special assessment, on a pro rata basis, for property taxes. 
* 13. Special Service District for Paving Roads. Declarant, for each Lot owned by it, 
and each Owner shall, by acquiring or in any way becoming vested with his interest in a Lot, be 
deemed to covenant and agree to accept and pay proportionate amounts of money and 
* assessments due when and if a Special Service District may be organized for paving the roads in 
| and around the Property. 
14. Optional Declarant Subsidy. For ten (10) years after the date on which this Second 
* Restated, Supplementary and Amended Declaration is filed for record in the Office of the County 
I Recorder of Washington County, Utah, or during such time as Declarant has Class B voting rights, 
[ i whichever is longer, Declarant or its assigns may in its discretion subsidize the Association. 
k Notwithstanding this right, Declarant is under no obligation to do so. Subsidization shall be defined 
as the payment of any or all of the reasonable cost needs of the Association for ordinary and 
' necessary maintenance expenses of the Association, including maintenance of the airstrip, taxiways 
> and Common Areas. Declarant may seek reimbursement from the Association for all reasonable 
| amounts expended for any such subsidization and the Association hereby covenants and agrees to 
4 make such reimbursement. 
15. Exempt Property. The following property subject to this Declaration shall be exempt 
from the assessments created herein: 
(a) All Properties dedicated to and accepted by any local public authority; 
(b) The Common Area; and 
(c) Ail property owned by Declarant other than Lots in Phase 1, unless a Dwelling owned 
by Declarant is constructed on a Lot in another phase and is occupied as a residence. 
16, Additional Assessments. In addition to the annual assessments and special assessments 
for capital improvements authorized herein, the Association shall levy such assessments as may be 
necessary from time to time in case of emergency, or for the purpose of repairing and restoring any 
damage or disruption to the airstrip, taxiways or streets or other Common Areas, including damage 
from the activities of any governmental entity or utility-in maintaining, repairing or replacing utility 
lines and facilities thereon. All additional assessments are subject to the limitation on funding of 
;2WSU;tS/;ega; activities. u~j U'it riSSOCiatiOn wiuiOuL me approvai ol 2/3 s of me members as described 
in paragraph 2 above. 
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VI. OPERATION AND MAIN1HENANCE 
1. Maintenance of Lots and Living Units. .Each Lot and Living Unit shall be 
maintained by the Owner thereof so as not to detract from the appearance of the Property and so 
as not to affect adversely the value or use of any other Lot or Living Unit. The Association shall 
have no obligation regarding maintenance or care of Lots or Living Units except as provided in 
Paragraph 2 of this Article VI. 
2. Operation and Maintenance by Association. The Association, by its duly delegated 
representative, shall nrflYMp for such mamtenanceja^-d^pe^fc 
la^i^ra^^s^aflysb^neoc^sary or desirable to rnakethem appropriately usable in conjunction with** 
tb&btfasmpifito keep them clean, functional, attractive and generally in good condition and repair. 
"T^tidl^^if^f^MPm a in t a iiftfWPRSnt Yard Areas of each Lot including, but not by way O J ^ ^ 
hTflflarrfc^ and the sprinkling system.,JMMIUUI 
the*teB50CRtiOT-sh^ Areas acquired." 
Twice annually, or at times to be decided by the Board of Trustees, spraying to control 
weeds along and in the roadways and fence lines will occur. The costs associated with this 
spraying shall be added and become part of the assessment to which each Lot is subject. 
Notwithstanding the provisions regarding Lot and Living Unit maintenance by Owners, in 
the event an Owner of any Lot in the Property shall fail to maintain his Lot and the exterior of his 
Living Unit situated thereon in a manner satisfactory to the Architectural Control Committee of 
the Board; the Association, after approval by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Board, shall have the 
right, through its agents, employees or through an independent contractor to enter upon his Lot 
and repair, maintain and restore the portion of the Lot maintainable by the Owner and the 
exterior of his Living Unit and any other improvements erected thereon (but not the interior of 
his Living Unit). The cost of such exterior maintenance shall be added to and become part of the 
assessment to which Lot is subject. 
If shall be cause for automalidifeiilfSffKrom membership on the Board of Trustees^ QiJhfi 
A ^ e M B B ^ ^ the quality and condition of the areas to be.. 
maintained as identifie^ZktteiiS^^ and weatheipraofing 
and maintaining fencefs. 
3. Water. Culinary and irrigation water is available through the purchase of water 
connections from the Washington County Water Conservancy District. Purchase of such 
connections is the responsibility of the individual Lot Owners. 
4. Insurance. The Association shall secure and at all times maintain the following 
insurance coverages: 
(a) A policy or policies of fire and casualty insurance, with extended coverage 
endorsement, for the full insurable replacement value of all improvements comprising a 
part of the Common Areas. The name of the insured under each such policy shall be in 
form and substance similar to: "GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH LANDOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION for the use and benefit of the individual Lot Owners and Mortgagees, as 
their interests may appear." 
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(b) A comprehensive policy or policies insuring the Owners, the Association, and 
its directors, officers, agents, and employees against any liability incident to the 
ownership use or operation of the Common Areas, which may arise among themselves, to 
the public and to any invitees or tenants of the Property or of the Owners. Limits of . 
liability under such insurance shall not be less than $1,000,000.00, for all claims for 
personal injury and/or property damage arising out of a single occurrence, such coverage 
to include protection against water damage, liability for non-owned or hired automobile, 
liability for property of others, and such other risks as shall customarily be covered with 
** respect to projects similar in construction, location and use and maybe subject to 
• periodical adjustments, if the amount and scope of coverage is deemed insufficient by the 
0 airport owner or board, based upon recommendations from the insurance carrier or other 
H aviation oriented agencies. Such policies shall be issued on a comprehensive liability 
basis, shall provide a cross liability endorsement pursuant to which the rights of the 
™ named insured as between themselves are not prejudiced, and shall contain "a severability 
$ of interest" clause or endorsement to preclude the insurer from denying the claim of an 
g Owner in the Development because of negligent acts of the Association or other Owners. 
# 
(c) A comprehensive policy or policies as required by Sky Ranch Aiiport, Inc., in 
* its lease with the Association to cover any and all liabilities for operating the airstrip. 
I Such policy shall name Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., Sky Ranch Development, and 
| Michael O. Longley or, their successors and assigns as an insured and shall be subject 
annually to the reasonable approval of Grassy Meadows Aiiport, Inc. or its successors and 
assigns. Copies of all such policies must be delivered to Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. or 
its successors or assigns at each renewal period. 
The following additional provisions shall apply with respect to insurance: 
(I) In addition to the insurance described above, the Association shall secure and 
at all times maintain insurance against such risks as are or hereafter may be customarily 
) insured against in connection with developments similar io the Property in construction, 
) nature and use. 
(2) All policies shall be written by a company holding a rating of Class IV or 
better from Best's Insurance Reports or other similar standard yielding this minimum 
) quality of insurer. Each insurer must be specifically licensed in the State of Utah. 
i 
} (3) The Association shall have the authority to adjust losses. 
(4) Insurance secured and maintained by the Association shall not be brought into 
contribution with insurance held by the individual Owners or their Mortgagees. 
(5) Each policy of insurance obtained by the Association shall, if reasonably 
possible, provide a waiver of the insurer's subrogation rights with respect to the 
Association, the Owners and their respective directors, officers, agents, employees, 
invitees and tenants; that it cannot be cancelled, suspended or invalidated due to the 
couduci of any particular Owner or Owners; that it cannot be cancelled, suspended or 
) invalidated due to the conduct of the Association or of any director, officer, agent or 
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employee of the Association without a prior written demand that the defect be cured; that 
any "on other insurance" clause therein shall not apply with respeci to insurance kid 
individually by the Owners. 
(6) Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary herein; so long as the 
Mortgagee or its designee holds a mortgage or beneficial interest in a trust deed on a Lotm 
in the Development or owns a Lot, insurance policies shall meet all requirements and 
contain such other coverage and endorsements as may be required from time .to time by 
the Mortgagee or its designee. 
(7) Fidelity Coverage. The Association shall maintain fidelity coverage to protect 
against dishonest acts on the part of trustees, officers, manager, employees of the 
Association and all others (including volunteers) who handle, or are responsible for 
handling, funds of the Association. Such fidelity bonds shall: 
(a) name the Association as an obligee as the named insured; 
(b) be written in an amount sufficient to provide protection which is in no event 
less than one and one-half (V/i) times the Association's estimated annual 
operating expenses and reserves; 
(c) contain waivers of any defense based upon the exclusion of volunteers or 
persons who serve without compensation from any definition of "employee" or 
similar expression; 
(d) provide that they may not be cancelled or substantially modified (including 
cancellation for nonpayment of premium) without at least thirty (30) days' prior 
written notice to all first Mortgagees of Lots; and 
(e) provide that there will be no coverage of members of the Board of Trustees 
for any action they may take which is contrary to or not supported by these 
CC&Rs. 
(8) Mortgagee Clause. All policies of hazard insurance must contain or have 
attached the standard mortgagee clause commonly accepted by private institutional 
mortgage investors in the area in which the mortgaged premises are located. The 
mortgagee clause must provide that the insurance carrier shall notify the first Mortgagee 
(or trustee) named at least ten (10) days in advance of the effective date of any reduction 
or in cancellation of the policy. 
(9) Review of Insurance. The Board shall periodically, and whenever requested 
by twenty percent (20%) or more of the Owners or the Airport owner, review the 
adequacy of the Association's insurance program and shall report in writing the 
conclusion reached and any action taken on such review to the Owner of each Lot and to 
the holder of any mortgage on any Lot who shall have requested a copy of such report-
Copies of every policy of insurance procured by the Board shall be available for 
inspection by the Owner. 
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(10) Lots Not Insured by Association. The Association shall have no duty or 
responsibility to procure or maintain any fire, liability, extended coverage or other 
insurance covering any Lot, any Living Unit thereon or acts and events thereon. 
r Accordingly, each Owner shall secure and keep in force at all times fire and extended 
| coverage insurance which shall be equal to or greater than that commonly required by 
I private institutional mortgage investors in the area in which Ihe Mortgaged premises are 
located. The policy shall provide, as a minimum, fire and extended coverage insurance 
on a replacement cost basis in an amount not less that that necessary7 to comply wilb any 
9 co-insurance percentage stipulated in the policy. The amount of coverage shall be 
) sufficient so that in the event of any damage or loss to the Mortgaged premises of a type 
| covered by the insurance, the insurance proceeds shall provide at least the lesser of; (i) 
compensation equal to the full amount of damage or loss; or (ii) compensation to the first 
Mortgagee under the Mortgage equal to the full amount of the unpaid principal balance of 
* the Mortgage Loan. 
k (11) Unacceptable Policies. Policies are unacceptable where; (i) under the terms of 
the carrier's charter, bylaws or policy, contributions or assessments may be made against 
•' the Lot Owner or Mortgagee or Mortgagee's designee; or (ii) by the terms of the carrier's 
J charter, bylaws or policy, loss payments are contingent upon action by carrier's board of 
) directors, policyholders or members; or (iii) the policy includes any limiting clauses 
(other than insurance conditions) which could prevent Lot Owner, Mortgage or 
Mortgagee's Designee from collecting insurance proceeds. 
(12) The Development is not located in an area identified by the Housing and 
Urban Development as an area having special flood hazards. In the event that at some 
future time the Development should be declared to be in such flood area, a blanket policy 
of flood insurance on the Project shall be maintained in the amount of the aggregate of 
the outstanding principal balances of the Mortgage loans on the Living Units comprising 
the Development or the maximum limit of coverage available under the National flood 
Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, whichever is less. The name of the insured under 
each required policy must be in form and substance as that required by the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation at any given time. 
5. Airstrip. GRASSY MEADOWS LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION has entered into an 
. exclusive lease agreement with Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. for the use of the airstrip by the 
Lot Owners, their guests and invitees and other persons wishing to use the airport facility. 
CRaTpsnfflHflFTb the Association through this lease agreement shall be passed along to the 
"Members through proration and shall become part of the assessment described In Article,Y of 
these coveriaff£S. IfSKSlfbt cause for automatic dismissal from membership on the Board of _ 
Trusfees'of^thrftesociation for board members to fail to maintain the quality and condition of the 
airstrip as requifed"By the Jease agreement, or to fail to make the necessary lease payments for. ihe 
.Association's continued use of the airstrip, or to faii to sign the addendum to the Jease agreement 
which provides to the Association use of a strip of land that connects the airstrip to Phase 4, *. 
whichaocess is vitallo the continued use of tberairstrip by all Jot owners-in Phases 4Jx^Bjmd 
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6. Manager. The Association may carry out through a Manager any of its functions 
which are properly the subject of delegation. Any Manager so engaged may be an independent 
contractor or an agent or employee of the Association. The Manager shall be responsible for 
managing the Property for the benefit of the Association and the Owners, and shall, to the extent 
permitted by law and the terms of the agreement with the Association, be authorized to perform 
any of the functions or acts required or permitted to be performed by the Association itself. 
7. Terms of Management Agreement. Any agreement for professional management of 
the Development, or any other contract providing for services of the Declarant, sponsor or 
builder, may not exceed three (3) years. Any such agreement must provide for termination by 
either party without cause and without payment of a termination fee on ninety (90) days or less 
written notice. 
8. Repair of Damage Caused by an Owner, his Tenants, Guests, Invitees and Pets. 
Any damage caused to the Common Area and facilities, airstrip, taxiways, and/or personal 
property owned by the Association, by any Owner, his tenant, guest, invitee, minor child or any 
animal or pet under the control of or owned by any such person or a combination of the 
foregoing, shall create an assessable debt owed by such Owner to the Association. If the Owner 
does not adequately repair the damage, the Association shall, after approval by a majority vote of 
the Board of Trustees, have the right, through its agents, employees, or through an independent 
contractor, to repair the damage. The reasonable costs incurred by the Association in repairing 
the damage shall be added to and become an assessment against the Unit as described elsewhere 
in this Declaration. Any Owner or agent of an Owner who intends to undertake repair work of 
such damage pursuant to this Section must first submit plans to the ACC and obtain the 
approvals required as provided herein. 
VII. USE RESTRICTIONS 
1. Use of Common Areas. The Common Areas shall be used only in a manner 
consistent with their community nature and with the use restrictions applicable to Lots and 
Living Units. No admission fees, charges for use, leases, or other income-generating 
arrangement of any type shall be employed or entered into with respect to any portion of the 
Common Areas unless approved by the Declarant or voted upon and approved according to the 
procedures adapted for the approval of special assessments in Article V paragraph 4 and 5. 
2. Use of Lots and Living Units. All Lots other than commercial lots are to be 
improved with Living Units and are restricted to such use. Each residential Lot shall be 
improved with a Living Unit, each to be used only as a residence. Notwithstanding this, Owners 
are permitted to operate a home office/business as long as the same is not a retail business and is 
confined within the residence and does not create noise that could be heard by adjacent Owners. 
iBed and Breakfasts are also allowed. No residential Lot or Living Unit may be subdivided or 
used, occupied or altered in violation of law, so as to create a nuisance or interfere with the rights 
of any Owner or in a way w;hich would result in an increase in the cost of any insurance covering 
the Common Areas. Notwithstanding this, the restrictions in this paragraph shall not apply to 
Declarant, its successors and assigns in respect to the Declarant's planned development .of certain 
portions of lands as Commercial Lots, as is more fully described in paragraph 6 below. 
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3. Building Setbacks. The setback for buildings located in the development shall be: 
Front 50', Side 25', Backyard 120' when located on airstrip, otherwise 25'. Where the back lot 
line fronts on the airplane landing strip, no foliage may be planted or maintained whose height is 
in excess of 3 feet within the 120' safety zone. This paragraph shall not affect the power 
delegated to the Architectural Control Committee to grant variance to the setback requirements in 
appropriate circumstances. 
4. Minimum Square Footage. The minimum square footage requirements for any 
Living Unit shall be 1,500 square feet of finished interior feet on the ground level exclusive of 
garages, patios, balconies, decks or other semi-external space. Each Living Unit shall be 
improved with an attached or detached garage with a minimum square footage requirement of 
400 square feet of finished interior space. 
5. Fences. All fences throughout the community shall be three (3) rail double lodge 
pole pine fencing, at least 4' high or other fencing approved by the Architectural Control 
Committee. All fences shall be installed within six (6) months of purchase at the expense of the 
Owner. Thereafter, all fences shail be maintained (including weatherproofing) by the 
Association. Such maintenance includes annually oiling all posts and rails. It shall be cause for 
automatic dismissal from membership on the Board of Trustees of the Association for board 
members to fail to maintain the quality and condition of the fences as required by this paragraph. 
In the event the Owner fails to complete all or part of the fencing required by this paragraph, the 
Association may in its discretion, construct or cause to be constructed the fences required. The 
costs of said construction shall be assessed to the Owner of the Lot as provided for in Article V 
of these covenants. 
6. Non-Residential Lots. €xce^^^*!Wfie^W3rarrrt)r as otherwise^aJteaikkiteiP 
^Declaration, no part of the Property shall be used for any commercial, manufacturing, mercantile, 
storing, vending or other such non-residential purposes, with the exception that an Owner may 
siwe; buy and sell operational aircraft on his Lot or may operate a home based business or bed 
anOTWSEHBTin conformance with paragraph 2 above. Declarant, its successors or assigns may
 % 
us^A^PropSTfj^for a modellrcmresite display, and as a sales office during the construction and 
sales period, and conduct certain commercial operations on lands owned by it adjacent to the 
airstrip and in other locations in the development, including, but not limited to, fixed base 
o^efltlOTS for gas sales and refueling aircraft and purposes incident thereto, construction and sale 
OfJeasing^fraiTcraft storage and hangar space, scenic tour flights, lodging units, a convenience .„ 
sl&m^ud*$udi^tk&mbmintss operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate; provided,., 
however, thafranj^ swh commercial operations or activities conducted by the Declarant, its 
successors or assigns, shall in the view of the Declarant be consistent with, and shall not 
unreasonably interfere or restrict the Owners' beneficial use and enjoyment of their .Lots or the 
PropertyTasset' forth in this Declaration. Declarant, its successors or assigns have planned, an4 it 
is their intent to also develop, certain portions of land to be aimexedinto the Property as 
Commercial Lots.' 
7. Sign. Other than signs the Declarant determines are necessary in the commercial 
areas, or signs permitted in this paragraph, no sign or billboard of any kind shall be disDlayed to 
the public view on any portion of the Property or any Lot. This prohibition includes signs 
advertising the Property for sale or rent except signs used by Declarant, its successor or assigns, 
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to advertise the Property during the construction and sales period, provided that each Unit Owner 
shall be allowed to display no more than two (2) "for sale/' or "for rent" signs (which may 
include signs by the Owner's realtor) which may only be displayed in the unit windows or on the 
Owner's fence (or where there is no fence, on the owner's property) and said signs shall be no 
more than 24" x 36" in size. 
8. Quiet Enjoyment, No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon 
any Lot or any part of the Property, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be or may 
become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood, or which shall in any way interfere with 
the quiet enjoyment of each of the Owners of his respective Living Unit or which shall in any 
way increase the rate of insurance. Notwithstanding this, this paragraph shall not in any way 
limit or restrict the Declarant or its successors or assigns from constructing, developing and 
operating whatever commercial operations it deems desirable and appropriate in the FBO area 
and any other commercial areas, nor shall it restrict the use of the airstrip by jet or large aircraft, 
nor shall it restrict the use of fireworks. 
9. Temporary Structures, Equipment, Motor Vehicles. Etc. No structure of a 
temporary character, trailer, tent, shack, garage, barn or other out building shall be used on any 
Lot at any time as a residence, either temporarily or permanently, and no mobile home, trailer, 
camper, boat, truck larger than % tone, flat bed truck, aircraft or similar equipment or vehicle not. 
in running condition shall be permitted to be parked upon any Lot, except the Owner may park 
and occupy a mobile home or trailer on his Lot for the maximum period of one year while his 
Living Unit is under construction. The equipment and vehicles previously described may be 
parked within a garage, hangar or facility properly screened from the view of others and 
approved by the Architectural Control Committee. No motor vehicle whatsoever may be parked 
on any common street or driveways, but shall be kept in the parking area. An Owner may 
construct a hangar guest house subject to approval of the Architectural Control Committee, 
providing a main house pad is set aside for the future permanent residence. 
10. Animals. Horses or similar animals may be bred and/or raised on the individual 
Lots subject to approval of the Architectural Control Committee. Pigs are strictly prohibited. 
The allowable number of the foregoing animals shall not exceed three (3) animals per acre, 
Dogs, cats and other household pets may also be kept on the Lots. All large animals must be 
kept within a sturdy enclosure and are not allowed on the Common Areas unless they are under a 
means of adequate control. All household pets must be leashed while in the Common Areas, and 
Owners are responsible to clean up any waste deposits by their pets on the common areas or on 
the property of others. The reasonable cost to repair any damage caused by a pet of an Owner, 
his guest, or invitee, shall be an additional assessment upon the Unit pursuant to Article V of.this 
Declaration. This paragraph shall not apply to excluded lots as identified in any Supplemental 
Declaration or plat for any phase, where all animals^other than household pets are excluded. 
11. Weeds. Weeds are those noxious plants allowed to grow by the Owner and do not 
include those native plants now growing on the Lots and Property. Excessive weeds in the 
project decreases the property value of all Lots. The Owner is responsible for controlling and 
removing weeds growing on his Lot and removing tumbleweeds that accumulate on the inside of 
his fence. Tumbleweeds along fence lines in ihe from yard areas shall be removed by the 
Association at least once per month. Every quarter, and a( any additional times determined by 
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14. Electronic Antennas and Stove or Chimney Flues. No television, radio or other 
electronic antenna or device of any type (other than satellite dishes) shall be erected, constructed, 
placed or permitted to remain on any of the Living Units or structures on the Lots in said tract 
unless and until the same shall have been approved in writing by the Architectural Committee of 
the Association. No stove flue, chimney or other similar venting system shall be installed to the 
exterior of the Unit, nor shall any heating device be installed other than that provided with the 
Unit without the written approval of the Architectural Control Committee. 
15. Airstrip. The airstrip may be used by the Owner, his guests and invitees solely for 
the taxiing, take-off and landing of aircraft and for incidental purposes, including the buying and 
selling of operational aircraft, related thereto^Scheduled airline service is prohibited^ Undep©®^ 
circumstances shall anyonecause,any; aircraft or other vehicle to be parked or tied down on ajgj^  
.part of the airstrip or safety area. The Owner shall provide sufficient parking and tie down 
facilities on his Lot for all aircraft operated or used by Owner, his guests or invitees. 
Furthermore, any use of the airstrip shall be at the user's own risk and, each Owner, by his 
acceptance of a deed to a Unit, acknowledges and agrees that, Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. and 
its successors and assigns, shall not be responsible for and shall be indemnified and held 
harmless from any damages to person or property that are in any way connected with or result 
from use of the airstrip by the Owner or his invitee, including any damages or claims related lo 
any act, omission or negligence of Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., its agents, successors or 
assigns. 
16. Exception for Declarant. Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in this Article 
VII, for the ten-year period following the date of which this Second Restated, Supplementary' and 
Amended Declaration is filed for record in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington 
County, Utah, Declarant or its assigns or successor, shall have the right to use any Lot nr T IVMW 
^e any U>t or Living 
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Unit owned by it and any part of the Common Areas reasonably necessary or appropriate, 
including, but not limited to, a model or other temporary structure as a sales office, in furtherance 
of any construction, marketing, sales, management, promotional or other activities designed to 
accomplish or facilitate improvement of the Common Areas or improvement and/or sale of all 
Lots owned by Declarant. In addition, without being subject to any time limit, Declarant may 
also conduct collateral, commercial business activity in the Project, including, feflfTOrtbii^ to, 
cOTti^ fflflf*^ t^l*lTase operations^cn^as^afeffm^ 
piupMe*4pcid«l4fafeifttQM^ 
17. Obstruction of the Common Area, There shall be no obstruction of the Common 
Area. Nothing shall be stored, altered or constructed, or removed from the Common Area, except 
with the prior written consent of the Board of Trustees, 
.18. Swimming Pools, Hot Tubs and Tennis Courts. No above-ground or ground level 
swimming pools, lap pools, therapy pools, hot tubs, whirlpools, Jacuzzis or tennis courts shall be 
erected, constructed, placed or permitted to remain on any Unit without construction and erection 
of proper landscaping and privacy screening as determined by the Architectural Design Guidelines 
and approved by the ACC. 
19. Items Stored on Lots. No lumber, appliances, nonfunctional vehicles or other 
items, materials or supplies may be stored in the open on any lot except for the temporary storage 
of building or landscaping materials related to construction or installation of a home or 
landscaping. 
20. Landscaping to not Block Visibility. No landscaping or other item shall be 
located on any lot in such manner that it blocks the visibility necessary for safe operation of 
vehicles or airplanes at the intersection of roads or taxiways, or along said roads or taxiways. 
21. Use of Water. No Owner may make any use of water on his property that would 
affect the drainage or the flow of water or cause flooding across any adjacent properties. 
22. Waiver Incident to Proximity to Airstrip. Upon an Owner's purchase of a Lot 
adjacent to or near the airstrip, said Owner expressly waives any claim against the Declarant, the 
owner of the airstrip or the Association related to any harm to person or property resulting from ' 
the Owner's proximity to said airstrip, including but not limited to any claim related to noise, 
noxious fumes, or any other damage or harm to said Owner or his invitees. Furthermore, said 
^Owners acknowledge that they have chosen to be part of an airport community, and as suchrthey,^ # 
have waived any claim they otherwise may have had against use of the airstrip by aircraft?. 
including jet and large aircraft. 
V1IL ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
1. Architectural Control Committee, The Board of Trustees of the Association shall 
appoint a committee the function of which shall be to insure that all exteriors of Living Units and 
landscaping within the Property harmonize wiih exisiing surroundings and structures, The 
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m Committee need not be composed of Owners. If such a Committee is not appointed the Board 
^ itself shall perform the duties required of the Committee. 
^ 2. Submission to Committee. No Living Unit, accessory or addition to a Living 
H Unit, landscaping or other improvement of a Lot shall be constructed, maintained or 
m accomplished and no alteration, repainting or refurbishing of the exterior of any Living Unit shall 
^ be performed, unless complete plans and specifications therefor have first been submitted to and 
approved by the Architectural Control Committee. Potential purchasers of Lots may submit 
* plans and specifications for proposed improvements on a lot to the Committee. All of the 
$ provisions of this Article VIII shall apply to such a submission by a potential purchaser of a Lot. 
^ It shall be cause for automatic dismissal from membership on the Committee for Committee 
^ members to refuse consider such plans and specifications. 
^ 3. Standard. In deciding whether to approve or disapprove plans and specifications 
8^  submitted to it, the Committee shall use its best judgment to insure that all improvements, 
£ construction, landscaping and alterations on Lots within the Property conform to and harmonize 
with existing surroundings and structures. The Board may formulate general guidelines and 
procedures. The adopted guidelines and procedures shall be incorporated in the Book of 
Resolutions of the Association and the Architectural Control Committee, or the Board, as the 
§ case may be, shall act in accordance with such guidelines and procedures. 
i 
fe 4. - Approval Procedure. Any plans and specifications submitted to the Committee 
shall be approved or disapproved by it in writing within thirty (30) days after submission. In the 
event the Committee fails to take any action within such period it shall be deemed to have 
; b, approved the material submitted. 
* . . . 
fe 5. Request for Reconsideration. An applicant may request reconsideration of a 
ruling of the ACC by submitting to the ACC written arguments for such reconsideration within 
l thirty (30) days of the date of receipt of the ACC's ruling. The ACC will give its final ruling by 
| answering the arguments and by confirming or modifying its ruling within thirty (30) days of 
k receipt of the applicant's written arguments. No fee is required to be submitted for 
reconsideration. Failure of the ACC to notify the applicant regarding the reconsideration within 
thirty (30) days of the date of submittal of the written arguments to the ACC shall be deemed 
* approval of the submittal. Final approvals by the ACC shall be valid for one (1) year from the 
| date of final approval and must be obtained prior to formal submission to Washington County for 
| a building permit. If a building permit is not issued within one (1) year after an Owner obtains an 
approval, the approval shall be void and an application for the proposed improvements) shall be 
resubmitted to and re-approved by the ACC. Verbal approvals shall not be effective approvals, 
and the ACC shall not be bound thereby. 
> 
) 6. Appeal to Board of Trustees. An applicant may appeal the final ruling of the 
, ACC by filing a petition of appeal, together with a written statement as to the ruling from which 
the appeal is taken, and the reasons in support of the applicant's appeal, with the Board of 
' Trustees of the Association. The Board of Trustees shall solicit a response from the ACC, which 
) response shall be filed by the ACC within twenty (20) days after notification reaches the ACC of 
I the need for such a response. The Board of Trustees may request such other and additional 
,/ information as it deems to be relevant, and shall thereupon make a final decision on the matter. 
COcKs 
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The Board shall make its decision within thirty (30) days of the filing of the petition of appeal, 
and their failure to do so shall be deemed an approval. 
7. Disclaimer of Liability. Neither the Architectural Committee, nor any member 
thereof acting in good faith shall be liable to the Association or to any Owner for any damage, 
loss or prejudice suffered or claims on account of (a) the approval or rejection of, or the failure to 
approve or reject, any plans, drawings and specifications, (b) the construction or performance of 
any work, whether or not pursuant to approved plans, drawings and specifications, (c) the 
development or manner of development of any of the Property, or (d) any engineering or other 
defect in approved plans and specifications. 
8. Nonwaiver. The approval by the Architectural Committee of any plans and 
specifications for any work done or proposed shall not constitute a waiver of any right of ihe 
Architectural Committee to disapprove any similar plans and specifications. 
9. Completion of Construction. Once begun, any improvements, construction, 
landscaping or alterations approved by the Architectural Committee shall be diligently 
prosecuted to completion in strict accordance with the plans and specifications approved by the 
Architectural Committee. If reasonably necessary to enable such improvements, construction, 
landscaping or alternation, the person or persons carrying out the same shall be entitled to 
temporarily use and occupy unimproved portions of the Common Areas in the vicinity of the 
activity. 
10. Indemnification by Owner. Each Owner, as a condition of obtaining any approval 
under the Development Guidelines, agrees to fully indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless 
the Declarant, the owner of the airstrip, the Board of Trustees, the Association, the ACQ and any 
Member or designated representatives thereof, against and from any and all claims, liabilities, 
lawsuits and disputes related in any way to any approval and/or approved or disapproved 
improvement. 
11. Exception for Declarant. The foregoing provisions of this Article VIII shall not 
apply to any improvements, construction, landscaping or alteration which is carried out by 
Declarant on any Lot or on any part of the Common Areas and which occurs at any time during 
the ten year period following the date on which this Second Restated, Supplementary Amended 
Declaration is filed for record in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah 
or during such time as the Declarant has Class B voting rights, whichever is longer. Declarants 
shall further have the right without being subject to any time limit to designate the location and 
dwigffDf any Common Area amenities including recreational amenities or green areas, provided 
thaTffiirDe^^^ 
12. Declarant's Obligation. Declarant LereHy covefraiTCrtn-fever-of each Owner that 
^*hTipit^erifOTt'Of the Common Areas accomplished by it shall be architecturally compatible 
•wit 
13. Declarant's Attendance at ACC and Board Meetings. The Architectural Control 
Committee and the Board of Trustees shall provide the Declarant with timely notice (the same 
notice as that given to members of their respective bodies) of all of their meetings, and the 
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% Declarant and any member who desires to do so shall be entitled to attend and participate and 
make comments in said meetings. The Architectural Control Committee and the Board of 
Trustees shall also provide the Declarant with copies of all minules of their meetings and shall 
make such minules available to all members upon request. 
IX. CONDEMNATION 
If at any time or times the Common Areas or any part thereof shall be taken or 
^ condemned by any authority having the power of eminent domain, all compensation and damages 
§ " shall be payable to the Association and shall be used promptly by the Association to the extent 
|> necessary for restoring or replacing any improvements on the remainder of the Common Areas. 
* Upon completion of such work and payment in full therefor, any proceeds of condemnalion (hen 
or thereafter in the hands of the Association which are proceeds for the taking of any porlion of 
* the Common Areas shall be disposed of in such manner as the members by majority vote and 
I (during the 15 year period following the dale on which (his Second Restated, Supplementary 
| Amended Declaration is filed for the record in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington 
County, Utah) the Declarant shall reasonably determine; provided, however, that in the event of a 
taking in which any Lot is eliminated, the Association shall disburse the portion of the proceeds 
of the condemnation award allocable to the interest of the Owner of such Lot to such Owner and 
\ any first Mortgagee of such Lot, as their interests shall appear, after deducting the proportionate 
\ share of said Lot for the cost of debris removal. 
> 
) 
I Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Declaration, the following provisions 
) concerning the rights of first Mortgagees shall be in effect: 
X. RIGHTS OF FIRST MORTGAGEES 
L Preservation of Regulatory Structure and Insurance, Unless the holders of 100% of 
all first Mortgagees and 75% each of Classes A and C of the Lot Owners shall have given their 
prior written approval, the Association shall not be entitled; 
(a) by act or omission to change, waive or abandon any scheme of regulations, or 
enforcement thereof, pertaining to the Architectural design of the exterior appearance of 
Living Units, the exterior maintenance of Living Units under those certain conditions 
provided in Section 2 of Article VI, or the upkeep of the Common Areas of the Property; 
(b) to fail to maintain fire and extended coverage on insurable portions of the 
Common Areas on a current replacement cost basis in an amount not less than one 
hundred percent (100%) of the insurable value (based on current replacement costs); or 
(c) to use hazard insurance proceeds for losses to the Common Areas for other than 
the repair, replacement or reconstruction of improvements on the Common Areas. 
2. Preservation of Common Areas; Change in Method of Assessment, Unless the 
Association shall receive the prior written approval of (l)at least 100% of aJ) first Mortgagees 
(based on one vote for each Mortgagee) of the Lots and (2) the Owners of at least seventy-five 
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percent (75%) of the Lots in each of Classes A and C (not including Lots owned by Declarant) 
the Association shall not be entitled: 
(a) . by act or omission to seek to abandon, partition, subdivide, encumber, sell or 
transfer the Common Areas, except to grant easements for utilities and similar or related 
purposes, as herein elsewhere reserved; or 
(b) to change the ratio or method of determining the obligations, assessments, due or 
other charges which may be levied against a Lot or the Owrner thereof. 
3. Notice of Matters Affecting Security, The Association shall give written notice to 
any first Mortgagee of a Lot requesting such notice wherever: 
(a) there is any default by the Owner of the Lot subject to the first Mortgage in 
performance of any obligation under this Declaration or the Articles or Bylaws of the 
Association which is not cured within thirty (30) days after default occurs; or 
(b) there occurs any substantial damage to or destruction of any Living Unit or any part 
of the Common Areas involving an amount in excess of, or reasonably estimated to be in 
excess of $15,000.00. Said notice shall be given within ten (10) days after the Association 
learns of such damage or destruction; or 
(c) there is any condemnation proceedings or proposed acquisitions of a Living Unit or 
of any portion of the Common Areas within ten (10) days after the Association learns of the 
same; or 
(d) any of the following matters come up for consideration or effectuation by the 
Association; 
(i) abandonment or termination of the Planned Unit Development established by 
this Declaration; 
(ii) material amendment of the Declaration or the Articles or Bylaws of the 
Association; or 
(iii) any decision to terminate professional management of the Common Areas 
and assume self-management by the Owners. 
4. Notice of Meetings. The Association shall give to any first Mortgagee of a Lot 
requesting the same, notice of all meetings of the Association; and such first Mortgagee shall 
have the right to designate in writing a representative to attend all such meetings. 
5. Right to Examine Association Records. The Declarant, each individual member 
.and any first Mortgagee shall have the right to examine the books, records and audit financial 
statements of the Association, and to obtain copies of any documents they wish. The Association 
may charge u fee of fiOin 1G£ to 25<3 for the copies. Requests for copies shall be fully responded 
to by the Association no later than two weeks after the request is made. 
CC&Rs 
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6. Right to Pay Taxes and Charges. First Mortgagees may, jointly or singly, pay taxes 
or other charges which are in default and which may or have become a charge against any portion 
of the Common Areas and may pay overdue premiums on hazard insurance policies, or secure 
new hazard insurance coverage on the lapse of a policy, for the Common Areas; and first 
Mortgagees making such payments shall be owed immediate reimbursement therefor from the 
Association. Declarant, for the Association as owner of the Common Areas, hereby covenants 
and the Association by acceptance of the conveyance of the Common Areas, whether or not it 
shall be so expressed in such conveyance, is deemed to covenant and agree to make such 
reimbursement. 
H 7. Exemption from any First Right of Refusal. Any first Mortgagee and any purchaser 
therefrom who obtains title to the Lot pursuant to the remedies provided in the first Mortgage, or 
^ by foreclosure of the first Mortgage, or by deed or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, or by sale 
§ pursuant to any power of sale or otherwise, shall be exempt from any "right of first refusal" 
B which would otherwise affect the Lot. 
8. Rights Upon Foreclosure of Mortgage. Each holder of a first Mortgage (or deed of 
* trust) on a Lot and any purchaser from it who comes into possession of the Lot by virtue of 
I foreclosures of the Mortgage, or by deed or assignment in lieu of foreclosure, or pursuant to 
| power of sale or otherwise will take the Lot free of and shall not be liable for, any claims for 
I unpaid assessment and charges against the Lot which accrue prior to the time such holder comes 
into possession of the Lot. 
^ 9. Restrictions Without Approval of Mortgagees. Except as to the Association's right 
| to grant easements for utilities and similar or related purposes, the Development's Common 
I Areas may not be alienated, released, transferred, hypothecated or otherwise encumbered without 
the approval of all holders of first Mortgage liens on the Lots. 
) 10. Mortgagees Rights Concerning Amendments, Except as concerns the right of 
) Declarant to amend the Declaration and related documents as contained in Article XII of the 
. Declaration, no material amendment to the Declaration, Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Association shall be accomplished or effective unless at least 100% of the Mortgagees 
(based on one vote for each Mortgagee) of the individual Lots have given their prior written 
I approval to such amendment. 
11. Exception for Declarant. None of the provisions in this article shall in any way 
restrict the Declarant from pursuing any act which he has the power to do under this Declaration. 
XI. ANNEXATION OF ADDITIONAL LAND 
1. Annexation by Declarant. Declarant may expand the Property subject to this * 
Declaration by the annexation of additional land for Common Areas or for subdivision into •*• 
additional residential, hangar and commercial Lots. The annexation of such land shall become^ 
effective upon the recordation in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington Cnnnfv, IJfah, 
of a Supplementary Declaration which (i) describes the land to be annexed or incorporated by-
reference to the description of the additional land, (ii) declares that the annexed land is to be 
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held, sold, conveyed, encumbered, leased, occupied and improved as part of the Property subject 
to the Declaration, (iii) sets forth such additional limitations, restrictions, covenants and 
conditions as are applicable to the annexed land, and (iv) states when such annexation becomes 
applicable to the annexed land. When such annexation becomes effective, the annexed land shall 
become part of the Property. Such annexation may be accomplished in one or more annexations 
without limitations as to size or location. 
2. Limitation on Annexation. Declarant's right to annex said land to the Property shall 
be subject to the following limitations, conditions and right granted to the Declarant: 
(a) ^ a ^ w ^ i ^ h 
.residential Lots, or 106 residential UruLsinihe,addit4Md^i®p^rt5^^^#h^^toiii*IL 
However, ,there.is-no restriction regarding the numbejkO^haEgaOjnd.commercial units 
^allowed. 
(b) Declarant's right to annex land to the Property shall expire ten (10) years after this 
Second Restated Supplementary and Amended Declaration is filed for record in the Office of 
the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah. 
(c) Additional Living Units when constructed shall be compatible with existing 
structures on the Property, provided that such determination shall be made in the discretion of 
Declarant (with respect to Living Units or Common Area improvements built by Declarant or 
their assigns), or as approved by the Architectural Control Committee for those units and 
common areas not built by Declarant. 
(d) The configuration of annexed land as to Lot size, Common Areas and the nature, 
quantity or quality of improvements shall be in discretion of the Declarant or its assigns. No 
assurances can therefore be given. 
(e) Declarant reserves unto itself and its assigns the right to create limited Common 
Areas and facilities within any portion of the annexed land. No assurances can therefore be 
made with respect to such items. 
3. Supplementary Declaration. The annexation authorized under the foregoing section 
shall be made by filing of record a Supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions or similar instrument, with respect to the additional Property which shall extend the 
plan of this Declaration to such Property, 
Such Supplementary Declaration contemplated above may contain such complimentary 
additions and modifications of the covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in this 
Declaration as may be necessary to reflect the different character, if any, of the added Property 
and as' are not inconsistent with the plan of the Declaration. 
The recordation of such Supplementary Declaration shall constitute and effectuate the 
annexation of the said real property described therein, making said real property subject to this 
Declaration and subject to the functions, powers and jurisdiction of the Association and 
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fi thereafter all of the Owners of Lots in said real property shall automatically be Members of the 
f Association. Such owners of Lots in additional phases shall be entitled to vote and to exercise all 
of the privileges and assume all of the responsibilities as other members of the Association. 
$ 4. Declarant's Right to Amend. Until the right to enlarge the Development through 
$ the addition of tracts or subdivisions terminates, Declarant shall have, and is hereby vested with, 
H the right to unilaterally amend the Declaration as may be reasonably necessary or desirable: (i) to 
adjust the boundaries of the Units, including adding or deleting Common Areas (by filing an 
* appropriate amended plat) to accommodate design changes or changes in type of Dwellings or 
I adjustments to Unit configuration; (ii) to more accurately express the intent of any provisions of 
| the Declaration in the light of then existing circumstances or information; (iii) to better insure, in 
H light of then existing circumstances or information, workability of the arrangement which is • 
contemplated by the Declaration; or (iv) to facilitate the practical, technical, administrative or 
' functional integration of any additional tract or subdivision into the Development. 
£ 5. Expansion of Definitions. In the event the Property is expanded, the definitions 
I used in this Declaration automatically shall be expanded to encompass and refer to the Property 
as so expanded. Eg., "Property" shall mean the real property described in Article II of this 
Declaration plus any additional real property added by a Supplementary Declaration or by 
I Supplementary Declarations, and reference to this Declaration shall mean this Declaration as so 
I supplemented. 
) 1. Notices. Any notice required or permitted to be given to any Owner under the 
| provisions of this Declaration shall have deemed to have been properly furnished if delivered or 
I mailed, postage prepaid, to the person named as the Owner, at the latest address for such person 
as reflected in the records of the .Association at the time of delivery or at an address where it is 
' known that the Owner will be reached. The Association shall annually update its records of 
) Owner addresses, and provide a list of the same to each member. In addition, the Association 
) shall bear the responsibility of diligently updating its records of Owner addresses whenever it 
i receives changes in address from owners, or when it otherwise learns that an Owner has 
undergone a change of address and the new address is known or readily ascertainable. 
Notwithstanding any provision in this Declaration to the contrary, lack of any required notice by 
) the Association shall not be excused where the correct address of the owner is readily 
) ascertainable. Any notice required or permitted to be given to the Architectural Control 
j Committee may be given by delivering or mailing the same to the Chairman or any member of 
such committee. 
XII. MISCELLANEOUS 
2. Rules and Regulation. The Association shall have authority to promulgate and 
) enforce such reasonable rules, regulations and procedures as may be necessary or desirable to aid 
the Association in carrying out any of its functions or to insure that (he Property is maintained 
and used in a manner consistent with the interests of the Owners. During the 15 year period 
following the date on which this Second Restated, Supplementary Amended Declaration is filed 
for the record in the Office of the County Recorder of Washington County. Utah, or during the 
time that the Declarant continues to possess Class B voting rights, whichever is longer, the 
Declarant shall have the right to unconditionally veto any such rules or regulations promulgated 
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by the Association. Irrespective of any time period, no rules promulgated by the Association 
shall be inconsistent with these CC&Rs, or any airstrip rules promulgated by the airstrip owner. 
If any Association rules conflict with any rules of the airstrip owner, the rules of the airstrip 
owner shall prevail. 
3. Amendment, Any amendment to this Declaration other than Declarant's unilateral 
right to amend which is discussed below shall require: (a) the affirmative written vote of at least 
two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A and C membership votes which Members are entitled to cast at a 
meeting duly called for such purpose; (b) so long as the Class B membership exists the written 
consent of Declarant; and (c) for material amendments, the written approval of 100% of the 
mortgagees as required by Article X, section 10 of this Declaration. Written notice setting forth 
the purpose of the meeting and the substance of the amendment proposed shall be sent to all 
Members, and to mortgagees in the case of material amendments, at least ten (10) days but not 
more than thirty (30) days prior to the meeting date. The quorum required for any such meeting 
shall be as follows: At the first meeting called the presence of Members or of proxies entitled to 
cast sixty percent (60%) of all the votes of the Class A and C membership shall constitute a 
quorum. If a quorum is not present at the first meeting, another meeting shall be called (subject 
to the notice requirement set forth in the foregoing portion of this Section 3), at which a quorum 
shall be one-half (1/2) of the quorum which was required at the immediately preceding meeting. 
No further reduction in the number to achieve a quorum shall occur by the calling of subsequent 
meetings. No.subsequent meeting shall be held more than forty-five (45) days following the 
immediately preceding meeting. Any amendment authorized pursuant to this Section shall be 
accomplished through the recordation of an instrument executed by the Association (and by the 
Declarant if the Class B membership then exists). In such instrument an officer or director of the 
Association shall certify that the vote required by this Section for amendment has occurred. 
Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, until eighty percent (80%) of the Lots 
in the Development (including proposed lots in additional phases, or in other words. 80% of the 
contemplated 150 lots in the development) have been sold to purchasers, Declarant shaii have, 
and is hereby vested with the right to unilaterally amend this Declaration as may be reasonably 
necessary or desirable; (a) to adjust the boundaries of the Units, including adding or deleting 
Common Areas (by filing an appropriate amended plat) to accommodate design changes or 
changes in type of Dwellings or adjustments to Unit configuration, (b) to more accurately express 
the intent of any provision of this Declaration, in light of then existing circumstances, 
information or Mortgagee requirements, (c) to better insure, in light of then existing 
circumstances or information, workability of the arrangement which is contemplated by this 
Declaration or (d) to facilitate the practical, technical, administrative or functional integration of 
any additional tract or subdivision into the Development. 
4. Consent in Lieu of Vote. In any case in which this Declaration requires for 
authorization or approval of a transaction the assent or affirmative vote of a stated percentage of 
the votes present or represented at a meeting, such requirement may be fully satisfied by 
obtaining, with or without a meeting, consents in writing to such transaction from Members 
entitled to cast at least the stated percentage of all membership votes outstanding in connection 
with the class of membership concerned. The following additional provisions shall govern any 
aDDlication of this Section 4; 
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(a) All necessary consents must be obtained prior to the expiration of ninety (90) days 
after the first consent is given by any Member, 
(b) -The total number of votes required for authorization or approval under this Section 
4 shall be determined as of the date on which the last consent is signed. 
(c) Except as provided in the following sentence, any change in ownership of a Lot 
which occurs after consent has been obtained from the Owners thereof shall not be 
considered or taken into account for any purpose. A change in ownership which would 
otherwise result in an increase in the total number of Class A and C votes outstanding shall, 
however, be effective in that regard and shall entitle the new Owner to give or withhold his 
consent. 
(d) Unless the consent of all Members whose memberships are appurtenant to the same 
Lot are secured, the consent of none of such Members shall be effective. 
5. Reserve Fund. The Association shall establish adequate reserve to cover the cost 
of reasonably predictable and necessary major repairs and replacements of the Common Areas 
and exterior maintenance and shall cause such reserve to be funded by regular monthly or other 
periodic assessments against the Lot Owners rather than by special assessments. Special 
assessments for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any construction 
(including new.construction), reconstruction, repair or replacement of any capital improvement 
upon the Common Area, including fixtures and personal property related thereto on any phase of 
the Project, will be allowed only after the reserve fund has been expended and not replenished. 
6. Lease Provisions. Any Owner may lease his Lot or Living Unit, provided, 
however, that any lease agreement between a Lot Owner and the Lessee must be in writing 
Short term vacation rentals are allowed. Any damage to the Common Area and exteriors of the 
buildings caused by the lessee or guests of the lessee shall be the responsibility of the Owner and 
said Owner shall be subject to an additional assessment upon the Unit pursuant to Article V of 
this Declaration. All leases must provide interalia, that: 
(a) The terms of the Lease shall in all respects be subject to the provisions of the 
Declaration, Articles of Incorporation of the Association and the Bylaws; and 
(b) Any failure of the Lessee to comply with the terms of such documents shall constitute 
a default under the Lease, 
7. Purchase of Airstrip. The Association expressly reserves the right to purchase or 
otherwise accept fee ownership of the airstrip from Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc., its successors 
or assigns at some future date. 
8. Declarant's Rights Assignable. All or any portion of the rights of Declarant under 
this Declaration or in any way relating to the Property may be assigned. 
9. Interpretation, The captions which precede the Articles and Sections of this 
Declaration are for convenience only and shall in no way affect the manner in which any 
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provision hereof is construed. Whenever the context so requires, the singular shall include the 
plural, the plural shall include the singular, the whole shall include any part thereof, and any 
gender shall include both genders. The invalidity or unenforceability of any portion of this 
Declaration shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder hereof. 
10. Covenants to Run With Land. This Declaration and all the provisions hereof shall 
constitute covenants to run with the land or equitable servitudes, as the case may be, and shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of Declarant and all parties who hereafter acquire any 
interest in a Lot or in the Common Areas. All parties who hereafter acquire any interest in a Lot 
or in the Common Areas shall be subject to the terms of this Declaration and the. provisions of 
any rules, regulations, agreements, instruments and determinations contemplated by this 
Declaration. By acquiring any interest in a Lot or in the Common Areas, the party acquiring such 
interest consents to, and agrees to be bound by, each and every provision of this Declaration. 
11. Enforcement. The Association, or the Declarant or its successors in interest, or any 
Owner, shall have the right to sue for damages, or to enforce by any proceeding injunctive or 
otherwise, at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and charges 
now or hereafter imposed or contemplated by the provisions of this Second Restated Supplementary 
and Amended Declaration. Specifically, the aggrieved party may seek to recover damages and/or 
injunctive relief. Failure by the Association to enforce any covenant or restriction herein contained 
shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. The prevailing party to any 
action brought to enforce the terms of this Declaration or any supplements or amendments thereto 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
12. Effective Date and Duration. This Second Restated, Supplementary and Amended 
Declaration and any amendment hereof shall take effect upon its being filed for record in the Office 
of the County Recorder of Washington County, Utah and shall continue for a term of thirty (30) 
years thereafter, after which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive 
periods of ten (10) years. 
13. Conflicts. In case of any conflict between this Second Restated Supplementary and 
Amended Declaration, as the same may be amended from time to time, and the Articles of 
Incorporation and the Bylaws of the Association, as they may be amended from time to time, the 
provisions of this Second Restated Supplementary and Amended Declaration shall be controlling. 
EXECUTED the day and year first above written. 
SKY RANCH DEVELOPMENT, INC. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
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EXHIBIT A 
The following properties and the legal descriptions as described on the Subdivision Plats 
recorded in the Office of the Washington County Recorder, State of Utah: 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PHASE 2 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PHASE 3 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PHASE 4 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PHASE 5A 
GRASSY MEADOWS SKY RANCH PHASE 5C and the amended supplemental 
declaration recorded May 17,2002, in Book 1466, at Page 227, as Entry No. 765422 
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EXHIBIT B 
Any and all property that may be annexed into the Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch, a 
Planned Development, located within Sections 28 and 33, Township 42 South, Range 13 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch 
Total Votes 
The Sky Ranch Airport votes are tallied as follows according to the Official County 
•Records in Washington County, State of Utah October 24,2002. 
Phase 1 17 Class A 4 Class C 
Phase 11 22 Class A 
Phase HI 8 Class A 
Phase IV 14 Class A 
Phase VA 5 Class A 45 Class B 3.5-ClassC 
Phase VC 143 Class B 3.5 Class C 
CU1-3' 15 Class B 
Total 66 Class A 203 Class B 11 Class C 
The declarant gets 2.5 votes for every non-taxi way residential lot in Phase VA. The 
declarant also receives 5 voles for every taxiway access residential lot. The declarant 
received 5 votes for every commercial hangar unit in Phase VC. The declarant receives 
2.5 votes for every 5 units in Phase VC other than those subject by purchase contract. 
These votes are as Class B votes. 
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